re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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High Russian casualties will likely prevent Russian forces from fully replenishing and reconstituting existing units in Ukraine and forming new operational and strategic reserves

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First, on domestic politics: My colleagues Andrei Kolesnikov and Denis Volkov have found that the war has general approval among about 75% of the population. Many Russians see the conflict as one between their country and the West, not Ukraine.

More specifically, my colleagues have found that up to 22% of the population strongly support the war and oppose cessation of hostilities. Another 53% are somewhat more passive in their support, and most of them agree with the government’s course. So if tomorrow, Putin would argue that Russia should start peace negotiations, many of these people would accept that, too.

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That data reinforces what is clear on the ground—that the war has been fully internalized by the majority of Russians, at both the popular and elite levels.

It makes sense. Unlike Ukraine, one-fifth of whose territory is occupied and which is subject to missile and drone attacks every day, most of Russia hasn’t looked like a nation at war throughout 2023—except some settlements on the border with Ukraine that witness regular shelling, and, of course, the territories occupied and annexed by Russia, including Crimea. In fact, when the Ukrainians launched attacks against government buildings in Moscow this summer, Muscovites shrugged and life continued as normal.

“The real downside is that if you live outside of the city, when wining and dining in central Moscow you need to get home by 1 a.m. to beat the drone attacks, just like you would beat the traffic,” one of my contacts said to me.

What’s more, fewer people than last year are ready to express any form of opposition. Since the full-scale invasion last year, nearly 20,000 people have been detained for antiwar actions, and some have faced Kafkaesque trials and draconian prison terms. So despite occasional acts of individual bravery, Russia hasn’t witnessed any mass antiwar protests since September 2022, when a partial mobilization was announced.

At the same time, the elites have demonstrated remarkable cohesion and the inability to challenge the Kremlin’s course. Even the failed mutiny by the infamous mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin, whose improvised march on Moscow in June was soon followed by his fiery death in a plane crash, has only strengthened Putin’s grip on power.

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Just as in domestic politics, the war is becoming a mainstay of the Kremlin’s economic policy. In the 2024 budget, military spending is set at 6% of GDP for the first time since Russia’s independence in 1991, exceeding social expenditure. Around 39% of the budget will go on the war in Ukraine, including beefing up Russia’s defense industry and payments to soldiers, and domestic security.

And that isn’t all. The rest of the Kremlin’s economic policy is shaped by the war and resulting Western sanctions, including efforts to encourage import-substitution, reintroduction of capital controls, and a tolerance to high budget deficits.

War and the boom in military production has driven unemployment to historic lows of 3%. The money that families of those killed and wounded in Ukraine receive from the state is a genuine windfall for the poorer regions from which the Kremlin is predominantly drafting soldiers, and where going to fight in Ukraine has become a rational economic choice for many: the ability to earn more money—dead or alive—than they could ever make in any other legal way under Putin.

This “coffin money,” compensation for injuries, and soldiers’ salaries are driving domestic demand and being channeled to finance domestic production or purchase the Chinese imports that have replaced Western brands. As a result, the Russian economy is expected to grow by 2.8% this year, despite mounting sanctions from the West. Bypassing the sanctions has become a cottage industry, and millions are being made by creating logistical and financial schemes to circumvent Western restrictions and smuggle in goods that feed Putin’s war machine.

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Finally, war has also become a central tenet of Russia’s foreign policy. Every relationship with a foreign power is assessed from the viewpoint of whether ties to that country can directly help Russia’s war effort through the supply of military goods, by filling the Kremlin’s war chest, or helping Moscow punish the West for its support for Ukraine. This new reality gives tremendous leverage to countries that are still willing to do business with Russia, allowing them to extract hefty prices for their services to Putin’s war effort.

When in September, Azerbaijan resorted to military force to resolve the decadeslong conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow didn’t lift a finger to protect the interests of its treaty ally Armenia, mostly because Baku and President Ilham Aliyev’s patrons in Turkey have become indispensable in helping the Kremlin to withstand sanctions.

Moscow was forced to source artillery shells, drones and missiles from Iran and North Korea in exchange for large payments and sharing sensitive military technology with these pariah regimes, and to take sides in regional conflicts where Moscow had previously hedged its bets. This is why the Kremlin’s muted reaction to the Oct. 7 terrorist attacks by Hamas and ensuing full-throated criticism of Israel’s war in Gaza would once have been unimaginable, but is hardly surprising in 2023.

Nor is it any surprise that in 2023, China has finally become Russia’s single most important foreign partner. The relationship with Beijing checks all three boxes, providing the Kremlin with critical components for its war machine, keeping the Russian economy afloat, and making sure that U.S. influence is kept in check by a more assertive and military powerful China.

In 2024, when Putin is set to win a new six-year term in staged elections slated for March, he will continue his course of destroying Ukraine in the hope that he will be able to wear down the Ukrainians and their Western supporters. With war the organizing principle of Russian life, the continuation of aggression against Ukraine and the crusade against Western interests at home and abroad is becoming the raison d’être for the entire machinery of Putinism.

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Brazil already has sent troops to Guyana. The US sends troops annually to train with Guyana's army. They just left in late November

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Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his presidential bid for 2024 on December 8 in an obviously staged effort to seem that he was running at the request of Russian servicemen.

Putin’s announcement of his presidential bid in a military setting indicates that his campaign may focus on Russia’s war in Ukraine more than ISW previously assessed, although the extent of this focus is unclear at this time.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 7 to 8.

Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin forecasted on December 7 that there will be “no agreement” between Russia and Ukraine to end the war and ”no freeze” of the frontlines in Ukraine, marking a notable shift from Girkin’s prior claims that the Russian military intended to “freeze the frontline” until after the Russian presidential elections.

The Russian military has reportedly banned the use of civilian cars for military purposes likely as part of ongoing formalization efforts, sparking criticisms from Russian milbloggers.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is expanding its ability to guard Russian officials and entities abroad likely to better surveil Russian and international actors outside of Russian territory.

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to artificially alter the demographic composition of occupied Ukraine.

Ukraine’s partners continued to announce military and financial aid packages to Ukraine recently.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Udmurt Republic Head Alexander Brechalov announced on December 7 that the region formed and will soon deploy four new units to fight in Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 8 that Russia is trying to destroy Ukrainian children’s connection to Ukraine and that swift intervention is necessary to maintain this connection during a speech at the first meeting of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children.

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Ukraine will not be able to conduct a new offensive until 2025, analysts at The Wall Street Journal said

In their opinion, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will switch to strategic defense, while economic and military support from the USA and Europe is in question.

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Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada adopted a law on the criminalization of smuggling, –– said People's Deputy Yaroslav Zhelezniak.

The draft law is also a requirement of the European Union to provide a macro-finance of 1.5 billion euros. The document was supported by 248 people's deputies.

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QUICK THREAD on the Russian TVZvezda (MOD-affiliated) report about Project Archangel's volunteer effort and its FPV drone manufacturing and use. This video builds on the one shown a few weeks earlier. Several key points stand out

Project Archangel (PA) founder says that the Sudoplatov effort "as part of the MOD is the largest such effort that manufactures and uses FPV drones, given direct MOD involvement." He says that PA has two goals - to work with FPV developers to connect them with military units and

to train FPV pilots who signed an MOD contract. His efforts also trains those pilots already on the frontlines - "to create a system." PA builds FPV drones in 14 regions across Russia, including Moscow, with many located "near the fighting."

Mikhail, PA's founder, says "we are witnessing a very rapid development of new defense-industrial branch dealing with FPV drones." Typical FPV pilot unit "can have a significant battlefield impact that can stop any adversary advance including infantry and vehicles."

"Earlier, the adversary was moving at will - today, Ukrainian forces have trouble moving within 10km from the line of contact. Panic (among the Ukrainian forces) is a positive development that stifles its movements."

"We also have young women who are fighting (as FPV pilots) for a year and a half - they have great endurance and exhibit no emotions when flyting (FPV) drones. Its better if they are younger than 30 and have computer gaming experience."

"Experience plays a role - an FPV pilot with a four week experience can strike up to 30 different targets a month - this experience is gained very quickly. Targets include weapons, infantry, comms and sensors. Decision to strike is made at the local commander's level."

"We are forming entire units (companies) of engineers and instructors that can quickly react to any changes at the front, including pilot feedback. FPV units are formed everywhere, but slowly, since the military is a huge organization, but improvements are everywhere."

He was asked by a journalist if Project Archangel and its volunteer developers are working on other tech - "Yes, EW and radio recon, other useful technologies are sourced and tested in the Moscow region. Then we test such tech at ranges near Ukraine combat, and

then they go into actual combat. If its works, we recommend such systems/weapons for mass production. Earlier, these we all disparate efforts - developers, engineers, volunteers, funders - now there is a system."

Towards the end, there is a short video from the Russian MOD's FPV Training School run under the Sudoplatov effort - "each month we train 45 pilots." 10 other MOD-run training centers that prepared almost 1600 pilots are located in the Russian-controlled Ukraine regions.

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This characterization of Austin’s remarks is 100 percent not true, acc to two sources who were in the briefings. Austin warned that it is not hyperbole to say Putin won’t stop at Ukraine. If he enters NATO territory US troops could be called to fight; cheaper to fund Ukraine now.

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Anduril Industries, the military tech company founded by Oculus founder Palmer Luckey, has unveiled a new kind of attack drone.

Anduril demonstrated the drone, which is capable of locking onto other drones and then knocking them out of the air to Bloomberg and NBC news. The drone seeks out target drones, identifies them, and then asks an operator's permission to attack.

Anduril cofounder and CEO Brian Schimpf said the Interceptor weighs roughly the same amount as a bowling ball, and can go 90 to 100 mph.

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Austin warned that it is not hyperbole to say Putin won’t stop at Ukraine.

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