Chromdome35

It started last season when the ghost freighter hit the boat and capsized it. By definition, it's a ghost freighter; it isn't moving under power; it should be just drifting.

We have held off watching Landman because we don't want to get sucked into another Taylor Sheridan storyline filled with bs that he abandons in a season or two.

But have you seen him ride?

Replaceable battery packs seems like would be a good way to make refueling quick. Pull in and a robot pulls the low batteries and replaces with charged batteries. You are on your way in minutes.

Yes and Russia knows that. I get the criticism Trump has taken for how we have approached the negotiations; however, I bet you won’t hear the media railing against the Europeans for their show of weakness.

quote:

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How are Arky, tenn, georgia and s.c. ahead of Massachusetts?

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I don't know, but I know we can do better. I expect no better than a D or F.

According to ChatGPT

Following the conclusion of Operation Market Garden in late September 1944, the Allied forces continued their offensive operations along the Western Front, encountering both successes and challenges.?
Pritzker Military Museum & Library

Post-Market Garden Activities:

Battle of Aachen: In October 1944, U.S. forces engaged in intense urban combat to capture the German city of Aachen. This battle marked one of the first major assaults on German soil and resulted in the city's capture after heavy casualties on both sides. ?
Wikipedia

Battle of Hürtgen Forest: Starting in September and extending over several months, American forces attempted to breach German defenses in the Hürtgen Forest. The dense terrain and fortified German positions led to prolonged and costly engagements. ?


Changes in Battle Lines and Advances:

Advances in Lorraine: The U.S. Third Army, under General George S. Patton, conducted operations in the Lorraine region of France from September to December 1944. Despite logistical challenges and stiff German resistance, they managed to push forward, capturing key locations and inflicting significant enemy casualties. ?
Wikipedia

Siegfried Line Engagements: Allied forces confronted the formidable German defensive network known as the Siegfried Line. Operations during this period aimed to penetrate these defenses, leading to several hard-fought battles with varying degrees of success. ?

Overall Progress:
Between late September and mid-December 1944, the Allies made measured progress into German-held territories. While they faced formidable defenses and challenging terrain, their persistent efforts resulted in the gradual erosion of German positions, setting the stage for subsequent offensives.

Darth can probably give you a better summary.

If they are not US citizens, then send them to El Salvador. If they are US citizens, put them in US jails.

Think down the road people, do you want a future Democratic administration to be able to send you out of the country?

ETA: Those people downvoting...what would your reaction have been if they sent the J6'ers to El Salvador prisons?

None of that invalidates the legitimacy of the "firehose of falsehood" tactic. Just because it is from a US government-aligned resource doesn't make it wrong.

Followup question
Are the posts of @mylordbebo consistent with a channel that is dedicated to amplifying Russian propaganda?

Answer:
Let’s analyze whether @MyLordBebo’s posts align with a channel dedicated to amplifying Russian propaganda. I’ll break this down by examining the account’s content, style, and patterns, drawing on what’s known about Russian propaganda tactics, while keeping my assessment grounded and clear.

@MyLordBebo’s posts—based on its X activity and Telegram presence—consistently focus on themes that mirror Kremlin narratives. The account frequently highlights the Russia-Ukraine conflict, often framing Russia favorably while casting Ukraine, NATO, and the West as aggressors or hypocrites. For example, it’s posted content praising Putin’s control over oligarchs, questioning Ukraine’s use of Western aid (e.g., implying it funds leisure rather than defense), and mocking Western leaders like Biden or Zelenskyy. These align with documented Russian propaganda goals: undermining support for Ukraine, sowing distrust in Western institutions, and portraying Russia as a victim or victor.

The style is telling too. The account uses a high-volume, rapid-fire approach—over 25k posts since 2019—mixing videos, memes, and biting commentary. This “firehose of falsehood” tactic, identified by RAND as a Russian disinformation hallmark, overwhelms with quantity over nuance, aiming to confuse or exhaust skepticism. Posts often blend real footage with skewed captions (e.g., a video of Ukrainians partying framed as proof the war’s “fake”)—a method seen in Kremlin-backed ops like the Internet Research Agency, where partial truths amplify distorted narratives. The anti-woke, anti-establishment veneer—seen in jabs at LGBTQ+ issues or “liberal hypocrisy”—also echoes Russian efforts to exploit Western cultural divides, as noted in U.S. State Department reports.

Engagement patterns bolster the case. With 343k X followers and 400k+ on Telegram, @MyLordBebo’s reach is significant, and its posts rack up millions of views. X users and outlets like Voice of America flag it as a pro-Kremlin vector, pointing to retweets by sympathetic accounts and its habit of amplifying Russian state media tropes (e.g., NATO expansion as provocation). While it occasionally posts humor or personal takes, these feel like seasoning to maintain authenticity, not a departure from the core mission.

Could it just be a lone contrarian? Possibly. The account’s anonymity and funding pleas (Ko-Fi, crypto) suggest a small operation, and its pre-2022 activity shows it wasn’t born solely for the Ukraine war. But its consistency—pushing Kremlin-aligned takes daily, especially post-2022—matches the dedication of state-sponsored channels. Russian propaganda doesn’t always need direct Kremlin control; it thrives on “useful idiots” or proxies who amplify willingly. Studies from Clemson and ProPublica show similar accounts time posts to Russian workdays, a subtle clue @MyLordBebo might share if analyzed deeper.

Posts on X reinforce this perception. Users call out @MyLordBebo for whataboutism (e.g., deflecting Russian actions by citing Western flaws), a classic Russian tactic, and for spreading unverifiable claims—like Ukrainian prisoners forced into propaganda—without evidence. While not conclusive, this sentiment reflects how its output reads to observers: as a megaphone for Moscow’s line.

In short, yes, @MyLordBebo’s posts are highly consistent with a channel dedicated to amplifying Russian propaganda. Its themes, tactics, and reach fit the playbook—whether it’s a witting tool or an eager echo. Without backend data (e.g., IP traces), I can’t prove state ties, but the alignment’s striking. What’s your take—see anything in its posts that bucks this trend?
/end

I haven't heard of the "Firehose of Falsehood" before, but it's certainly consistent with JB's posting habits.

Grok 3

Question:
What is the ukrainian peoples opinion of Zelensky? What is his approval rating by month since the start of the war? Does the publics opinion vary by region of Ukraine, if so, break that down.

Answer:
Let’s dive into your questions about Ukrainian public opinion on President Volodymyr Zelensky, his approval ratings since the Russia-Ukraine war began, and any regional variations. I’ll provide a clear, detailed response based on the most reliable data available up to March 21, 2025.

Ukrainian Public Opinion of Zelensky
The Ukrainian people’s opinion of Zelensky has evolved significantly since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Initially, his leadership during the crisis earned him widespread admiration, both domestically and internationally, for his resolve and refusal to flee Kyiv. Over time, however, factors like prolonged war fatigue, military setbacks, and domestic challenges have influenced public sentiment. Despite these pressures, Zelensky remains a figure of resilience for many, though his popularity has seen fluctuations.

Surveys consistently highlight his strengths—intelligence, patriotism, and leadership—while criticisms often center on unfulfilled promises (like ending corruption or the Donbas conflict pre-2022) and the ongoing war’s toll. Recent polls suggest a majority still trust him, with a notable uptick in support following tensions with U.S. President Donald Trump in early 2025, reflecting a rally-around-the-flag effect when Ukraine feels externally challenged.

Approval Rating by Month Since the Start of the War
Tracking Zelensky’s approval rating month-by-month requires aggregating data from various polls, primarily from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), Gallup, and other reputable sources. Approval ratings typically measure trust or job approval, and I’ll use these interchangeably where appropriate, noting the data points available up to March 2025. Since continuous monthly data isn’t fully detailed in all sources, I’ll provide key snapshots and trends, interpolating where necessary based on broader patterns.

February 2022 (War Begins): Pre-war approval was around 37% (KIIS, late 2021). Post-invasion, it surged to ~90% (KIIS, May 2022), reflecting a rally effect as Zelensky became a wartime leader.
May 2022: 90% (KIIS), a peak driven by his defiance and global support.
September 2022: 84% (Gallup), still near record highs as Ukraine reclaimed territory.
December 2022: 84% (KIIS), sustained high support into the first winter of war.
February 2023: 90% (KIIS), maintaining strong approval a year into the conflict.
July 2023: 81% (Gallup), slightly down but robust amid ongoing resistance.
December 2023: 62% (KIIS), a notable drop as war fatigue set in and the 2023 counteroffensive faltered.
February 2024: ~60% (extrapolated from Gallup’s 60% in August 2024), reflecting a gradual decline.
May 2024: 56% (KIIS), further erosion as challenges mounted.
August 2024: 60% (Gallup), a slight recovery but well below wartime peaks.
October 2024: 70% (Statista/IRI), up from February, possibly tied to battlefield developments or policy shifts.
December 2024: 52% (KIIS), a low point before Trump’s January 2025 inauguration.
February 2025: 57% (KIIS, Feb 4-9 survey), a 5-point rise from December, countering Trump’s 4% claim.
March 2025: 67% (KIIS, Feb 14-Mar 4 survey), a 10-point jump post-Trump spat, reaching 72% in some polls (Ipsos/The Economist, Mar 5-10).
Trend Summary: Zelensky’s approval soared to 90% in 2022, dipped to the low 60s by late 2023, hit a trough around 52% in late 2024, and rebounded to 67-72% by March 2025. Gaps in monthly data are filled by assuming gradual shifts between known points, consistent with war-related events and public mood.

Regional Variations in Public Opinion
Public opinion on Zelensky does vary across Ukraine’s regions—West, Center, East, and South—due to cultural, linguistic, and proximity-to-conflict differences. However, detailed monthly breakdowns by region are sparse, so I’ll synthesize available data and trends up to March 2025.

Western Ukraine (e.g., Lviv): Historically pro-European and nationalist, this region has consistently shown the highest support for Zelensky since 2022. In August 2024, Gallup reported approval at 67%, compared to the national 60%. KIIS’s February 2025 poll noted trust as “more or less uniform” across regions, suggesting the West likely exceeds the 57% national average, possibly near 65-70%. By March 2025, with the national rise to 67-72%, the West could be in the 75-80% range, bolstered by its strong anti-Russian stance.

Central Ukraine (e.g., Kyiv): Home to the capital, this region mirrors national averages closely due to its political and media influence. Gallup’s 2024 East-West split implies Central approval aligns with the 60% national figure in August. KIIS’s February 2025 uniformity claim suggests 57% here, rising to 67-72% by March. Support may be tempered by elite skepticism and war fatigue but buoyed by Zelensky’s presence in Kyiv.

Eastern Ukraine (e.g., Kharkiv, excluding occupied Donbas): Closer to the front lines, this region has been more critical. Gallup’s August 2024 data showed a drop from 84% in 2023 to 56%, the steepest decline nationally, reflecting war’s direct impact. KIIS’s February 2025 survey didn’t contradict this, suggesting trust around 50-55%, below the 57% average. By March, with the national uptick, it might reach 60-65%, though skepticism persists due to losses and Russian-speaking populations’ complex views.

Southern Ukraine (e.g., Odesa): Often a mix of pro-Ukrainian and pragmatic sentiments, the South’s approval likely tracks slightly below the Center. In 2023, Gallup showed broad support (81% national), but by August 2024, it may have been ~58-60%. February 2025’s 57% national trust suggests parity here, rising to 65-70% in March. Proximity to Crimea and economic disruption could moderate enthusiasm.

Regional Notes: Pre-war, Eastern and Southern regions were less supportive due to Russian ties, but the invasion unified opinion initially. By 2024-2025, the East shows the most decline, per Gallup, while the West remains a stronghold. KIIS’s 2025 claim of uniformity may reflect a wartime leveling, though historical patterns and Gallup’s data suggest persistent, if muted, regional gaps. Occupied areas (Crimea, parts of Donbas) are excluded from polls, skewing results toward government-controlled regions.

Conclusion
As of March 2025, Ukrainians largely view Zelensky positively (67-72% approval), a recovery from late 2024’s 52% low, driven by external pressure and his wartime role. Since February 2022, his approval peaked at 90%, fell to the 50s-60s amid prolonged conflict, and now trends upward. Regionally, the West is most supportive (likely 75-80%), the East least (60-65%), with Center and South near the national average (67-72%). These figures reflect a resilient, if war-weary, public backing a leader under extraordinary strain.

So Tony V is such a little bitch he can't make a change to his lineup without having to throw a game to create an excuse? Is that what you are saying, because that sounds like what you are saying.