re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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The TL:DW? The Ukrainians have the high ground outside of Soledar and are using the entire area as target practice. Russians are getting killed easily and in bunches. Russians still have yet to enter Bakhmut.

Sounds like they're holding pretty good. Still wanting more of course. But it doesn't sound dire. Of course this just one guys account, but still.

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It squares with what my sauce(s) in Ukraine have been telling me. The Russian advance in the whole Bakhmut axis has been so slow that Ukraine has had plenty of time to construct and improve multiple fall back positions. They are making Wagner and the VDV airborne troops pay in blood for every meter of ground.

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GOP_Tiger

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Lockheed Martin will increase the pace of production for F-16.

The measure has taken for countries to be able replace their fighters should they send some of their F-16s to Ukraine - Financial Times

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LINK

Sounds like there might finally be some movement on the F16s to Ukraine front in the near future.

LINK

Pretty intense vid of fighting in Donetsk. A lot of blown up Russian armor.

This is believed to have occurred on 1/15.

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While I don't think he is approaching Hitler, at least how Hitler is portrayed in his later years as things crumbled, I think there is a strong case to be made that he has fallen for his own mythos and propaganda - or at the very least been backed into a corner by it.

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”Absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

There’s been no one* to tell Vlad “no” for decades now.

That will change a person’s personality.

*no check on his power internally in Russia; the International community has sometimes not given him what he wanted, but that’s not controllable to him.

True, living in an echo chamber can create some huge blind spots as you can lose the ability to challenge your preconceptions.

It is a little more nuanced in my view though than Lord Acton's famous quote from which that aphorism is distilled, but discussing that will would likely derail the thread as it is more about ethics, philosophy and metaphysics.

Jan 25 ISW Update

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Russian forces may be engaging in limited spoiling attacks across most of the frontline in Ukraine in order to disperse and distract Ukrainian forces and set conditions to launch a decisive offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast. Russian forces have re-initiated offensive operations, namely limited ground attacks, on two main sectors of the front in the past few days—in central Zaporizhia Oblast along Kamianske-Mali Shcherbaky-Mala Tokmachka line and in the Vuhledar area of western Donetsk Oblast.[1] Ukrainian officials have noted that these attacks are conducted by small squad-sized assault groups of 10 to 15 people and are aimed at dispersing Ukrainian defensive lines.

These limited attacks are notably ongoing as the pace of Russian operations around Bakhmut, led by the Wagner Group, seems to be decreasing. Following the Russian capture of Soledar in mid-January, the attacks on Bakhmut and surrounding settlements have apparently dropped off, suggesting that the Russian offensive operation to take Bakhmut may be culminating. The Wagner Group has failed to deliver on its promise of securing Bakhmut and has been unable to progress beyond minor tactical gains in Soledar and other surrounding small settlements. Russian military leadership may have, therefore, decided to de-prioritize operations around Bakhmut after recognizing the low likelihood that Wagner will actually be able to take the settlement

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The Russian military appears to be shifting its focus towards conventional forces and away from the non-traditional force structure of the Wagner Group, potentially in preparation for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast. On the strategic level, certain changes to Russian command reflect a gradual transition away from reliance on unconventional force groupings such as Wagner and towards supporting and empowering conventional Russian elements. The recent appointment of Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to overall theater command of Russian forces in Ukraine (and subsequent demotion of Wagner Group favorite Army General Sergey Surovikin) suggests that Russian military leadership is increasingly looking to the traditional and conventional military establishment that Gerasimov represents and leads

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The array of conventional forces across the Luhansk Oblast frontline suggests that Russian forces may be preparing for a decisive effort in this sector, supported by limited spoiling attacks elsewhere on the frontline to distract and disperse Ukrainian forces. ISW has previously discussed indicators of a potential decisive Russian effort in Luhansk Oblast.[8] Taken in tandem with a variety of intelligence statements that Russia is preparing for an imminent offensive operation in the coming months, it is likely that a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast would be an offensive one.[9] The most probable course of a Russian offensive action in Luhansk Oblast would be premised on launching an attack along the Svatove-Kreminna line, supported by critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that run into major logistics hubs in Luhansk City and Starobilsk, in order to reach the Luhansk Oblast administrative border and complete the capture of the remaining part of Luhansk Oblast that is still Ukrainian-controlled

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The Kremlin and Russian milbloggers attempted to play down the Western provision of tanks to Ukraine, indicating that they likely find these systems threatening to Russian prospects. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on January 25 that the Western provision of Abrams and Leopard tanks to Ukraine is "quite a failure … in terms of technological aspects" and that there is a "clear overestimation of the potential that [these tanks] will add" to Ukrainian forces.[10] Some Russian milbloggers likely sought to reassure their domestic audiences by claiming that these systems do not pose a significant threat and that previous Western systems like HIMARS are a far more serious threat.[11] The Kremlin and Russian milbloggers previously framed the Western provision of purely defensive Patriot missile systems as a serious escalation between Russia and the West

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Key Takeaways

Russian forces may be engaging in limited spoiling attacks across most of the frontline in Ukraine in order to disperse and distract Ukrainian fronts and launch a decisive offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast.

The Russian military appears to be shifting its focus toward conventional forces deployed to Luhansk Oblast and away from the non-traditional force structure of the Wagner Group and its focus on Bakhmut.

The Kremlin and Russian milbloggers attempted to downplay the Western provision of tanks to Ukraine, indicating that they likely find these systems threatening to Russian prospects.

Russian forces claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Svatove as Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Kreminna.

Ukrainian forces have likely made advances around Kreminna.

Ukrainian officials acknowledged that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Soledar.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City area. Russian forces reportedly continued localized offensive operations near Vuhledar.

Russian forces continued to conduct small-scale ground attacks across the Zaporizhia Oblast front line, likely to attempt to fix Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian milbloggers are divided over the veracity of Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov’s ongoing, overblown information operation.

The Kremlin is attempting to downplay new restrictions on crossing the Russian border, likely in an effort to contain panic within Russian society about a likely second mobilization wave.

Russian President Vladimir Putin may be attempting to conduct another wave of mobilization discreetly out of concern for undermining his support among Russians.

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British Defence Intelligence
UPDATE ON UKRAINE 26 January 2023
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

Russia has likely completed training of the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division (GMRD) in Belarus, which had been carrying out training since autumn 2022. The majority of the 2nd GMRD has now transferred back to Russia, before almost certainly being recommitted to operations in Ukraine.

The 2nd GMRD is an element of the 1st Guards Tank Army and suffered major losses in the opening phases of the conflict. It is now primarily made up of mobilised personnel operating older equipment taken from storage. Its combat effectiveness will likely be limited despite several weeks of training.

There is a realistic possibility that other Russian units are being rotated into Belarus for similar training, and that Russia will continue this model to regenerate and prepare units to maintain its force in Ukraine.

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There is a realistic possibility that other Russian units are being rotated into Belarus for similar training, and that Russia will continue this model to regenerate and prepare units to maintain its force in Ukraine.

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Question, why go to Belarus to train? Why not train in Russia?

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quote:Question, why go to Belarus to train? Why not train in Russia? All their training officers are deployed?

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So the Russian troops are being trained by the Belarus army? Wow, and Russia is supposed to be a superpower!!!