re: Why doesnt Iran sink tankers or cargo vessels in the SOH?

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I understand that you are a moron who thinks the IRGC are rational ppl

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The structural constraint at the heart of the current energy crunch is the refinery barrel itself. Military jet fuel (JP-8) and civilian diesel are not refined from separate barrels — they compete for the same distillate cut from every barrel processed. So if Trump orders the Pentagon to start bombing Iran again, that will trigger draw downs on stocks — assuming the ops tempo in the Gulf is sustained — and refiners will face pressure to tilt output toward JP-8, which directly squeezes the supply of diesel and civil aviation fuel. In other words, there is no free barrel; every gallon of military fuel is a gallon not available to a trucking company, a farmer, or an airline.

Of all the downstream effects, diesel tightness is the most economically dangerous and the fastest-moving. Unlike gasoline, which is a consumer cost, diesel is an input cost — embedded in every freight shipment, every food delivery, every industrial process. When diesel tightens, the price increase doesn’t stop at the pump; it cascades through supply chains and lands simultaneously on freight rates, grocery prices, manufacturing margins, and retail costs. That kind of broad-based input inflation is one of the more reliable causes of recession, because it compresses margins economy-wide while simultaneously suppressing consumer purchasing power.

This helps explain why Donald Trump pivoted so quick to support the MoU with Iran. The real allocation question is not whether to release the SPR or whether to jawbone OPEC into producing more — it is how hard to run the war. Every incremental increase in operational intensity consumes distillate that the domestic economy cannot easily replace, tightening a transmission belt that runs directly from the Strait of Hormuz into Main Street prices. The tradeoff between war intensity and economic stability is not an abstract strategic concern; it is a daily refinery scheduling decision with macroeconomic consequences.

Here is the problem: currently, the US has approximately a 30-day supply of diesel. It is estimated that somewhere between 8% (VLCC class alone) and a figure approaching 15–20% of the broader crude and product tanker fleet is either stranded or effectively withdrawn from global circulation — a supply shock to shipping capacity that compounds the underlying oil supply disruption. This means there is no ready, quick solution to fill that gap in 30 days. In fact, the delay to restore the US supply of diesel could last as long as 60 days. In short, oil is not going to flow fast enough globally to meet existing demand, which probably accounts for Trump sudden decision last week to sign the MoU with Iran. A knowledgeable expert who provided me with this information believes that we will hit the wall of diesel shortage in July.

How’s that for cheery news?

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Laugh at me in month or two, but I am seeing a lot of things like this that we are that close to disaster. I think it's what drove Trump to the MOU and the comments about having four weeks of reserves and not wanting to be Herbert Hoover.

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The SOH gig is up. Iran is only hurting themselves.

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Someone forgot to tell Motiva in Port Arthur. Then you have Galveston. What you posted is fear porn. Nothing more.

We have no shortage of D6 either. Brownsville is kicking arse.

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It doesn’t matter

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