re: DJT - We run out of reserves at about 4 weeks...you wanna see bedlam?

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He may be. Right now, we are less than half of capacity (340 million barrels). Thanks, Joe

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Once again, this isn't about tUSA's strategic reserves. You cannot thank Joe for this.

This is what I voted for

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Cushing’s current inventory is 21.6 million barrels, according to the US Energy Information Administration.

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That was two weeks ago. It was at the operational minimum of 20.0 as of last week.

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Why admit this publicly?

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Everyone knows about it. It wasn’t a secret.

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Doesn’t it just signal to Iran that they can get an even better deal if they hold out longer?

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Absolutely. Time is on their side. And they can now turn off that spigot whenever they want.

Well, you can’t take anything Trump says at face value. Even if he manages intelligible sentences with discernible subjects and verbs…

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Interesting how the dems all of a sudden stopped talking about the green new deal when they could attack Orange for an oil spike price.

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Isn't it interesting... so many on the lefts enviro-insane side used to get excited at and recommended higher gas prices to force all of us losers to get off of fossil fuels. Now they worry about high gas prices and blame the president. I can't keep up.

How would the oil execs respond to a nuclear attack?????
Complain that the potus didn’t prevent it??

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China is going to gain so much diplomatically for helping the region during this war. So not only are they going to be able to get closer to Iran, Belt and Road Iran, etc., but they were also foil to the US in oil markets (US starts a war that cripples worldwide economies while China sacrifices to help these countries).

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Yes but we had to eliminate the British Empire. It just had to be done.

Many good points made by many on this topic.

I would like to add one aspect being overlooked.

Big Oil execs don’t want to expand their employment.

Drilling new wells and building new offshore rigs is expensive. They like the output to remain steady and mostly the same. They want to minimize their risk. Texas,Louisiana,and Oklahoma can produce enough crude to meet the demands of the SE US.

Also we have limited refining capacity. No one wants to build new refineries. Expanding existing refineries is costly and can run into environmental concerns.

In short the Big Oil execs are not comfortable with someone rocking their boat.

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DJT - We run out of reserves at about 4 weeks...

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Is he right?

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I’ve been running a Claude project on this for two months. I asked it for projections if the Strait is re-closed.

# Hypothetical Spoke — US Crude Drawdown Under a Hormuz Re-Closure

*Branch off the GOGET framework. Status: **hypothetical scenario study**, not a live-framework revision. Premise: with the MOU signed (Jun 15) and the strait reopening, Iran **re-closes** the Strait of Hormuz — a Path-C re-escalation, but starting from **today's depleted buffers** rather than the Feb-2026 pre-war stockpile. The entire point of the spoke is that the second closure hits a system that has already spent the cushion that absorbed the first. All starting figures are authoritative (EIA WPSR, week ending Jun 12, 2026); all forward numbers are **scenario estimates with stated assumptions**, not predictions.*

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## 0. Why a re-closure is not a replay of February

In Feb 2026 the strait closed into a **full** US buffer: SPR ~415 mb, Cushing ~29 mb, commercial well-stocked, the global system carrying normal floating storage. That buffer is now largely gone. A re-closure from here is a **second shock onto a drained system** — which compresses every timeline and raises every price milestone versus the first event. This is the single most important framing: *the GOGET Path-C midpoint ($130) was calibrated to a re-escalation from a fuller system; from today's starting point, a genuine re-closure skews above it.*

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## 1. Starting conditions — authoritative (WPSR, week ending Jun 12, 2026)

### 1a. Crude stocks by region

| Region | Stock (mb) | YoY | Operational floor (est.) | Runway to floor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PADD 1 — East Coast | **7.9** | -15.1% | ~6 | ~2 mb — *negligible; product-import dependent* |
| PADD 2 — Midwest (incl. Cushing) | **97.8** | -4.9% | ~80 (incl. Cushing ~18) | ~18 mb — *Canadian-fed, partial cushion* |
| — of which **Cushing** | **20.0** | -11.7% | **~18 (tank bottoms)** | **~2 mb — at minimum NOW** |
| PADD 3 — Gulf Coast | **243.8** | **+3.8%** | ~190 | ~54 mb — *the national swing buffer* |
| PADD 4 — Rocky Mtn | **23.5** | -1.3% | ~19 | ~4 mb — *isolated, self-supplied, least exposed* |
| PADD 5 — West Coast | **45.2** | -9.8% | ~30 | ~15 mb — *isolated, most import-exposed* |
| Alaska in-transit | 3.2 | — | — | — |
| **Commercial total** | **418.2** | -0.6% | **~350 (op. min) / ~300 (tank bottoms)** | **~68 mb to op. min** |
| **SPR** | **340.3** | -15.4% | rate-degrades < ~250; spent < ~150 | ~90 mb to rate-degradation |
| **Total crude (incl. SPR)** | **758.5** | -7.9% | — | — |

### 1b. Flows (the drain engine)

| Flow | Rate (mb/d) | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Domestic production | **13.8** | Near record; +6–9 mo lag to ramp materially |
| Crude imports | **5.7** (4-wk) | Mostly Canada (~4, pipeline, **not** Hormuz); Persian Gulf direct only ~0.3–0.5 |
| Crude exports | **4.9** (4-wk) | Terminal capacity ~8 ? ~3 mb/d of latent export-pull headroom |
| **Net crude imports** | **~0.8** | US is *barely* a net crude importer — direct import loss from Hormuz is small |
| Refinery inputs | **17.0** (4-wk) / 17.2 (wk) | **96.7% utilization** |
| Operable capacity | **18.0** | **Only ~1 mb/d of spare refining** |
| Net **product** exports | **6.1** (4-wk) | Gross product exports **7.8 mb/d** — the big swing |

**Operational-minimum logic.** *Cushing* tank bottoms ~18–20 mb (unpumpable heels, blending/pipeline integrity) — **it is already there.** *Commercial* "comfort floor" ~400 (we're at 418), true operational minimum ~350 (below the modern era's lows), theoretical tank bottoms ~300, scaled to today's larger system. *SPR* has no tank-bottom but its **drawdown-rate capability degrades below ~250 mb** and is functionally spent below ~150; max sustained release historically ~1.3–2.0 mb/d in practice (theoretical max ~4.4). *PADD 5* and *PADD 1* are the structurally fragile edges — isolated and import/product-dependent; *PADD 4* is the insulated core; *PADD 3* is the swing that does the actual work.

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## 2. The drain mechanism — why a closure empties US tanks despite near-self-sufficiency

The US loses almost no *direct* supply (only ~0.3–0.5 mb/d of Persian Gulf crude imports). The drain is **indirect and powerful**, through four channels:

1. **Export pull (largest).** A $130+ Brent world makes every US barrel maximally valuable abroad. With ~3 mb/d of latent crude-export-terminal headroom and Asia bidding desperately (§6), crude exports ramp from 4.9 toward 6–7 mb/d unless capped politically. **This is the dominant drain.**
2. **Refinery max-out.** Blowout cracks pull utilization from 96.7% toward ~99% (+~0.5–1.0 mb/d crude demand), but the ~1 mb/d spare is quickly exhausted — refining is already near its ceiling.
3. **PADD 5 direct loss.** The West Coast loses its Persian Gulf barrels and, being isolated (no pipeline from PADD 3, Jones-Act-constrained coastwise shipping), cannot be easily resupplied. It draws hardest in relative terms.
4. **SPR release.** Politically near-certain in a price spike — but it both *cushions* the commercial draw and *drains the SPR*, which is already at 340 with limited rate.

**Net:** stripping in max export pull (+1.5–2.0 mb/d), refinery ramp (+0.5–1.0), and a modest import loss (-0.5), the gross pull on US crude rises ~2.5–3.5 mb/d. An emergency SPR release of ~2.0 mb/d offsets much of it, leaving a **base-case commercial draw of ~2.0 mb/d (~14 mb/wk)** in the acute phase — versus the ~1.2 mb/d (~8 mb/wk) observed pre-closure. Higher (~3 mb/d) if exports run uncapped; lower as demand destruction and export controls bite.

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## 3. Drawdown timelines — to operational minimums and beyond

**Base case:** commercial draw ~14 mb/wk (2.0 mb/d) in Phase 1, SPR releasing ~2.0 mb/d, moderating as demand breaks and export curbs arrive. *Sensitivity:* "acute" (uncapped exports, ~3 mb/d commercial draw) pulls every milestone ~30–40% earlier; "managed" (early export controls + fast demand destruction, ~1.2 mb/d) pushes them ~50–70% later.

| Milestone | Base-case timing | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| **Cushing ? tank bottoms (~18)** | **Days–2 wks** | Already at 20. WTI **delivery squeeze** at the NYMEX point near-immediate — the first acute dislocation |
| Commercial ? 400 (strain zone) | **~1 wk** | Refiners/pipelines/terminals running on heels |
| PADD 5 ? ~30 (floor) | **~5–7 wks** | West Coast isolated; acute regional product crisis first |
| PADD 3 ? ~190 (floor) | **~5–6 wks** | The swing buffer exhausts; once gone, exports *must* be cut |
| Commercial ? 350 (operational minimum) | **~5–7 wks** | Unprecedented modern low; system-wide strain |
| SPR ? ~250 (rate degradation) | **~6–7 wks** | Emergency-release capability starts falling |
| PADD 2 ex-Cushing ? ~78 | ~3–4 wks | Canadian supply cushions; partial |
| PADD 1 ? ~6 | ~2–3 wks | Negligible crude; the East Coast crisis is *products*, not crude |
| Commercial ? ~300 (tank bottoms) | **~8–10 wks** *if closure persists & demand hasn't broken* | Physical floor; rationing territory |
| SPR ? ~150 (functionally spent) | **~3–4 months** | The strategic buffer is gone; no further policy cushion |
| PADD 4 ? ~19 | Barely draws | The one insulated region |

**Read:** the system reaches *operational minimum* (commercial ~350, SPR rate-degrading, Cushing already bottomed, PADD 5/3 at floors) in **roughly 5–7 weeks** in the base case. "Beyond" — tank bottoms and a spent SPR — arrives in **~2–4 months** *only if the closure persists and demand destruction hasn't yet broken the draw*. In practice something gives before then: demand collapses, exports are forced shut, or the strait is reopened by force or diplomacy.

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