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Message
Posted on 3/19/22 at 5:09 pm to LegendInMyMind
quote:
Some people have questioned/doubted that Russia even has them
Some people are stupid then... Guided munitions have been around way too long for Russia to not have them.
They may lack some of the more sophisticated types, but tv guided seems to be pretty low tech.
Posted on 3/19/22 at 5:14 pm to TexasForever
Posted on 3/19/22 at 5:17 pm to TutHillTiger
I do (that post was sarcastic). Wouldn’t surprise me if we had all kinds of wild shite somewhere. Which is exactly why I’ll never understand the melt by some that think a vodka fueled kleptocracy is a real threat to us.
Posted on 3/19/22 at 5:20 pm to PrecedentedTimes
russia isnt in the same league as we are in terms of conventional warfare. any war between us and them would be laughably one sided in that area. problem is they got shite ton of nukes
Posted on 3/19/22 at 5:22 pm to PrecedentedTimes
quote:
scherba? Retweeted
?
Visegrád 24
@visegrad24
Belarusian railway workers today sabotaged the railway lines leading to Ukraine, making it impossible for the Russians to resupply by train. The Russian logistics situation near Kyiv just went from bad to worse. It’s the largest sabotage action in Belarus so far during this war
Also reports that a Russian admiral has joined the dead heroes club. Unconfirmed, but every one of these has turned out to be true so far.
Posted on 3/19/22 at 5:42 pm to Jim Rockford
Welp, nice knowing ya, railway workers... Hope it was worth it
Posted on 3/19/22 at 5:47 pm to TexasForever
We've seen the reports of Russia "Finally using the thermobaric......" multiple times already. We've seen numerous videos of explosions that were "thermobaric". None of them turned out to be so. I'll wait for this time for it to be shot down or finally verified before I put any stock in it.
This post was edited on 3/19/22 at 5:48 pm
Posted on 3/19/22 at 5:53 pm to Jim Rockford
March 19, 3 pm ET
Ukrainian forces have defeated the initial Russian campaign of this war. That campaign aimed to conduct airborne and mechanized operations to seize Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and other major Ukrainian cities to force a change of government in Ukraine. That campaign has culminated. Russian forces continue to make limited advances in some parts of the theater but are very unlikely to be able to seize their objectives in this way. The doctrinally sound Russian response to this situation would be to end this campaign, accept a possibly lengthy operational pause, develop the plan for a new campaign, build up resources for that new campaign, and launch it when the resources and other conditions are ready. The Russian military has not yet adopted this approach. It is instead continuing to feed small collections of reinforcements into an ongoing effort to keep the current campaign alive. We assess that that effort will fail.
The ultimate fall of Mariupol is increasingly unlikely to free up enough Russian combat power to change the outcome of the initial campaign dramatically. Russian forces concentrated considerable combat power around Mariupol drawn from the 8th Combined Arms Army to the east and from the group of Russian forces in Crimea to the west. Had the Russians taken Mariupol quickly or with relatively few losses they would likely have been able to move enough combat power west toward Zaporizhiya and Dnipro to threaten those cities. The protracted siege of Mariupol is seriously weakening Russian forces on that axis, however. The confirmed death of the commander of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division likely indicates the scale of the damage Ukrainian defenders are inflicting on those formations. The block-by-block fighting in Mariupol itself is costing the Russian military time, initiative, and combat power. If and when Mariupol ultimately falls the Russian forces now besieging it may not be strong enough to change the course of the campaign dramatically by attacking to the west.
Russian forces in the south appear to be focusing on a drive toward Kryvyi Rih, presumably to isolate and then take Zaporizhiya and Dnipro from the west but are unlikely to secure any of those cities in the coming weeks if at all. Kryvyi Rih is a city of more than 600,000 and heavily fortified according to the head of its military administration. Zaporizhiya and Dnipro are also large. The Russian military has been struggling to take Mariupol, smaller than any of them, since the start of the war with more combat power than it is currently pushing toward Kryvyi Rih. The Russian advance on that axis is thus likely to bog down as all other Russian advances on major cities have done.
The Russian military continues to commit small groups of reinforcements to localized fighting rather than concentrating them to launch new large-scale operations. Russia continues to commit units drawn from its naval infantry from all fleets, likely because those units are relatively more combat-ready than rank-and-file Russian regiments and brigades. The naval infantry belonging to the Black Sea Fleet is likely the largest single pool of ready reserve forces the Russian military has not yet committed. Much of that naval infantry has likely been embarked on amphibious landing ships off the Odesa coast since early in the war, presumably ready to land near Odesa as soon as Russian forces from Crimea secured a reliable ground line of communication (GLOC) from Crimea to Odesa. The likelihood that Russian forces from Crimea will establish such a GLOC in the near future is becoming remote, however, and the Russian military has apparently begun using elements of the Black Sea Fleet naval infantry to reinforce efforts to take Mariupol.
The culmination of the initial Russian campaign is creating conditions of stalemate throughout most of Ukraine. Russian forces are digging in around the periphery of Kyiv and elsewhere, attempting to consolidate political control over areas they currently occupy, resupplying and attempting to reinforce units in static positions, and generally beginning to set conditions to hold in approximately their current forward positions for an indefinite time. Maxar imagery of Russian forces digging trenches and revetments in Kyiv Oblast over the past several days supports this assessment.[1] Comments by Duma members about forcing Ukraine to surrender by exhaustion in May could reflect a revised Russian approach to ending this conflict on terms favorable to Moscow.
Stalemate will likely be very violent and bloody, especially if it protracts. Stalemate is not armistice or ceasefire. It is a condition in war in which each side conducts offensive operations that do not fundamentally alter the situation. Those operations can be very damaging and cause enormous casualties. The World War I battles of the Somme, Verdun, and Passchendaele were all fought in conditions of stalemate and did not break the stalemate. If the war in Ukraine settles into a stalemate condition Russian forces will continue to bomb and bombard Ukrainian cities, devastating them and killing civilians, even as Ukrainian forces impose losses on Russian attackers and conduct counter-attacks of their own. The Russians could hope to break Ukrainians’ will to continue fighting under such circumstances by demonstrating Kyiv’s inability to expel Russian forces or stop their attacks even if the Russians are demonstrably unable to take Ukraine’s cities. Ukraine’s defeat of the initial Russian campaign may therefore set conditions for a devastating protraction of the conflict and a dangerous new period testing the resolve of Ukraine and the West. Continued and expanded Western support to Ukraine will be vital to seeing Ukraine through that new period.
Key Takeaways:
We now assess that the initial Russian campaign to seize Ukraine’s capital and major cities and force regime change has failed;
Russian forces continue efforts to restore momentum to this culminated campaign, but those efforts will likely also fail;
Russian troops will continue trying to advance to within effective artillery range of the center of Kyiv, but prospects for their success are unclear;
The war will likely descend into a phase of bloody stalemate that could last for weeks or months;
Russia will expand efforts to bombard Ukrainian civilians in order to break Ukrainians’ will to continue fighting (at which the Russians will likely fail);
The most dangerous current Russian advance is from Kherson north toward Kryvyi Rih in an effort to isolate Zaporizhiya and Dnipro from the west. Russian forces are unlikely to be able to surround or take Kryvyi Rih in the coming days, and may not be able to do so at all without massing much larger forces for the effort than they now have available on that axis;
The Russians appear to have abandoned plans to attack Odesa at least in the near term.
Full Report
Only bolded what og text had bolded...interesting update no less.
Ukrainian forces have defeated the initial Russian campaign of this war. That campaign aimed to conduct airborne and mechanized operations to seize Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and other major Ukrainian cities to force a change of government in Ukraine. That campaign has culminated. Russian forces continue to make limited advances in some parts of the theater but are very unlikely to be able to seize their objectives in this way. The doctrinally sound Russian response to this situation would be to end this campaign, accept a possibly lengthy operational pause, develop the plan for a new campaign, build up resources for that new campaign, and launch it when the resources and other conditions are ready. The Russian military has not yet adopted this approach. It is instead continuing to feed small collections of reinforcements into an ongoing effort to keep the current campaign alive. We assess that that effort will fail.
The ultimate fall of Mariupol is increasingly unlikely to free up enough Russian combat power to change the outcome of the initial campaign dramatically. Russian forces concentrated considerable combat power around Mariupol drawn from the 8th Combined Arms Army to the east and from the group of Russian forces in Crimea to the west. Had the Russians taken Mariupol quickly or with relatively few losses they would likely have been able to move enough combat power west toward Zaporizhiya and Dnipro to threaten those cities. The protracted siege of Mariupol is seriously weakening Russian forces on that axis, however. The confirmed death of the commander of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division likely indicates the scale of the damage Ukrainian defenders are inflicting on those formations. The block-by-block fighting in Mariupol itself is costing the Russian military time, initiative, and combat power. If and when Mariupol ultimately falls the Russian forces now besieging it may not be strong enough to change the course of the campaign dramatically by attacking to the west.
Russian forces in the south appear to be focusing on a drive toward Kryvyi Rih, presumably to isolate and then take Zaporizhiya and Dnipro from the west but are unlikely to secure any of those cities in the coming weeks if at all. Kryvyi Rih is a city of more than 600,000 and heavily fortified according to the head of its military administration. Zaporizhiya and Dnipro are also large. The Russian military has been struggling to take Mariupol, smaller than any of them, since the start of the war with more combat power than it is currently pushing toward Kryvyi Rih. The Russian advance on that axis is thus likely to bog down as all other Russian advances on major cities have done.
The Russian military continues to commit small groups of reinforcements to localized fighting rather than concentrating them to launch new large-scale operations. Russia continues to commit units drawn from its naval infantry from all fleets, likely because those units are relatively more combat-ready than rank-and-file Russian regiments and brigades. The naval infantry belonging to the Black Sea Fleet is likely the largest single pool of ready reserve forces the Russian military has not yet committed. Much of that naval infantry has likely been embarked on amphibious landing ships off the Odesa coast since early in the war, presumably ready to land near Odesa as soon as Russian forces from Crimea secured a reliable ground line of communication (GLOC) from Crimea to Odesa. The likelihood that Russian forces from Crimea will establish such a GLOC in the near future is becoming remote, however, and the Russian military has apparently begun using elements of the Black Sea Fleet naval infantry to reinforce efforts to take Mariupol.
The culmination of the initial Russian campaign is creating conditions of stalemate throughout most of Ukraine. Russian forces are digging in around the periphery of Kyiv and elsewhere, attempting to consolidate political control over areas they currently occupy, resupplying and attempting to reinforce units in static positions, and generally beginning to set conditions to hold in approximately their current forward positions for an indefinite time. Maxar imagery of Russian forces digging trenches and revetments in Kyiv Oblast over the past several days supports this assessment.[1] Comments by Duma members about forcing Ukraine to surrender by exhaustion in May could reflect a revised Russian approach to ending this conflict on terms favorable to Moscow.
Stalemate will likely be very violent and bloody, especially if it protracts. Stalemate is not armistice or ceasefire. It is a condition in war in which each side conducts offensive operations that do not fundamentally alter the situation. Those operations can be very damaging and cause enormous casualties. The World War I battles of the Somme, Verdun, and Passchendaele were all fought in conditions of stalemate and did not break the stalemate. If the war in Ukraine settles into a stalemate condition Russian forces will continue to bomb and bombard Ukrainian cities, devastating them and killing civilians, even as Ukrainian forces impose losses on Russian attackers and conduct counter-attacks of their own. The Russians could hope to break Ukrainians’ will to continue fighting under such circumstances by demonstrating Kyiv’s inability to expel Russian forces or stop their attacks even if the Russians are demonstrably unable to take Ukraine’s cities. Ukraine’s defeat of the initial Russian campaign may therefore set conditions for a devastating protraction of the conflict and a dangerous new period testing the resolve of Ukraine and the West. Continued and expanded Western support to Ukraine will be vital to seeing Ukraine through that new period.
Key Takeaways:
We now assess that the initial Russian campaign to seize Ukraine’s capital and major cities and force regime change has failed;
Russian forces continue efforts to restore momentum to this culminated campaign, but those efforts will likely also fail;
Russian troops will continue trying to advance to within effective artillery range of the center of Kyiv, but prospects for their success are unclear;
The war will likely descend into a phase of bloody stalemate that could last for weeks or months;
Russia will expand efforts to bombard Ukrainian civilians in order to break Ukrainians’ will to continue fighting (at which the Russians will likely fail);
The most dangerous current Russian advance is from Kherson north toward Kryvyi Rih in an effort to isolate Zaporizhiya and Dnipro from the west. Russian forces are unlikely to be able to surround or take Kryvyi Rih in the coming days, and may not be able to do so at all without massing much larger forces for the effort than they now have available on that axis;
The Russians appear to have abandoned plans to attack Odesa at least in the near term.
Full Report
Only bolded what og text had bolded...interesting update no less.
Posted on 3/19/22 at 5:53 pm to LegendInMyMind
The whole thermobaric thing is so overrated and 99.9% of the planet couldn’t look at a thermobaric explosion and tell the difference from any other explosion.
Posted on 3/19/22 at 5:58 pm to swervr
quote:
swervr
I wouldn’t put too much stock into that report that gets posted everyday. Frankly it’s written like fanfic by some guy who went to the Army war college 20 years ago and knows a bunch of fancy military terms. Then reads the same news we do and writes it like a field grade officer who likes looking at maps and watching the history channel.
Not saying he’s completely wrong but I seriously doubt it’s even close to the reality on the ground or indicative of the Russian commander’s mindset.
It is fun to read though
Posted on 3/19/22 at 6:03 pm to GeauxxxTigers23
quote:
The whole thermobaric thing is so overrated and 99.9% of the planet couldn’t look at a thermobaric explosion and tell the difference from any other explosion.
I even went so far as to post a military video of what those particular Russian thermo rockets look like when they explode. It doesn't matter. Any big explosion with good video in Ukraine will get labeled "thermobaric".
Posted on 3/19/22 at 6:14 pm to GeauxxxTigers23
Frederick Kagan was a professor of history at West Point and his particular area of specialization is Russian/Soviet military history. He's made a career of studying the mindset of Russian commanders. You may disagree with his conclusions, time will tell. You can't say he's not qualified though. If you go back and read his daily reports, he's been pretty much spot on from the beginning.
Posted on 3/19/22 at 6:23 pm to Jim Rockford
I didn’t say he was unqualified and I even went out of my way to say that he may be right. But I think his takes read like someone doing a play by play of wwii 30 years after it already ended. So I will remain hopeful but skeptical
Posted on 3/19/22 at 6:57 pm to TutHillTiger
quote:
You know we have spent about 50 trillion in black box advanced weapon systems over last decades or so right? None of it public
I just wanna see a functional rail gun deployed.
Posted on 3/19/22 at 7:12 pm to Lonnie Utah
quote:
You know we have spent about 50 trillion in black box advanced weapon systems over last decades or so right? None of it public
I just wanna see a functional rail gun deployed.
The government is saving it to use on the protestors that will breakout nationwide once gas hits $6/gallon.
Posted on 3/19/22 at 7:31 pm to GeauxxxTigers23
Drone footage of the Ukies shelling a Russian base. I'm no military expert or an expert on drones or anything like that, but that looks like video from a commercial drone with a GoPro attached instead of a video from a military drone. Why is Russia not jamming all the cell towers so the Ukies cannot use a $1500 commercial drone as artillery spotter is insane to me.
Posted on 3/19/22 at 7:46 pm to Jim Rockford
quote:
Annnd the claimed hypersonic missile attack is likely a Russian hoax
I saw that earlier, but didn't know if it had been posted yet.
Posted on 3/19/22 at 7:47 pm to WeeWee
quote:
Why is Russia not jamming all the cell towers so the Ukies cannot use a $1500 commercial drone as artillery spotter is insane to me.
Because, in their infinite wisdom, the Russians developed a brand new state-of-the-art communications system/network that is reliant upon local 3G and 4G cellular infrastructure. Seriously. They put it into operation just last year.
This post was edited on 3/19/22 at 7:48 pm
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