re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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But there’s no doubt Storm Shadows can be fitted to Ukrainian fighters. It would be better to use their Su-27s though to carry them. Storm Shadow is a heavy munition and the heavier the load the faster you burn fuel and their Su-27s can fly much farther with heavier loads. We fixed a toilet to an A-1 in Vietnam the Ukrainians would fly on the wing of that aircraft and hold onto that thing if it meant being able to strike Crimea. They will figure it out in short order.

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I certainly hope you're correct, but I also know that one of the reasons that the UK is getting rid of its Tranche 1 Eurofighter Typhoons is that they weren't built with the electronic connections to fire Storm Shadow, and the conversion is supposed to be expensive.

But, we figured out how to get a MiG-29 to fire HARM with the pilot using a tablet in the cockpit, so hopefully, that same kind of thing can be done for Storm Shadow. Because, as you say, that thing carries a massive warhead. One hit with it and the Kerch Bridge is history, and Russian bases at Sevastopol and Saky become unusable. A dozen of those would fundamentally change the war, and I've seen estimates that the RAF still has at least 700 of them, and the missile is still in production, so the UK should be able to replace anything it sends to Ukraine.

Look at the size of this missile:




In addition, if I'm reading between the lines properly, it's clear that the UK is fully prepared to sent Eurofighter Typhoons to Ukraine if other NATO members are not prepared to send jets.

It looks like Italy is about to order some more new Typhoons, so again, it's a production line that's still humming along, and the RAF will be able to replace anything it sends to Ukraine.

There was a very long and detailed article in The Drive yesterday covering the feasibility of sending Typhoons to Ukraine and the advantages and disadvantages that the plane would have for Ukraine.

The authors point out that the older Tranche 1 planes have almost no air-to-ground capability, which limits their value to Ukraine but also makes them "less of an escalation," as those planes really couldn't be used to strike targets in Russia.

Anyway, I personally think that the Typhoon is Ukraine's 3rd choice, after the F-16 and the Mirage, but we'll see what happens.

It’s even bigger than that picture gives it justice. Like the size of a mini submarine. That’s why I said it would be better to use their Su-27s to carry them if/when they come. The Brits have some of the oldest typhoons out there as you mentioned but in that same context so do the Dutch with their f-16s. Some of their airframes were built in the early 80s, older than some of their pilots. They are retiring these first and would be the airframes most likely to go to Ukraine. Of course they have been updated every now and then with new avionics, radar, etc but there’s still a lot of hours on the airframes themselves. We have many already in the boneyard built after some of the Dutch f-16s still active.

A lot going on in the information theatre over the weekend, could be a busy couple of weeks or so groundside before it gets slushy.

Tass - Russian diplomat urges to legally seal West’s deceit regarding Minsk agreements

Tass - Russian diplomat believes latest Nord Stream findings deserve emergency NATO summit

Also there is a chemical weapons claim doing the rounds via the Gateway Pundit which is speculation at best, even by GP's standards. It has also been promulgated on similar boards in other regions.

Gateway Pundit - EXCLUSIVE: Is Ukraine Using Chemical Weapons?

British Defence Intelligence
UPDATE ON UKRAINE 12 February 2023
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

Over the past two weeks, Russia has likely suffered its highest rate of casualties since the first week of the invasion of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian General Staff release daily statistics on Russian casualties. Although Defence Intelligence cannot verify Ukraine's methodology, the trends the data illustrate are likely accurate. The mean average for the last seven days was 824 casualties per day, over four times the rate reported over June-July 2022. Ukraine also continues to suffer a high attrition rate.

The uptick in Russian casualties is likely due to a range of factors including lack of trained personnel, coordination, and resources across the front - this is exemplified in Vuhledar and Bakhmut.

So remember last weekend after my weekly conversation with some of my friends I said That Prigo and WG were getting shite on by the Kremlin and speculation was Prigo would be the fall guy for any issues in Ukraine? My folks were right. So effective Friday there is to be no more mention of WG on Russian State TV he is being treated as radioactive material. I just want to say personally to BK whatever he is this week and frick you botmfer. Also my guy in Russia told me to say hello to my buddy in CZ and he said “We’ll see him in court…hope it’s not the Hague lol” no mobilization because no weaponry for the people they have now. Oh just read above-old news. Likely dead Russians this week 4K+

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I just want to say personally to BK whatever he is this week and frick you botmfer

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It was over a month ago that he came back and bet me that Bakhmut would fall in a week.

Which, by the way, is the situation at Bakhmut stabilizing? It seems that Ukraine has definitely stabilized things south of Bakhmut for the time being, and that's where the greater danger was. Russia is still making some progress north of the city, but I also think that's slowing down.

A few weeks ago, I thought that Ukraine needed to go ahead and withdraw from the city, but they have instead reinforced it and seem to be doing fine there for now.


EDIT: on the other hand, I'm just now reading that Ukraine is closing press access to Bakhmut, which isn't a good sign -- but I'd still bet BKR that Bakhmut will hold on for another week.

isw update

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Ukrainian military officials and Russian pro-war nationalist voices are downplaying Russia’s ability to launch a sweeping large-scale offensive in Donetsk Oblast in the current circumstances of the Russian Armed Forces. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Andriy Chernyak, stated that Russia does not have the resources necessary to launch a large-scale offensive operation on February 24 to coincide with the anniversary of Russia’s 2022 invasion.[1] Chernyak noted that Russians are preparing to intensify their attacks in eastern Ukraine in the next few weeks and are currently searching for weak spots in Ukrainian defenses.

Russian milbloggers continue to appear demoralized at the Kremlin’s prospects for executing a major offensive. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) commander Alexander Khodakovsky questioned why Russian forces are wasting their limited resources on small-scale grinding advances rather than accumulating combat force to launch larger-scale offensives.

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Russian forces’ reported culmination and tactical failures around Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, have likely further weakened the Russian ultranationalist community’s belief that Russian forces are able to launch a decisive offensive operation. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces failed to quickly advance in the first days of their offensive to capture Vuhledar and that Russian forces had lost the initiative by the end of January due to Ukrainian forces’ rapid transfer of reserves to the area.

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The disparity between the limited but significant Russian advances in the Bakhmut area and the lack of meaningful advances elsewhere in Ukraine may support milblogger and Ukrainian observations that Russian forces are unable to secure rapid advances through traditional mechanized maneuver warfare. The Russian military command is deploying its most elite units to the Bakhmut area in smaller formations using urban infiltration tactics, according to the limited footage of Russian tactics in the area that ISW has observed

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Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is trying to salvage his declining influence in Russia as the Kremlin continues to sideline him and his mercenaries. Prigozhin attempted to improve the declining reputation of his Wagner mercenaries in an interview with a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger Semyon Pegov (known under the alias Wargonzo) on February 10. Prigozhin responded to a series of questions about Wagner controversies such as high casualties and ineffectiveness of recruited convicts, execution of deserters, treatment of recruited forces as cannon fodder, Prigozhin’s harsh criticism of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and his supposed political aspirations, and Wagner mercenaries bearing “symbols of the Third Reich” despite fighting to “denazify” Ukraine

The Kremlin is continuing to dim Prigozhin’s star by depriving him of the right to recruit in prisons and by targeting his influence in the information space. In addition to the Wargonzo interview, a Wagner-affiliated milblogger obtained a document that outlines rules for covering the war in Ukraine with explicit requirements to refrain from mentioning Wagner and Prigozhin in the media.[13] The document also calls on media officials and milbloggers to refrain from praising Deputy Commander of the Russian Joint Grouping of Forces in Ukraine, Army General Sergei Surovikin, who is reportedly affiliated with Wagner

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Prigozhin likely attempted to deflect attention from his controversies by undercutting the Kremlin’s unrealistic goals for the war in Ukraine. Prigozhin forecasted that it would take Russian forces up to two years to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative borders and three years to advance to the Dnipro River from the east. Prigozhin added that Russian society would need to be drastically militarized for the Kremlin to reach the English Channel, likely either hyperbolizing Russia’s aims of destroying NATO or referring to the Cold War-era Soviet war plans aimed at conducting a rapid blitzkrieg to the Channel coast.

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Prigozhin’s criticism of the Kremlin’s military campaign resembles the rhetorical approach of the former Russian militant Igor Girkin. Girkin had previously assisted the Kremlin by leading proxy armed formations in Crimea and Donbas in 2014 until the Kremlin deprived him of any influence following his surrender of Slovyansk in July 2014. Girkin became an embittered critic of the Kremlin and the Russian military command while seeking to rehabilitate his reputation in extremist Russian nationalist circles. Prigozhin’s uncharacteristically nihilistic forecast about Russian offensive prospects closely mirrors Girkin’s forecasts, and it is possible that Prigozhin is also turning into a bitter zealot who is losing his ability to leverage his parallel military to obtain political influence.

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Russian forces targeted southern Ukraine with air, missile, and aerial and maritime drone strikes overnight on February 10-11. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted 20 of 24 Russian UAVs and one Kh-101 missile overnight.

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Key Takeaways

Ukrainian military officials and Russian pro-war nationalist voices are downplaying Russia’s ability to launch a sweeping large-scale offensive in Donetsk Oblast in the current circumstances of the Russian Armed Forces.

Russian forces’ reported culmination and tactical failures around Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, have likely further weakened the Russian ultranationalist community’s belief that Russian forces are able to launch a decisive military effort.

The disparity between the limited but significant Russian advances in the Bakhmut area and the lack of meaningful advances elsewhere in Ukraine may support milblogger and Ukrainian observations that Russian forces are unable to secure rapid advances through traditional mechanized maneuver warfare.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is trying to salvage his declining influence in Russia as the Kremlin continues to sideline him and his mercenaries.

Russian forces targeted southern Ukraine with air, missile, and aerial and maritime drone strikes overnight on February 10-11.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove and Kreminna.
Russian forces continue to prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast.

Russian occupation authorities are likely draining the Kakhovka Reservoir north of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin confirmed that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting inside Russian prisons due to the expiration of an agreement between the Wagner Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

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Russia is very very worried the UA spring offensive is going to rout entrenched RU positions and another debacle will happen…

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That would be great.

All this nuclear rhetoric is aimed solely at convincing western countries to just let Russia conquer what it apparently cannot conquer under the current conditions. The best course for Russia is to go home.

According to my folks in Russia Putins been planning this for about 3 months, Prigo is said to be fricking losing his mind, he’s not dumb and knows what’s happening-question is has he got a contingency plan….one that doesn’t end with him being handed over to The Hague or Special court? Or dying in a completely “random” UA shelling…

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has he got a contingency plan

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Go to Syria with the rest of the war criminals.

The Russians are about to find out what a Dirty Black Summer is.