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re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Posted on 2/12/23 at 1:22 pm to OutsideObserver
Posted on 2/12/23 at 1:22 pm to OutsideObserver
How Russian armor is taught to clear minefields...
I think these are the most amazing displays of incompetence I have seen except maybe the Russian poking the downed suicide drone with a stick.
Twitter video
I think these are the most amazing displays of incompetence I have seen except maybe the Russian poking the downed suicide drone with a stick.
Twitter video
2
Posted on 2/12/23 at 1:27 pm to AU86
If they go by Prigozhin/Wagner's current methodology of attack they would empty their prisons in about a year.
I guess it could be one way to stave off mobilisation and extend the war further hoping the West loses interest and stops supplying Ukraine.
I guess it could be one way to stave off mobilisation and extend the war further hoping the West loses interest and stops supplying Ukraine.
Posted on 2/12/23 at 1:40 pm to Obtuse1
quote:
How Russian armor is taught to clear minefields...
I think these are the most amazing displays of incompetence I have seen except maybe the Russian poking the downed suicide drone with a stick.
I am beginning to wonder how much Russia believes the stuff about the Donbas/Zelensky line being the Ukraine's final line of defence.
They are expending a hell of a lot of resources to crack it, even if it is poorly trained mobiks/prisoners with old equipment.
The only other rationale is to deplete Ukraine so they can't mount further offensives giving Russia time to rebuild but that leaves the question how does Russia rebuild their military with the direction their economy is heading and a plunge in the working age demographic?
Edit: Quote and clarity
This post was edited on 2/12/23 at 1:46 pm
Posted on 2/12/23 at 1:42 pm to LSUCanFAN
quote:
Russia is very very worried the UA spring offensive is going to rout entrenched RU positions and another debacle will happen
Not nearly as worried as they likely will be by the end of the month.
NATO defense ministers are meeting this week in Brussels, which means that plans for providing jets to Ukraine will get sorted out.
And then, President Biden has a trip to Poland scheduled for the 24th, the anniversary of the start of the war. My bet is that he actually goes to Lviv. He'll meet with Zelensky in any case, and he's going to be bringing presents.
Russia has a lot planned for the 24th, including a big concert in Moscow, etc. They are also likely to make some big missile and drone attacks that day. See this: LINK /
quote:
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that Moscow would take great measures to overshadow anti-Russia events allegedly being planned by the West to mark the war’s anniversary on Feb. 24.
“Our diplomacy will do everything to ensure that the anti-Russian sabbaths planned for the end of February — as if timed to coincide with the anniversary of the special military operation, both in New York and at other sites that the West is now actively working on together with the Kyiv regime — so that this will not turn out to be the only events that will gain the world’s attention,” the country’s top envoy said in a wide-ranging interview to state TV Russia 24 and RIA Novosti.
I don't think that Biden would be going if he weren't sure that Russia will not be able to "counter-program" his visit out of the top headline. That means that whatever we will be announcing for Ukraine at that time will be "splashy." I see three possibilities (or some combination of these):
1) ATACMS
2) F-16s
3) A lot of Bradleys and other heavy armor
Either 1 or 3 likely spells doom for Russia's hold on the South of Ukraine this spring. Ukraine doesn't need more than 20 or so ATACMS to take out Kerch and hit other Crimean targets that will greatly impede Russian logistics. And we can easily give another 250 or so Bradleys and Strykers that will ensure the success of the Ukrainian spring offensive.
It's why I think that Ukraine is making a mistake publicly pushing so hard right now for jets. I understand that such an announcement will make a big psychological impact in both Ukraine and in Russia, but an announcement of jets won't help Ukraine's spring offensive, and I really believe that the offensive must succeed if Ukraine is going to win the war on favorable terms. And I think they need a lot more heavy armor than what has been promised so far to be confident in that.
Posted on 2/12/23 at 1:43 pm to OutsideObserver
quote:
The only other rationale is to deplete Ukraine so they can't mount further offensives giving Russia time to rebuild but that leaves the question how does Russia rebuild their military with the direction their economy is heading and a plunge in the working age demographic?
Russia is banking on a numbers game. They think they can sustain casualties on a rate that Ukraine can only keep up with for a time. And if they war drags on long enough, they may be proven right. That remains to be seen though. In the meantime, the bodies will continue to be piled up on both sides.
Posted on 2/12/23 at 1:51 pm to Darth_Vader
That's a gamble itself. There was a report yesterday of a mobilized battalion of ethnic minorities refusing to advance. If that spreads, the Russian military is in deep kimchi. Russians in WWII were fighting for their existence, plus they knew the choice was attack or face either a firing squad or decades in a gulag. Putin doesn't have that stick to hold over them yet, and probably won't.
I think the better analog is WWI, where Russians thrown into a war of choice with bad preparation and no support, mutinied or simply walked home.
I think the better analog is WWI, where Russians thrown into a war of choice with bad preparation and no support, mutinied or simply walked home.
Posted on 2/12/23 at 2:28 pm to Darth_Vader
quote:
Russia is banking on a numbers game. They think they can sustain casualties on a rate that Ukraine can only keep up with for a time. And if they war drags on long enough, they may be proven right. That remains to be seen though. In the meantime, the bodies will continue to be piled up on both sides.
True, prior history shows that they have the capability and ideology to endure attrition based warfare.
In terms of a protracted war, I favour agreeing that Russia will likely have the upper hand through terms of sheer manpower regardless of the damage this may do to them long term.
I do question how far that ideology will extend however when not combating an actual invasion, hence Putin trying to sell the whole Russia is facing an existential threat/invasion line and the "annexation" of occupied regions.
Without a successful Ukrainian offensive once mobile warfare becomes viable again I see this becoming a battle between Ukrainian support continuing versus Russian tolerance in the short term (mid to end next year) and beyond that more a question of attrition as the body pile then will be likely approaching over a million.
Posted on 2/12/23 at 3:04 pm to Darth_Vader
quote:
Russia is banking on a numbers game. They think they can sustain casualties on a rate that Ukraine can only keep up with for a time.
100%. I have seen a lot of videos from Ukrainian soldiers over the past week or two and they are all talking about the same thing: the tremendous amount of Russian soldiers that are being sent at them. They talk about killing many and yet facing wave after wave that is pretty much nonstop.
Posted on 2/12/23 at 3:49 pm to AU86
It one thing to have high causality rates on both side in trench warfare. However, one sided high losses from armor blowing them selves up on anti-tank mines is another thing. Trading armor/men for mines didn’t gain much of anything……
Posted on 2/12/23 at 4:13 pm to AU86
quote:
They talk about killing many and yet facing wave after wave that is pretty much nonstop.
This sounds like a page from China's play book in sending troops across the North Korean border during that conflict...
Posted on 2/12/23 at 4:21 pm to OutsideObserver
quote:
True, prior history shows that they have the capability and ideology to endure attrition based warfare.
WW I and WW II not the same. Afghanistan not the same
Russo/Japan not the same
Not every war Russia has been involved in was the same
Posted on 2/12/23 at 4:45 pm to tigeraddict
quote:
It one thing to have high causality rates on both side in trench warfare. However, one sided high losses from armor blowing them selves up on anti-tank mines is another thing. Trading armor/men for mines didn’t gain much of anything……
Yep. Here's a new Twitter link to a bunch of Russian tanks and other vehicles clearing a field of mines near Vuldehar, one exploding vehicle at a time.
LINK
It's as though the very idea of a "mine" is foreign concept to these Russian tankers.
"Oh, the tank in front of me just got blown up by a mine in the road. I'm sure that we'll be fine if we just go around it. There's no way that the Ukrainians would've planted another mine just off the side of the road."
Posted on 2/12/23 at 4:51 pm to AU86
quote:
100%. I have seen a lot of videos from Ukrainian soldiers over the past week or two and they are all talking about the same thing: the tremendous amount of Russian soldiers that are being sent at them. They talk about killing many and yet facing wave after wave that is pretty much nonstop.
From the UK Ministry of Defence:
quote:
Although Defence Intelligence cannot verify Ukraine’s methodology, the trends the data illustrate are likely accurate.
Posted on 2/12/23 at 5:59 pm to doubleb
quote:
WW I and WW II not the same. Afghanistan not the same
Russo/Japan not the same
Not every war Russia has been involved in was the same
I didn't claim they were?
What has been a trend since the Napoleonic Invasion of 1812 in Russian methodology when threatened by invasion though is a willingness to trade space and/or bodies for time.
Whether Russian stoicism has been conditioned by the state to the point that they accept the invasion of Ukraine and the losses it is incurring as "defending Russia" remains to be seen.
Edit: Quote
This post was edited on 2/12/23 at 6:01 pm
Posted on 2/12/23 at 8:00 pm to GOP_Tiger
quote:
From the UK Ministry of Defence:
Averages at around 500 per day or 180,000 over the year, though compared to some of their losses per day in other conflicts this is "medium"
Posted on 2/12/23 at 9:14 pm to OutsideObserver
isw update
quote:
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, February 12. This report focuses on the impact of Russian information operations on delaying and deterring Western transfers of high-end weapons systems and other military aid to Ukraine. Russia has partially reconstituted its ability to conduct information operations as part of its hybrid warfare campaigns in support of military operations. These information operations will continue to emerge as Russia attempts to set conditions for upcoming operations and mitigate setbacks, and the West must critically evaluate the context of Russian information operations and avoid simply interacting with them on their own terms.
quote:
Russia has partially regained the ability to conduct successful information campaigns in support of strategic objectives and even discrete operational aims. Russian hybrid warfare theory has long called for the integration of information campaigns and military operations, with information operations sometimes taking precedence over kinetic activity....Russia has, however, reconstituted the ability to conduct discrete information campaigns in support of specific strategic objectives and to tailor those campaigns to mitigate battlefield setbacks and to set conditions for future planned operations.
quote:
Russian information campaigns have supported a continuous strategic objective of deterring or slowing the West’s provision of material support to Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely bought into his own pre-invasion narrative that the West would not support Ukraine but would instead seek to maintain good relations with Russia, fueling his hopes for a speedy victory in Ukraine.
quote:
Russia’s operational-level information campaigns aim either to set conditions for planned Russian operations or to mitigate Russian military failures. Russia shapes the information space in preparation for offensive operations to impede Ukraine’s ability to retain the battlefield initiative or prepare for the offensives. Russia also uses information campaigns to deter the West from supporting Ukraine’s counteroffensive efforts and exploitation of Russian military setbacks. Some of these Russian information campaigns are also intended to reestablish Russia’s geostrategic deterrence by rebuilding the projection of power that had been the focus and hallmark of Russian information campaigns before the 2022 re-invasion
quote:
Russia uses the narrative that Ukraine is incapable of defeating Russia because of inherent power disparities between the two states to mitigate major Russian setbacks or Russian failures to achieve rapid successes in major offensive operations. Russian information campaigns earlier in the invasion relied on amplifying the assumption that Russia possesses the “second largest military in the world” with advanced military capabilities. These information operations aimed to mislead the West and Ukraine into believing that any transfers of military equipment would be irrelevant because Ukraine would not be able to withstand rapidly unfolding offensive operations from different directions and would be vulnerable to Russian attack. The Kremlin, for example, threatened that Russia would view continuing Western military aid shipments to Ukraine as legitimate military targets in early March 2022.
The Kremlin reframed its information operations to exaggerate the importance of every tactical advance following the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv Oblast and redeployment to Donbas in spring-summer 2022. The narrative adjusted the idea of Russian military might from sweeping offensive operations that were no longer possible to make much of steady and grinding gains on the frontlines
quote:
Russia intensified narratives about the risk of nuclear escalation in September-November 2022 to reestablish deterrence and dissuade the West from providing Ukraine the materiel needed to continue its counteroffensives following devastating Russian military failures in Kharkiv Oblast. Putin began making deliberately vague and general references to nuclear use during his annexation speech on September 30 following sweeping Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast
quote:
It is now clear that the Russian information campaign centering on peace negotiations that intensified in December 2022 was aimed—among other things—at delaying the provision of Western tanks and other advanced equipment essential for the continuation of Ukrainian mechanized counteroffensives in order to set conditions for Russia’s own planned offensives. The Kremlin sharply amplified a false negotiations narrative throughout December 2022, with numerous Russian officials giving intentionally misleading signals of Moscow’s willingness to engage in serious negotiations with Ukraine
quote:
Russia continues its shaping effort targeting Western provisions of long-range weapons and tanks to Ukraine by spreading the narrative that Ukraine will deliberately threaten Russia with these weapons instead of prioritizing the liberation of its Russian-occupied territories. Putin accused the United States of purposely protracting the war on December 22, 2022, following the US authorization to transfer Patriot air-defense systems to Ukraine on December 21, 2022
Kremlin officials are continuing to foster the narrative that Western transfers of longer-range precision rocket systems and Leopard tanks pose some new threat to Russian security, even though they pose no greater threat than the provision of Soviet tanks or other precision systems
quote:
Russia will continue to weaponize information operations to directly support discrete military operations in Ukraine—especially after it has regained the initiative on the frontlines in eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin is resuming a narrative exaggerating Russian frontline victories with the ongoing offensives on Bakhmut and Lyman. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is proudly parading victories over captured settlements around Bakhmut, but the impact of such information operations is waning—both Ukraine and pro-war Russian nationalists have become less willing to accept claims of inevitable Russian victory at face value because of the year of Russian military incompetence
The Kremlin appears to be developing other narratives at the time of this publication as well, with nationalist officials making outlandish nuclear threats as a response to recent Western weapons provisions and transfer pledges....The West should consider that Russian discussions of negotiations may not be about negotiations or conditions for peace at all, but may rather be information campaigns specifically targeted at getting Russia through windows of opportunity or vulnerability on the battlefield.
quote:
All these information campaigns will support overarching Kremlin strategic aims of splitting the West from Ukraine, deterring or delaying the provision of Western materiel, and generally undermining Western support for Ukraine and the cohesion of the Western coalition.
Posted on 2/12/23 at 9:15 pm to StormyMcMan
quote:
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on February 12:
Ukrainian officials continued to question the Russian military’s ability to launch large-scale strategic offensive operations in Ukraine.[28]
The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces have likely suffered the highest rate of casualties in Ukraine since the first weeks of the invasion based on statistics obtained from the Ukrainian General Staff, with an average of 824 casualties per day in the past week.[29] The UK MoD stated that they cannot verify the Ukrainian General Staff’s methodology for counting Russian casualties.
A Russian State Duma parliamentarian called for increased censorship legislation to protect Russian military figures from criticism.[30]
The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) released an intercepted call excerpt of Shahed drone operators in Ukraine speaking in Kurdish and Farsi and stated that Russian forces may be using Kurdish mercenaries to operate Iranian drones in Ukraine.[31]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are continuing offensive operations northwest of Svatove.[32] Russian forces continued offensive operations around Kreminna with a reported 23 combat clashes in the area.[33]
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.[34]
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner Group forces seized Krasna Hora north of Bakhmut.[35] Prigozhin also falsely claimed that Wagner Group forces are the only Russian forces within a 50km radius of Bakhmut.[36
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces in Kherson Oblast lack the capability to start a full-scale offensive, supporting ISW’s prior assessments.[37]
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky stated that Ukrainian officials believe that Russian officials will postpone a planned second wave of mobilization because of persisting problems associated with the first mobilization wave.[38]
Russian sources claimed that Russia may build a Black Sea Fleet base in occupied Mariupol.[39]
CNN published an interview with two POWs who were Wagner Group prison recruits who claimed that Wagner Group severely misled recruits about the nature of the war and combat missions.[40] The fighters claimed that Wagner forces used prison recruits in human-wave assaults in summer assaults around Lysychansk and sustained high casualties.
Posted on 2/12/23 at 9:24 pm to Obtuse1
So what should the following armor have done?
Posted on 2/12/23 at 9:43 pm to GOP_Tiger
quote:
Ukraine doesn't need more than 20 or so ATACMS to take out Kerch and hit other Crimean targets that will greatly impede Russian logistics.
Question.. can the ATACMS be shot down by anti-missile systems?
I keep seeing that Ukraine doesn’t need many to take out high value targets (particularly the Kerch Bridge) and I think “surely they would see that coming.”
Granted, they let drones hit airbases in Russia so I realize their competence is always questionable. Just wondering if there’s some specific reason they can’t be shot down.
Posted on 2/12/23 at 10:29 pm to jeffsdad
Either turned around following in their previous tracks and finding another route or call EOD if it’s safe enough to stay in the area. And the following question about ATACMS the answer is yes they can be targeted by air defenses. The ATACMS flies faster than the standard rockets we give Ukraine for the HIMARS though so it would be harder to hit. It wouldn’t be easy for the Russians but it can absolutely be targeted and hit. I would think the U.S. factors that in to what they already send is intercept rate.
This post was edited on 2/12/23 at 10:31 pm
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