re: Reports of over 20 young camp girls missing In TX floods

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The NWS sent a flash flood emergency at 4am

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I don't mean to nitpick, but they also sent a flash flood warning at 1am. That means that flooding is actively occurring in the area of the warning. I don't know if that's where the camps started initiating evacuations or not. I'm sure that's coming in the next few months as they conduct a full lessons learned

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This is a confluence of the absolute worst conditions imaginable. Extreme drought, abnormally heavy rains over a short period, early morning hours, areas with poor cell signals, young children in lower lying areas. Basically every drop of rain in the entire watershed came down the Guadalupe. Its a once in a multiple lifetime event.

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As with most tragedies, the Swiss Cheese Model/Theory has been unfortunately realized.

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And yes, obviously if you would have known that this thing, that has not ever happened in the 99 years of the camp was going to happen, in the middle of the night, in the span of a little over an hour, you would have prepared differently.”

In 1978, the Guad flooding enough to put a van from La Junta twenty feet up in a tree down by the Hunt Store. I’m not buying the 99 year excuse.

In 1932, Hunt had 36’. This time, it was 37’.

With these situations it is almost never one entity or individual to blame, rather it is a combination of little things that add up.

The time this occurred was a factor, and I don't just mean that it occured at night. Being that this happened headed into a holiday weekend the normal trained weather spotter system, and the eyes that go along with it, was likely limited with people out of town or gearing up for their plans. That put even fewer eyes on the situation on the ground as it developed.

While there wasnt a true shortage of employees in the NWS Austin/San Antonio office leading up to and during this, the overall shortage of employees, the quality of employee, and the current state of limitations with travel very likely hampered direct coordination with local EMAs. Normally, meetings are had to go over what is expected and what the response plan should be with meteorologists, hydrologists, and emergency management officials working together to form a plan. We don't know yet to what extent that occurred. It is possible some of that may have been limited, as well, due to the holiday schedule.

I, personally, believe that the forecast was as good as it could get given the setup. Where I believe improvement could have been made is in the messaging from the NWS Austin/San Antonio. In my opinion, it lacked the urgency that the situation required. That could be due to the issues I mentioned earlier, they didn't know at the time the extent of the flooding due to fewer eyes being on the situation. All of that will be looked into going forward.

Then, there is the question of how local officials heeded the warnings and information given. Was the proper chain of command and decision making followed? Did they have the people they needed in position to get things moving on the ground as the situation developed? There isn't room for half measures when you are in an area catering specifically to children. You need a plan and people capable of putting it into action. That, too, will be figured out in the days and months to come.

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I'm not sure I'd survive that. I'd likely want to join my family. What a horrific story.

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It's hard on a person losing all your family. We have a local in our small town that walks everywhere and won't accept a ride. His wife, kids and even his dog were killed in a car accident 15 years ago. He hasn't so much as sat in a vehicle since.

We see him carrying his groceries and it heartbreaking knowing why.

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With these situations it is almost never one entity or individual to blame, rather it is a combination of little things that add up.

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Yep. Which is why I mentioned the Swiss Cheese Theory earlier.

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I, personally, believe that the forecast was as good as it could get given the setup. Where I believe improvement could have been made is in the messaging from the NWS Austin/San Antonio. In my opinion, it lacked the urgency that the situation required. That could be due to the issues I mentioned earlier, they didn't know at the time the extent of the flooding due to fewer eyes being on the situation. All of that will be looked into going forward.

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In this same realm, I find it interesting that 38 years ago, the NWS made direct contact with Camp Mystic. Being presumptive here but the meteorologists were likely local having deep knowledge of the area and those facilities along the river. The mobility of careers in this era results in a higher likelihood of the staff at the NWS - despite being highly skilled - not having the intimate awareness of the area.

You see this in severe thunderstorm/tornado warnings where local meteorologists that have either grown up or been in that community for years get down to the granular level of neighborhoods, street intersections, etc. vs. the transplants that simply read off town/community names that the computer spits out.

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Kerr county decided not to spend the money.

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That's where the bulk of the deceased were. 68 per the Chronicle this a.m.

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We probably won’t ever know if the young campers from Mystic had any idea what was even going on.

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I think the whole camp was being actively evacuated, so I’m sure they were aware. Those cabins had never flooded before and were likely considered safe and the last to be evacuated.