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Posted on 1/15/23 at 8:28 pm to WeeWee
Bitch plz we just met the debt ceiling. So let’s continue to pump money into death and destruction over Ukraine 
Posted on 1/15/23 at 8:42 pm to GOP_Tiger
quote:
FOX EXCLUSIVE: Video shows the plane carrying 90-100 Ukrainian soldiers landing at Fort Sill regional airport to begin training on the Patriot missile system this week at Fort Sill, Oklahoma
I wonder how these dudes scored a job that lets them go to the USA for a few months then man the Patriot battery once back home. Way better than sleeping in a trench outside of Bakhmut.
Posted on 1/15/23 at 8:46 pm to LSUPilot07
isw update
quote:
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, January 15. This report focuses on Russia’s likely preparation to conduct a decisive strategic action in 2023 intended to end Ukraine’s string of operational successes and regain the initiative.
The Kremlin is belatedly taking personnel mobilization, reorganization, and industrial actions it realistically should have before launching its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 invasion and is taking steps to conduct the “special military operation” as a major conventional war. Russian President Vladimir Putin began publicly signaling preparations for a protracted war in early December 2022, pledging that Russia will improve upon the mistakes of its earlier military campaigns and setting conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine
quote:
The Kremlin is likely preparing to conduct a decisive strategic action in the next six months intended to regain the initiative and end Ukraine’s current string of operational successes. Russia has failed to achieve most of its major operational objectives in Ukraine over the past eleven months. Russian forces failed to capture Kyiv, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and to maintain gains in Kharkiv Oblast or hold the strategic city of Kherson
quote:
ISW has observed several Russian lines of effort (LOEs) likely intended to support a decisive action in the next six months.
LOE 1: The Kremlin is intensifying both near- and long-term force-generation efforts. Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced plans to drastically expand the conventional Russian military by forming new divisions, reinstating pre-2010 military districts in western Russia, and increasing the conscription age — all indicating Russian intent (though likely not actual capability) to reform the Russian military to conduct large-scale conventional warfighting.
LOE 2: The Russian military is conserving mobilized personnel for future use — an inflection from the Kremlin’s initial approach of rushing untrained bodies to the front in fall 2022. Putin stated on December 7 that the Russian Armed Forces have not yet committed all mobilized personnel from the first mobilization wave to the frontlines, likely to take time to train and equip these forces for a later, concentrated use
LOE 3: Russia is attempting to reinvigorate its defense industrial base (DIB): The Kremlin began placing a significant emphasis on the resurrection of the Russian DIB in December. Putin has held several senior meetings and visited defense enterprises throughout the country since December
LOE 4: Putin is re-centralizing control of the war effort in Ukraine under the Ministry of Defense and appointed Russia’s senior-most uniformed officer, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, as theater commander. The Kremlin is also reinstating the original planners of the war and belatedly attempting to correct command-structure deficiencies. Army General Sergey Surovikin and previous Russian theater commanders failed to achieve the decisive operations Putin — likely unrealistically — intended them to achieve. The Kremlin appointed Gerasimov as the Commander of the Joint Grouping of Forces in Ukraine on January 11 after previously sidelining Gerasimov throughout the full-scale invasion
LOE 5: The Kremlin is intensifying its conditioning of the Russian information space to support the war. The Kremlin is shaping the information space to regenerate support for the invasion by reintroducing pre–February 24 narratives and undertaking measures to regain control over war coverage, after previously ceding this space to a variety of independent actors. Kremlin officials resumed promoting a false narrative in late 2022 that the existence of an independent Ukraine threatens Russian sovereignty and culture, justifying Russia’s invasion and ongoing Russian sacrifices as inevitable and necessary “self-defense” measures
quote:
The Kremlin’s effort to prepare for a likely intended decisive strategic action in 2023 is not mutually exclusive with the Kremlin’s efforts to set conditions for a protracted war. ISW is not forecasting a “last ditch” Russian effort to win the war in Ukraine. The war will not end, and Russia will not necessarily lose, if any of the possible actions discussed below fail. Russia’s rapid attempt to capture Kyiv and conduct a regime change within the first two weeks of the war was a failed strategic decisive action, for example.
quote:
Russia’s decisive strategic action in 2023 can manifest itself in multiple possible courses of action (COAs) that are not mutually exclusive. According to US military doctrine, a military can undertake a decisive action at every level of war to produce a definitive result and achieve an objective.[17] Decisive actions can be at the tactical, operational, or strategic level and can be either offensive or defensive.[18]
COA 1: A major Russian offensive, most likely in the Luhansk Oblast area. Russian forces may seek to conduct a major offensive in the Luhansk Oblast area. The full capture of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts remain the Kremlin’s official war goals and are among Russia’s most achievable (though still highly challenging) objectives given Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are logistically the easiest territories for Russia to capture
COA 2: A Russian defensive operation to defeat and exploit a Ukrainian counteroffensive. The Kremlin redeployed significant military units from the southern (Kherson) direction to Luhansk Oblast in late 2022 and established field fortifications in Luhansk Oblast, as well as in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts in Russia.
Many of the aforementioned Russian lines of effort could support both COA 1 and COA 2; these scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Russian forces could be preparing for a major offensive operation or, alternatively, larger spoiling attacks short of a general offensive operation. The indicators could also support a counterattack to take advantage of a Ukrainian counteroffensive that Russian forces expect to stop.
quote:
The most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) of a Russian offensive against northern Ukraine remains unlikely at this time. However, the Kremlin is creating planning flexibility and will likely expand Russia’s military presence in Belarus in the period leading up to planned major exercises (which could possibly support a combat operation) in September 2023. ISW continues to track Russian and Belarusian activities that could in time support a new Russian attack on Ukraine from Belarus. Russia will likely deploy more forces to Belarus under the rubric of the Zapad (West) 2023 and Union Shield 2023 exercises that will likely occur in September 2023.[
quote:
The Kremlin retains its maximalist goals to seize all of Ukraine, despite its poor conduct of the war to date. The Kremlin has been slow to effectively fix its flawed invasion for almost a year and has repeatedly opted for short-term solutions such as: repeatedly cycling through theater commanders and retaining a fragmented command structure, introducing crypto-mobilization campaigns as opposed to full-scale mobilization, failing to control the Russian information space by allowing different pro-war factions to partition the information space, and consistently disrupting the Russian military’s chain of command
Posted on 1/15/23 at 8:47 pm to StormyMcMan
quote:
Russian forces remain dangerous, and Ukraine requires sustained support. Ukraine requires further and timely Western support to adequately prepare for the Russian COAs for 2023 outlined above. Ukraine’s Western allies will need to continue supporting Ukraine in the long run even if a Russian decisive action in 2023 fails, as the Kremlin is nonetheless preparing for a protracted war. The West must continue its support to Ukraine’s efforts to defeat Russia’s invasion — and must do so quickly. The Russian military, as the saying goes, retains a vote on the course of the war despite its weaknesses and is actively setting conditions for major operations as the war enters its second year.
quote:
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on January 15:
Ukrainian officials specified that a Russian Kh-22 missile struck a residential building in Dnipro City on January 14, killing at least 25–30 civilians.[29] Ukrainian officials clarified inaccurate reporting that Ukrainian air defenses may have caused the destruction to the building, noting that Ukraine does not have the capability to shoot down Kh-22 missiles.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin awarded medals to Wagner Group forces for the capture of Soledar, likely in an ongoing effort to frame the capture of Soledar as a Wagner accomplishment rather than a joint effort with the Russian Armed Forces, as the Russian Ministry of Defense previously claimed.[30]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults near Makiivka and Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are transferring Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) off-road vehicles from Russia to Luhansk Oblast, possibly for use in combat.[32]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces finished clearing Soledar and attacked Ukrainian positions to the north, west, and southwest of the settlement.[33] A Ukrainian source reported that Russian forces captured a mine west of Soledar near Dvorichchia on January 15.[34]
Russian forces continued to attack Bakhmut and areas to the north, east, south, and southwest of the city.[35]
Russian forces made marginal territorial gains southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka.[36]
Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that Russian forces increased their presence in occupied Kherson Oblast and that some Wagner Group forces arrived in Kherson Oblast.[37] Russian occupation head of Kherson Oblast Vladimir Saldo claimed that the restoration of the Henichesk-Arabat Spit bridge improved Russian logistics into occupied Kherson Oblast.[38]
A Russian servicemember reportedly detonated a grenade in a building where Russian soldiers quartered in Belgorod Oblast, Russia, possibly in a fratricidal act of resistance against mobilization.[39] A Russian source reported that the grenade attack killed three and injured 10 mobilized personnel.[40]
Posted on 1/15/23 at 9:08 pm to Obtuse1
quote:
They aren't going to have high def sat footage like the US will gather.
Question, why is that?
Posted on 1/15/23 at 9:15 pm to TigersSEC2010
quote:
I wonder how these dudes scored a job that lets them go to the USA for a few months then man the Patriot battery once back home. Way better than sleeping in a trench outside of Bakhmut.
Crushed the ASVAB
Posted on 1/15/23 at 9:30 pm to WeeWee
Nothing at all tells me they will begin training on them snytine soon besides a few crews with the 14 from Poland depending on how long it takes them to transfer those. Unfortunately anything Ukraine does they have to factor in this multi month lag time between drawing up maneuvers and actually having the equipment to attempt it. I don’t think Belarus will attack unless Putin just gives them no choice but you still can’t leave that flank open so you have to pull forces to cover that ground. Luckily the land helps them with the swamps and hard to cross ground so they need to mostly make sure roadways are heavily covered. I would like to know what Ukraine’s current situation is with JAVELINS and NLAWS. If the Russians tried another large scale attack somewhere they would be needed but I know they expended a bunch in the first couple months of the war.
This post was edited on 1/15/23 at 9:41 pm
Posted on 1/15/23 at 9:36 pm to doubleb
quote:
Question, why is that?
Russia is woefully lacking in optical recon sats in orbit, supposedly they only have two active and they are well past their operational life. They are also lacking in quality coms and nav sats, the one area they seem to be first world is SIGINT including COMINT, ELINT, and FISINT. Prior to the war you often saw them lauded as best in the world at this but I am second guessing them being great at anything save for information space attacks.
Solovyoz and I think Skabeeva (or Simonyan) were lamenting this a couple of months ago when it came out there how poor their military satellite coverage was.
Posted on 1/15/23 at 9:40 pm to Lakeboy7
quote:
I wonder how these dudes scored a job that lets them go to the USA for a few months then man the Patriot battery once back home. Way better than sleeping in a trench outside of Bakhmut.
Crushed the ASVAB
I read an article about how a lot of these technical slots are filled by architects, engineers, and similar professionals recruited directly into the Ukrainian military.
Posted on 1/15/23 at 10:30 pm to momentoftruth87
quote:
Major concern is this war lasting any longer, bleeding the US tax payer.
The taxpayer money for it was spent decades ago. What is being spent now is maintenance and/or destruction cost
Posted on 1/15/23 at 10:35 pm to CitizenK
quote:
The French have bigger balls than Germany but the bribed/let's make a deal politicians in Germany are beginning to fall. The Polish definitely have bigger ones.
German Social Democrats hesitant on tank deliveries to Ukraine | DW Interview
Oh there are still quite a few in Germany.
Posted on 1/15/23 at 10:47 pm to LSUPilot07
quote:
I don’t think Belarus will attack unless Putin just gives them no choice
IMO Putin will force Belarus it’s just a matter of when and not if. I have lost all faith in the civilian population of Russia and Belarus to think that their disapproval will factor into the decision. A few will protest but most will disapprove and just go right along doing nothing.
quote:
Luckily the land helps them with the swamps and hard to cross ground so they need to mostly make sure roadways are heavily covered.
Very true. It’s been a warm winter so any invasion would be a repeat of last year. The Russians would be forced to rely on the E95 on the eastern approach to Kyiv and the P02 highway on the western approach. It could be done if Russia has learned from its mistakes and trained their infantry how to properly support their armor. Based on the fighting in the east I would say that they have not.
quote:
I would like to know what Ukraine’s current situation is with JAVELINS and NLAWS. If the Russians tried another large scale attack somewhere they would be needed but I know they expended a bunch in the first couple months of the war.
They have plenty of ATGMs. The Javelins and the NLAWs got all the press coverage but the Ukrainians killed more tanks with RPGs and their own Stugna P missiles than they did with other missile systems. They still have plenty of those left over.
Posted on 1/16/23 at 6:23 am to RLDSC FAN
British Defence Intelligence
UPDATE ON UKRAINE 16 January 2023
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE
Over the weekend, intense fighting continued in both the Kremina and Bakhmut sectors of the Donbas front. As of 15 January 2023, Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) almost certainly maintained positions in Soledar, north of Bakhmut, in the face of continued Wagner Group assaults.
Around Kremina, fighting has been characterised by a complex series of local attacks and counter-attacks in wooded country. However, overall, the UAF continue to gradually advance their front line east on the edge of Kremina town.
Over the last six weeks, both Russia and Ukraine have achieved hard-fought but limited gains in different sectors. In these circumstances, a key operational challenge for both sides is to generate formations of uncommitted, capable troops which can exploit the tactical successes to create operational breakthroughs.
UPDATE ON UKRAINE 16 January 2023
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE
Over the weekend, intense fighting continued in both the Kremina and Bakhmut sectors of the Donbas front. As of 15 January 2023, Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) almost certainly maintained positions in Soledar, north of Bakhmut, in the face of continued Wagner Group assaults.
Around Kremina, fighting has been characterised by a complex series of local attacks and counter-attacks in wooded country. However, overall, the UAF continue to gradually advance their front line east on the edge of Kremina town.
Over the last six weeks, both Russia and Ukraine have achieved hard-fought but limited gains in different sectors. In these circumstances, a key operational challenge for both sides is to generate formations of uncommitted, capable troops which can exploit the tactical successes to create operational breakthroughs.
Posted on 1/16/23 at 7:22 am to WeeWee
If Belarus joins the fight, would Ukraine have restrictions from the west about invading/ bombing Belarus?
Posted on 1/16/23 at 7:25 am to WeeWee
There are two possible objectives to an assault from Belarus:
1) A new attempt to take Kyiv
2) An assault in Western Ukraine that cuts the supply lines from Poland
These are very different kinds of operations. To make a new attempt on Kyiv would seem to be the height of folly, as Kyiv is much better defended than it was a year ago. If Russia were looking further west, an operation in Western Ukraine near the Polish border would be extremely difficult for Russian logistics to sustain.
But either of these would also have the secondary objectives of:
3) Temporarily forestalling a big Ukrainian spring offensive by forcing Ukraine to defend,
4) Continuing the "we are winning" propaganda push in Russia to ensure continued support for the war, and
5) Fully investing Lukashenko in the fight
These last two are really more of political objectives than they are military objectives, which is why a potential new invasion from Belarus might make more sense in the Kremlin than it does to Western military strategists.
I have read a couple of stories (here's one) saying that the swamps are much larger than normal, because people normally clean out the beaver dams. This year, no one is cleaning them out, so the beavers have dammed everything up, and the swamps are huge.
1) A new attempt to take Kyiv
2) An assault in Western Ukraine that cuts the supply lines from Poland
These are very different kinds of operations. To make a new attempt on Kyiv would seem to be the height of folly, as Kyiv is much better defended than it was a year ago. If Russia were looking further west, an operation in Western Ukraine near the Polish border would be extremely difficult for Russian logistics to sustain.
But either of these would also have the secondary objectives of:
3) Temporarily forestalling a big Ukrainian spring offensive by forcing Ukraine to defend,
4) Continuing the "we are winning" propaganda push in Russia to ensure continued support for the war, and
5) Fully investing Lukashenko in the fight
These last two are really more of political objectives than they are military objectives, which is why a potential new invasion from Belarus might make more sense in the Kremlin than it does to Western military strategists.
quote:
Luckily the land helps them with the swamps and hard to cross ground so they need to mostly make sure roadways are heavily covered.
I have read a couple of stories (here's one) saying that the swamps are much larger than normal, because people normally clean out the beaver dams. This year, no one is cleaning them out, so the beavers have dammed everything up, and the swamps are huge.
Posted on 1/16/23 at 7:44 am to GOP_Tiger
Where have all the "Europe will freeze and millions will die" trolls gone?
Posted on 1/16/23 at 7:46 am to Obtuse1
Thxs
Posted on 1/16/23 at 7:53 am to Lakeboy7
Me: Military culture for 600
Alex: Crushed the ASVAB
Me: How not to become a Marine
Alex: that is correct
Alex: Crushed the ASVAB
Me: How not to become a Marine
Alex: that is correct
Posted on 1/16/23 at 8:07 am to GOP_Tiger
Bloomberg News:
quote:
Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki signaled on Monday that he expects Germany to quickly grant its approval to send Leopard battle tanks to Ukraine.
NATO-member Poland intends to deliver a “company” of German-made Leopard 2 tanks as part of a coordinated effort among allies. Any decision would require approval from Berlin, which the Polish government has persistently criticized for being slow in backing Ukraine with heavy weaponry.
“We need to have consent” from Germany, Morawiecki told a news conference in Warsaw, before flying to Berlin for meetings with politicians there. “But I cannot imagine that this approval will not be given quickly.”
Germany is about to take a decision on transferring the tanks this week, as European allies assess how to help the government in Kyiv in the event fighting builds in the spring, according to two officials familiar with the government’s thinking.
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