re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

I see that others have already responded to this. Do you even know where Bakhmut is located in Ukraine? Do you have any knowledge of the terrain around Bakhmut?

A simple look at google maps in terrain mode will provide ample counterpoint to your statement.

Bakhmut is a local logistical hub; however, there is nowhere on the battlefield that Ukraine can't resupply if it loses Bakhmut. The town only matters logistically in that its loss will complicate the Ukrainian supply chain, not break it.

The Ukrainians are doing the exact same thing to Russia that they did in Serverodonetsk...bleeding the Russians as much as possible before ceding the land. It is a pattern they have repeated several times in this war.

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Russia is on the brink of breaking through

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How many times have you said this only to go back and edit or delete your post like a bitch?

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Where is the manpower for that going to come from? Russia is on the brink of breaking through Ukraine's strongest defense lines in the Donbas. Once Bakhmut falls, their 70km Donbas defense line that they started building up in 2014 will have a huge hole in it.

It's why for the past several months most of the Russian offensives have been directly solely in that region.

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Even the most optimistic Russian projections put Ukraine KIA currently at 230,000 - 240,000, though without any verification and by trying to tie several unrelated stories about small numbers of losses together as proof.

Svpressa - Kiev thinks where to hide 230,000 corpses Feb '23 (Requires translation)

This is one of the more pessimistic reports towards Ukraine from Western sources with similar numbers, if you extrapolate by month estimates, but as casualties rather than KIA, hence a portion could return to fight.

Guardian - Ukraine casualty rate may be tipping point in war June '22

As of Feb 2022 Ukraine is reported to have had 500,000 military personnel. Of this 250,000 were active military and the other half were reserves. 200,000 of the active military were ground personnel.

Following the outbreak of the war Ukraine also started conscription of 18-60 year olds bringing in another 250,00 - 500,000 - though their 1 year term is set to expire shortly I could not find information on possible extensions or new conscription drives. This puts their armed forces at 700,000-1,000,000. Note that Ukraine still has several million in the 18-60 year old category that they could further conscript.

Nationalworld - How big is Ukraine army? Sept '22

Global Firepower Ukraine

Reuters - Ukraine starts drafting 18-60 year olds. Feb '22

Wikipedia - Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022

Even with the most conservative Russian casualty numbers against the most pessimistic Ukrainian ones, Ukraine maintains a parity of troop numbers with Russia for now. While things have stabilised somewhat since the breakthroughs, weather has not been conducive for mobile warfare which has been Ukraine's strength. It has however, favoured Russian tactics so gains by Russia can be expected.

So yes, I have little doubt they have the troops to execute one major counter offensive, two may be a stretch in tandem. The critical part is whether they have had the time to train sufficiently and be brought up to speed on the new toys received to be effective at causing a significant enough breakthrough to put Russia on the back foot.

As for the value of the Donbas line, other's have already covered that. I suggest checking the below out though, I used it to brush up on my map reading skills as it's been a decade or so since I used them beyond getting from A to B.

The Prepared - How to read maps

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My thinking is that the #1 priority is to drive a corridor to the sea - so my main thrust is at Polohoy and then south to Berdiansk. That cuts off Tokmak as well as Melitopol. But probably you have to at least engage Tokmak somewhat to prevent the forces there from giving you problems with the offensive. It really depends on where Russian troops are positioned. Tokmak would take priority over Melitopol which would follow. It's just a matter of how heavily Tokmak is defended. Maybe you can do it as part of the early offensive. Hell, maybe the Russians in Tokmak bug out when they realize they are being cut off.

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I think we have looked at it from slightly different angles, the sea corridor is definitely a priority and maybe I was trying to be overly sneaky.

Much of the chatter I read is Melitopol is considered the target of choice including from Russian sources so a semi-fake through Tokmak towards Melitopol to isolate it from the east made sense in my head, especially if they can apply pressure along the front towards Volnovakha making a subsequent Berdinask thrust and then Melitopol capture easier and less costly in manpower. Very much agree it is dependent on how fortified Tokmak is though.

A few interesting things I found while roaming around today.

Will be interesting to see how this plays and how far it goes:

Deutsche Well - US stats sending Russian oligarch money to Ukraine

Seems like they aren't keen on the west training more Ukraine soldiers.

Pravda Russia - Western trained forces will not ensure victory (Translation needed)

True, the issue is that even from Berdinask the range to the Kerch bridge is problematic, for missiles it pushes the range of a GLSDB which they don't even have yet.

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Where is the manpower for that going to come from? Russia is on the brink of breaking through Ukraine's strongest defense lines in the Donbas. Once Bakhmut falls, their 70km Donbas defense line that they started building up in 2014 will have a huge hole in it.

It's why for the past several months most of the Russian offensives have been directly solely in that region.

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Huzzah I can finally repost this

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The Eastern Front has collapsed and Ukraine is in full retreat.

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June 28th

LINK

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The Eastern frontline defense is collapsing for Ukraine.

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June 21st

LINK

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Russian advances near Popasna appear to be rapid. ISW is unable to confirm but the writing appears to be on the wall. They’re encircling the Eastern front.

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May 22nd

Map where you talk about how fast Russia advancing May 10th

And for comparison on that fast advancing collapsing front on June 27th


And from April 9th LINK

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- They’re strategy has shifted to encircling the Eastern Army in the southeast from two separate fronts. This will be the new major battle for the next month.

- Mariupol should completely fall within the next week. This will free up a lot of their manpower and artillery to help with the Southeastern front.

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Mariupol fell 6 weeks after this and it's been basically 2 months of major battles.

LINK to the post from June 2022

isw update

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Russian decisive offensive operations are unlikely to target Zaporizhia City from the western Donetsk–Zaporizhia frontline as the Russian military continues to prepare for an offensive in western Luhansk Oblast. Advisor to the exiled Ukrainian mayor of Mariupol, Petro Andryushenko, stated that Russian soldiers in Mariupol are telling residents that the Russian military ordered offensive operations against Vuhledar, areas southwest of Bakhmut, Zaporizhia City and Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Andryushenko added that Russia is also building up forces at barracks and settlements on roads leading to frontline positions, and that Russia had brought an extra 10,000–15,000 troops to Mariupol and its outskirts

Western and Ukrainian military officials have repeatedly noted that Russian forces are likely setting conditions to reach the Luhansk and Donetsk oblast borders — an objective that Russian Chief of General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov had also outlined on December 22

Russian sources have been claiming Russian forces have been making territorial gains in Zaporizhia Oblast in late January, claims that ISW assesses were likely an information operation aimed at dispersing Ukrainian forces ahead of the decisive offensive in the east.

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Russia has not shown the capacity to sustain the multiple major offensive operations that would be necessary to simultaneously reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative borders and take Zaporizhia City. Andryushenko’s reported Russian troop concentration of 30,000 servicemen in the Mariupol area is not sufficient to attack Zaporizhia, a city of roughly three-quarters of a million people, while continuing offensive operations to encircle Bakhmut and launching a new major attack in Luhansk Oblast. Russian conventional forces, reserves, and Wagner forces have committed tens of thousands of troops to the effort to seize Bakhmut already, reportedly suffering many thousands of casualties in that effort

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The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has launched a series of efforts to restructure and consolidate the mismatched blend of irregular forces supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine into Russia’s conventional military forces. A Russian MoD map published on February 3 included occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts in the Southern Military District’s (SMD) area of responsibility.[11] The SMD press service also announced that the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Militias are integrating into the Russian Armed Forces

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The Russian MoD might be taking some steps to integrate volunteer battalions into its framework. A prominent Russian milblogger stated on February 4 that the Union of Volunteers of Donbas military units elected to create a single Russian Armed Forces Volunteer Corps from Russian Armed Forces volunteer units.[15] A DNR Telegram channel claimed on February 2 that Russian officials coerced mobilized miners into taking military oaths to Russia despite months of prior service.[16] Russian media outlet TASS also reported on February 4 that the Russian government expanded military medical commissions’ mandate to provide care for volunteer formations as well.[

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The Russian MoD may be rushing to integrate and professionalize irregular forces into its conventional structure while Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov has the favor of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[18] Russian irregular forces in Ukraine include contract soldiers, mobilized soldiers, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics‘ (DNR and LNR) forces, volunteer battalions, Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) forces, Cossack and Chechen units, and Wagner Group mercenaries. These formations have different objectives, limitations, pre-requisites, hierarchies, and legal statuses. The Russian MoD has initiated several professionalization efforts since Gerasimov’s appointment as the Commander of the Joint Grouping of Forces in Ukraine on January 11, and it is logical that the Russian MoD would seek to cohere the current odd mix of forces into a more traditional structure

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Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely overcompensating for his declining influence by continuing to frame himself as the sole victor in the Bakhmut area and attempting to leverage his remaining influence online. Prigozhin responded to a question on February 4 about rumors of a new Russian offensive by comparing Wagner Group forces’ battle strategy to a chess game in which players must “hit [their opponents’] head with a chessboard.”[20] Prigozhin also called for Russian authorities to investigate US-based Russian-language international media outlet RTVI for disseminating “slanderous information,” one of many recent calls for Russian officials to take action based on his demands alone

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Russia and Ukraine conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on February 4, exchanging 63 Russian POWs for 116 Ukrainian POWs.[23] The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian POWs included personnel of an unspecified “sensitive category,” and the MoD credited the United Arab Emirates leadership for mediating the exchange. A Russian milblogger expressed continued frustration at uneven Russo–Ukrainian POW exchanges

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Key Takeaways

A Russian decisive offensive operation is unlikely to target Zaporizhia City from the western Donetsk–Zaporizhia frontline.

Russian forces have not shown the capacity to sustain the multiple simultaneous large-scale offensive operations that would be necessary to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk Oblast and seize Zaporizhia City.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has launched a series of efforts to restructure and consolidate the mismatched blend of irregular forces supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine into Russia’s conventional military forces.

The Russian MoD’s decision to undertake significant structural reform while preparing for a major offensive in eastern Ukraine likely represents an effort by Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to complete reforms while he has Russian President Vladimir Putin’s often fleeting favor.

Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is overcompensating for his declining influence by continuing to frame himself as the sole victor in the Bakhmut area.

Russian and Ukrainian officials exchanged 63 Russian POWs for 116 Ukrainian POWs.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations northwest of Svatove and continued offensive operations around Kreminna.

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut and Vuhledar but have slowed the pace of their offensives along the western outskirts of Donetsk City.

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian military assets in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.

Russian authorities are attempting to reinvigorate force generation efforts by drawing from broader pools of manpower.

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I suppose my instinct is to follow the German idea of Blitzkrieg that they used soo effectively against France. But that could have failed if France could have cut the German advance from the sides.

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It came close to failing but DeGaulle didn't get the reinforcements he requested. Rommel was held up for a day or so.

Not a tank guy.

From these 2 sources it looks like it would be effective against T-62's and T-72's between 400-1500 metres depending on rounds being used which seems a little short ranged.

Military Today - Leopard I Tank

Historum - 105mm L7 gun penetration

This seems to agree but leans on the side of it being more effective than the above 2, it is a very long article but uses sources well.

War Online - Two Myths of One Battle: Syrian T-72 in 1982 Lebanon War (Needs translation)

Also sounds like there are still issues in supplying ammunition:

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On 25 April 2022, it was reported that Rheinmetall sought to export 88 Leopard 1A5 tanks to Ukraine in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the deal fell through in part due to a lack of available ammunition and the refusal of other NATO Leopard 1 operators to supply it.

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In February 2023, the German government approved the delivery of Leopard 1 tanks from industrial stock, as soon as they were repaired. Yet, there is still a problem with supplying munition for them. Brazil has a huge stock of it, but until that point, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has so far refused to pass it on to Ukraine

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Wikipedia - Leopard 1

Edit: Clarity