re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Yeah, I think that we are just waiting on the official announcement of annexation from Russia (which should happen on the 30th). We need to have a strong response to the annexation announcement, and ATACMS must be a part of that. It should also include Western tanks and aircraft.

Hopefully, we have already coordinated all the responses of our NATO allies.

ISW Update

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This campaign assessment special edition focuses on Russian military mobilization efforts. Significant inflections ISW would normally cover in its regular sections will be summarized briefly today and addressed in more detail tomorrow.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to overcome fundamental structural challenges in attempting to mobilize large numbers of Russians to continue his war in Ukraine.

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The Russian Armed Forces have not been setting conditions for an effective large-scale mobilization since at least 2008 and have not been building the kind of reserve force needed for a snap mobilization intended to produce immediate effects on the battlefield. There are no rapid solutions to these problems.

The problems Putin confronts stem in part from long-standing unresolved tensions in the Russian approach to generating military manpower

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The Russian military tried to move to an all-volunteer basis amid the 2008 financial crisis and failed to make the transition fully

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The Russian military ended up with a hybrid model blending conscript and professional soldiers

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The reduction in the mandatory term of service for conscripts made Russia’s reserves less combat ready.

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The prioritization of building a professional force and the de-prioritization of conscript service likely translated into an erosion of the bureaucratic structures required for mobilization.

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Putin has already conducted at least four attempts at mobilization in the last year, likely draining the pool of available combat-ready (and willing) reservists ahead of the “partial mobilization.”

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The most recent “partial mobilization” will draw mainly on Russians who have demonstrated that they do not wish to fight by their failures to join “volunteer battalions” or enter the BARS program. It may also be drawing on less-qualified involuntary reservists as well, assuming previous involuntary mobilizations pulled in the readiest individuals.

Conducting voluntary and involuntary mobilization efforts simultaneously is likely straining the bureaucrats responsible for these efforts

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The current “partial mobilization” also highlights structural tensions in Russia’s military manpower system resulting from the fact that the Ministry of Defense appears to share responsibility for mobilization with local government officials.

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Protests and resistance to involuntary mobilization also reflect Putin’s repeated and surprising failures to prepare his population for a major war.

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Russia will mobilize reservists for this conflict. The process will be ugly, the quality of the reservists poor, and their motivation to fight likely even worse. But the systems are sufficiently in place to allow military commissars and other Russian officials to find people and send them to training units and thence to war. But the low quality of the voluntary reserve units produced by the BARS and volunteer battalion efforts is likely a reliable indicator of the net increase in combat power Russia can expect to generate in this way. This mobilization will not affect the course of the conflict in 2022 and may not have a very dramatic impact on Russia’s ability to sustain its current level of effort into 2023. The problems undermining Putin’s effort to mobilize his people to fight, finally, are so deep and fundamental that he cannot likely fix them in the coming months—and possibly for years. Putin is likely coming up against the hard limits of Russia’s ability to fight a large-scale war.

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Key inflections in ongoing military operations on September 25

ISW identified three small changes in control of terrain in the past 24 hours:

Ukrainian forces likely liberated the town of Shevchenko in Donetsk Oblast.

Ukrainian forces likely control Maliivka in Kharkiv Oblast.

Ukrainian forces are contesting Russian positions around Karpivka, Nove, Ridkodub, and Novoserhiivka in Donetsk Oblast

Russian sources claim that Russian forces hit Ukraine’s Operational Command South headquarters in Odesa with Shahed-136 drones on September 25.[12] Ukrainian Operational Command South reported Russian Shahed-136 drone strikes in Odesa, but not that its headquarters was a target of any of them

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Key inflections in Russian force-generation efforts on September 25

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian contract soldiers in Zaporizhia Oblast have been informed that the terms of their contracts are no longer relevant and that they will have to continue to serve at the discretion of the military command.[14] The General Staff also claimed that Russian authorities are telling men mobilized in Sevastopol that they will serve for the duration of the ”special military operation,” and that the Russian military is sending mobilized men directly to combat units without additional training.[15]

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the Russian military is sending mobilized men directly to combat units without additional training.[

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For anyone who occasionally wonders, “Is training actually necessary for combat troops?” we will soon know the answer.

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But would China step in to help Russia?

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China and Russia have been neighbors and adversaries for generations. China may step in, but only to help China in the long run.

Yes ATACMS have been long overdue as a need for Ukraine as if they had them they could destroy all the railways behind the lines that supply Russia and if the time ever came for it, destroy the Kerch Bridge. Problem is even we don’t have a large stockpile of those so the number wouldn’t be a big one. Every single missile would have to count and be used on the highest of priority targets and most likely our own intelligence would pick the targets they are used on. That would probably be a requirement for us to send them. We could also stand to send another dozen or so HIMARS without depleting our own stocks and would go a long way to evening the artillery difference between the two sides. As for aircraft the fastest way to help would be convincing Poland to send their 23 MiG-29s to at least help hold the line because even if they finally agreed and chose a western aircraft to send tomorrow it would be at least 4-6 months before we could get their pilots trained and get them to the battlefield. Ideally they settle on the Gripen instead of the F-16 but it will end up being the F-16 which means Ukraine has a whole lot of improvements to make to their airfields. I’d much rather send them a few squadrons of Cobra attack helicopters and have the Swedes send Gripens that can operate on less than ideal airfields. We know Sweden is keen on finding buyers for them and they are more than capable aircraft against what Russia can field against it. For all this to work the U.S. can’t be the lone supplier. Everyone will have to pitch in.

frick that, we shouldn't be sending shite. Stay out of that completely.

So you'd rather spend a ton more with out own boots on the ground later due our existing treaties? Putin already said he wanted back all the way to Berlin.

I get it, you prefer spending trillions instead of billions

Looks like some of the “others” are watching.


LINK

This overnight Ukrainian missile strike South of Kherson supposedly took out the Russian Control Center for the operation of Iranian-made drones.

Twitter

I'm sure the folks in Odessa will appreciate that.

ETA:

It was built by RUS in the village of Chulakivka.

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Briefly about the situation at the front: Fierce fighting continues in the Liman area. The enemy is trying to use his advantage in manpower, since the terrain in the city area is wooded and rugged, with a relatively undeveloped road network, which, on the one hand, does not allow the use of large forces of armored vehicles off the roads, on the other hand, contributes to covert concentration and preparation for the offensive infantry divisions. So far, the enemy has not succeeded in encircling Liman, but he has tactical advances in its vicinity almost daily. On the Donetsk front, local (in my opinion, completely unintelligible) attacks by units of the RF Armed Forces, PMCs and LDNR continue on the fortified positions of the enemy. Successes are purely tactical, not worth the losses incurred. Zaporizhia Front - the lull and the concentration of troops continues. Most respondents expect that the main offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will take place in this area. On the Kherson front - over the past 3 days - a significant weakening of enemy activity. A non-intensive exchange of artillery and missile strikes continues. On the Belgorod front, artillery skirmishes and sorties of the DRG of the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue.

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Copied from Gurkin’s telegram.