re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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Thread on Bakhmut. Before talking about the tactical situation, it is important to put it in the strategic context. Ukraine conducted successful offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson after heavy Russian military attrition during the Battle of the Donbas left its lines vulnerable.

Russia's successful withdrawal from the right bank of Kherson and mobilization helped stabilize the lines and stopped Ukraine's advance to Kreminna. In order to make further serious gains, Ukraine went on the defense to buy time to form new units/train on NATO equipment.

The battle in Bakhmut began more than 6 months ago, but became a focus over the winter as both sides redeployed forces to Bakhmut from Kherson. Bakhmut thereby acquired a degree of political significance on both sides.

Russia began its winter offensive in late January. Russian forces have attempted to advance in several parts of the front while making minimal gains. In some areas like Vuhledar, Russian forces have suffered far heavier losses than Ukrainian forces.

Russia has also sustained heavy losses in Bakhmut, but the ratio of losses shifted as Russia took the flanks (which sit on high ground), beginning with the southern flank in January and the northern flank in mid/late-February including Yahidne on the 25th.

Although the center of Bakhmut has strong buildings and factories, the flanks are composed of houses without basements. Once they're targeted, they're no longer useful as fighting positions. Russian advances on the flanks put the main resupply routes within direct-fire range.

Newly mobilized soldiers are being sent to Bakhmut as combat replacements and the units don't have enough time to train them properly. There is a trade-off between sending mobilized soldiers to the front or to new units preparing for the spring offensive.

Ukrainian soldiers in Bakhmut: ‘Our troops are not being protected’
But multiple defenders of this embattled city in Donetsk Oblast feel that they are in a similar boat, according to interviews with more than a dozen soldiers currently fighting in or around Bakhmut.

Although there was a 3-week period in which Russian artillery fire was reduced, it increased at the end of February as the 106th Airborne Division played a greater role, which coincided with greater Wagner-VDV cooperation. Russia has a substantial artillery advantage in Bakhmut.

Wagner commanders are given greater discretion and flexibility to fight as they see fit and to find/exploit weak points (TDF units are often deliberately targeted). Some Wagner units operate at night while others only during the day. Wagner convicts are not allowed to retreat.

Bakhmut matters to Russia because its stated goal is to seize all of the Donbas, but Russian forces are struggling to advance towards Kramatorsk-Slovyansk from the other directions. It has also been key to Ukraine’s defense of the rest of the Donbas.

Ukraine is prioritizing forming and training new units in three army corps for its spring offensive while trying to hold the entirety of the front line. But those are competing priorities, and Ukraine is deliberately holding back reserves. economist.com/zaluzhny-trans…

This may give the impression that Ukraine is losing, but, in reality, Ukraine is not committing all of its resources to the front. Ukraine has a better chance of achieving another significant breakthrough this spring than Russia does during its current offensive.

Russia is dependent on a small number of elite units for their assaults (e.g. naval infantry, VDV, Wagner professionals), but they can grind their way to slow, costly victories by employing greater forces and artillery. An attritional fight is not in Ukraine’s interests.

Until its offensive, Ukraine's best strategy is to pick battles where it can achieve a favorable ratio of attrition and expend fewer munitions, which could weaken Russian forces' ability to defend without significantly sapping Ukraine's offensive potential in the coming months.

Although the attrition ratio in Bakhmut has been advantageous for the duration of the battle, the ratio is much less favorable now with Ru forces holding high ground on the city's flanks. Much of Russia's losses are prisoners of less military value than Ukrainian soldiers.

In contrast, in Vuhledar, the share of Russian casualties from elite units is higher than in Bakhmut, and it isn't clear if Wagner's use of convicts would be as effective in a less urban setting.

The upcoming Ukrainian offensive will be strategically critical and potentially decisive. Western aid, including ammunition, will likely peak this spring and summer, and it will take years before increases in artillery production capacity can be achieved.

Ukraine will not have air superiority, will face stronger Russian defenses than it did in Kharkiv, and will likely only be able to achieve localized superiority in artillery fire and forces. To gives its offensive the best chance for success, Kyiv needs to husband its resources.

There is no risk-free option for Ukraine. Retrograde operations are dangerous, withdrawing from Bakhmut could lead to more pressure on Siversk or elsewhere, and there is no guarantee Ukraine would be able to retake the city later if it withdraws.

But there is a risk that, by committing the necessary forces to continue holding Bakhmut (where its attrition ratio isn't favorable), Ukraine will sap some of the forces available for its strategically more important spring offensive.

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Mykhailo Fedorov, the 32-year-old deputy prime minister responsible for both Ukraine’s drone programme and its digital transformation, says the turning-point may be coming faster than people think. A number of changes are about to make a big impact, he says. The army has completed a big restructuring, establishing 60 new attack-drone squadrons, at least one in every brigade, with separate staff and commanders. This is the first reform of its kind anywhere in the world. Ukraine’s military doctrine has been updated to include (classified) guidelines on drone use. The defence ministry has created a new board to co-ordinate the work of drone producers. There has been a drive to deregulate: removing import and certification barriers. And this month is marked by the launch of a new military “cluster” venture designed to link Ukrainian military tech with international companies and capital.

A defence-industry insider, speaking on condition of anonymity, confirms that the army is due to gain “significant and high-tech capacity” in the coming weeks and months. That said, it will still struggle against the Russians, he cautions. Their own Iranian-designed drones have tormented Ukrainian cities since the start of winter. The war is also testing drone technologies as never before: over a large, contested airspace and against sophisticated electronic-warfare systems.

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But though Ukraine may have proved the concept, it is another thing to scale it up. Ukraine’s strike-drone programme still appears some way from achieving the production volumes it needs to rival Russia’s long-range strike capacity, says Seth Frantzman, the author of “Drone Wars”, which traces the use of uavs in combat. One problem is access to air-launched munitions, with America reluctant to provide weapons that could reach deep inside Russia. Improvised devices and ingenuity can only go so far, though the Ukrainians are certainly trying.

Another major bottleneck is engine production, especially the petrol engines (as opposed to electric motors) needed to power strike drones over large distances. Only a limited number of manufacturers in the world can produce them and Ukraine is competing to buy from the same markets as its enemy. “We really sense the presence of the other party here,” says Mr Fedorov, the deputy prime minister

A drone manufacturer working out of a heavily guarded factory in the suburbs of one Ukrainian city says that Russia’s authoritarian nature has given it a head start in strike capability, and that Ukraine is obliged to play catch-up. “Sanctions mean they will start to run out of parts faster than we do,” he said. “But we shouldn’t kid ourselves. They activated their production lines far faster than we did.”

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Listen to Ukrainian military officers, like I was able to do during a research trip to Kyiv and the Donbas this month, and a different picture emerges. Not the tank, but it’s less glamorous cousin—the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV)—was at the top of its weapons wish list. “We need everything, but IFVs are probably the most urgent need we have,” an officer in a Ukrainian mechanized brigade messaged me last week.

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The article goes on to talk about how NATO IFVs such as Bradleys and CV-90s will help Ukraine.

For reference, Franz-Stefan Gady went on the same recent trip to Ukraine as Michael Kofman, Konrad Muzyka and Rob Lee. I think it's important, when reading them, to realize that these guys saw the same things.

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I understand that prison (and I can only begin to imagine a Russian prison) is its own ecosystem with its own rules, written and unwritten. But that's some crazy mental gymnastics and justification. These people at the bottom of the Russian prison hierarchy are so bad, that you cannot even come into contact with them, or even their possessions, or you will be an outcast and forced to be one of the "lowers"...unless you're fricking them. Then it's cool.

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