re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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So, if this is legit, Ukraine is claiming just shy of 100k Russians have been killed so far since the start of the war. What the actual number is, I doubt we’ll know for years if ever.

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Separate fierce frick-up are the constantly popping up videos from the 1st Army Corps of the DPR showing firing from tanks from closed positions, practiced on a regular basis. The horror here, of course, is not that tanks shoot from closed positions, they can do it, a good tankman should be able to do it, moreover, tankmen were trained for this in 2016-2017 and the KCPN carried manuals for this on the topic. The horror is that with the silent catastrophic lack of shells in artillery (you can’t talk about it, because then someone will have to answer for it, but no one wants to), it was decided to replace artillery with tanks on a regular basis. For tanks, shells seem to still exist.

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Smooth-bore tank guns are not designed for what they are now doing all day long: continuously bombarding enemy positions with high-explosive fragmentation shells. Modern tank guns are made smooth-bore so that they can be used to accelerate an armor-piercing projectile, in the jargon – a “crowbar”, to an initial speed of 1700-1800 meters per second (For comparison, the rifled 152-mm howitzer D-20, aka – 2S3 “Akatsiya”, if we are talking about self-propelled guns, the combat missions of which the tankmen are trying to perform, has an three times smaller speed of a high-explosive fragmentation projectile output). The task of the tank is to destroy enemy tanks with direct fire in a tank battle with such “crowbars”. If – you lose the barrel, you won’t hit anything, the enemy will destroy you first. And the survivability of the barrel of a tank gun, it is much less than that of a rifled howitzer. And the tanks that are doing all this are no longer new, the barrels have already been used, so to destroy targets from closed positions, a large consumption of shells is required, which wears out the barrels even more.

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From the fact that the Russian army can do nothing except for, bleeding, capture another village while surrendering a district center or an entire region on the other flank, the Russian army made an amazing conclusion – let’s take more villages! And arranged the maximum possible Verduns along the entire front line, including the very infamous Pavlovka in the DPR. And, of course, Bakhmut. How could it be without it? Why not kill the last remnants of combat-ready infantry at it? It’s not possible at all. These fricking bastards need to get positive motives for the news somewhere! Here, we freed another 100 meters of such and such village. And whoever is the first to report on the complete liberation of the village gets an order.

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I will reveal a terrible secret – the quality of this “Faberge Line” is purely secondary, because without all the other components of a properly built defense, even correctly, according to science, the built fortified areas can be assaulted without any problems.

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All they can offer the troops, who now need to dig into the ground, is wired communication, for which the troops themselves must find both cable and field telephones (there is no discussion of field switches). And, of course, these field lines are being laid… in full accordance with the guidelines for laying temporary field lines. Somewhere just across the field, elsewhere along the trees, elsewhere along the poles. TEMPORARY frickING LINES! In the projects of the cyclopean “Faberge Line,” there is no place for normal underground cable communications protected from shelling! Having all the equipment, the materials, the time, all the infantry in positions will still remain without wire communication after five minutes of shelling. Exactly as it was with the Red Army in the summer of 1942 in the breakthrough sector during Operation Blau. But that is only, of course, if the infantry at all manages to find a field cable on its own in order to lay this connection at least somehow, And spare parts for field telephones are sent to the army by volunteers, bought up at flea markets.

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The result at the moment (which the Russian media and biased bloggers are diligently trying to cover up with stories about how the fricking positions are taken out by 57-mm anti-aircraft guns and how cool it is to burn through the life of tank barrels with constant firing from closed positions) is a monstrous shell hunger in artillery.

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Did the artillery gain radically more “eyes” in the air after 10 months? No. Did the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation bring the artillerymen enough autumn and winter camouflage nets for their guns? No. And winter is ahead. It will no longer be possible to hide the guns in the forests – the forests are bare, and then more snow will fall and in general, every step will be visible from the air. And the enemy with the UAV is doing well. Even considering losses. On our side, the stupid morons who wasted the ammo on plowing the fields decided to replace the six-inch projectiles with VOGs [greandes] dropped from copters. With the motivation “Well, hohols do it!”

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Outcome? A fricking hell waiting for us ahead in the winter. There will be no significant chances to hold the current front, and the enemy is well aware of this, concentrating his forces where it is convenient and valuable for him. There is no progress on any of the points that determine the success of the defense, only regression that is systematically encouraged.

And the fricking thing will become especially obvious when the snow falls and the whole movement, including all our artillery, will be in full view of the enemy UAVs, and Grubnik [another volunteer] with his “People’s Network” will stupidly not be enough for the WHOLE ARMY to compensate for the lack of winter camouflage nets.

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This level of military incompetence simply does not exist. There is a huge, massive betrayal, and systematic preparation for a completely hellish massacre during the next Ukrainian offensive. The Russian army, and its command leave no chance of success.

And the **** among the “experts” and military correspondents who cover and glorify all this, sucking the “positive” out of this, bear their share of responsibility for all the future frick-ups.

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I’m in awe. I’m in complete fricking awe. And I’m not whining or complaining now. When the hohols break through the front, I will get my machine gun, put on my armor and go and try to kill someone before I die. And they will kill me, and I, damn it, will not see all the further shame, therefore we can say that I will be fine. Almost awesome. And you all will live in this fricked up place. And you will all be asking each other when Russia is “decolonized”, – “But how did it happen? How did it happen?!?”

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Whoa. Russian volunteer Murz has published a very, very long post, which Girkin promoted as "recommended reading." Similar to his previous posts, it's highly critical of Russian command.

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Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko likely deflected Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to coerce Belarus into further Russian-Belarusian integration concessions during a meeting in Minsk on December 19

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The Kremlin has also attempted to conceal Putin’s likely original intentions to pressure Lukashenko into further concessions regarding integration with the Russian Federation.

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Russian forces targeted Kyiv with Shahed-131 and -136 kamikaze drone strikes overnight on December 18–19.

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Igor Girkin, a former Russian militant commander and prominent critical voice in the Russian milblogger information space, shared a Russian volunteer’s harsh critique of the Russian military’s overall performance in the war on December 19.[

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The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) is reportedly clashing with other pro-Russian authorities about basic administrative functions, suggesting a lack of cohesion between occupation administrations throughout various areas of occupied Ukraine.

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The Wagner Group has likely built its offensive model around tactical brutality in order to accommodate for and take advantage of its base of poorly trained and recently recruited convicts

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Key Takeaways

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko likely deflected Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to coerce Belarus into Russian-Belarusian integration concessions on December 19.

Russian forces targeted Kyiv with Shahed-131 and 136 kamikaze drone strikes overnight on December 18-19.

Igor Girkin, a former Russian militant commander and prominent critical voice in the Russian milblogger information space, wrote a harsh critique of the Russian military’s overall performance in the war.

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) reportedly clashed with other Russian occupation authorities regarding basic administration procedures, suggesting tensions between the various occupation administrations in Ukraine.

The Wagner Group has likely built its offensive model around tactical brutality in order to accommodate for and take advantage of its base of poorly trained and recently recruited convicts.

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line as Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian rear positions in Luhansk Oblast.

Russian forces reportedly lost positions south of Bakhmut on December 18 and continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and Donetsk City.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces are pulling back some elements from areas along the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continued efforts to establish the Wagner Group as a legitimate parastatal organization by petitioning notoriously nationalist elements in the Kremlin.

Russian occupation authorities continued to restrict movement within occupied territories and employ societal intimidation tactics.

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“The question is not whether the Russian Federation will launch a new offensive in the direction of Moldovan territory, but when it will happen: either at the beginning of the year, in January, February, or later, in March, (or) April,” Musteata told TVR Moldova, which released a teaser ahead of the Monday evening broadcast.

“But, judging by the information we have,” he said, “Russia can go further to create a corridor with the Transnistrian region, which is the territory of Moldova.”

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The question is not whether the Russian Federation will launch a new offensive in the direction of Moldovan territory,

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