- My Forums
- Tiger Rant
- LSU Recruiting
- SEC Rant
- Saints Talk
- Pelicans Talk
- More Sports Board
- Fantasy Sports
- Golf Board
- Soccer Board
- O-T Lounge
- Tech Board
- Home/Garden Board
- Outdoor Board
- Health/Fitness Board
- Movie/TV Board
- Book Board
- Music Board
- Political Talk
- Money Talk
- Fark Board
- Gaming Board
- Travel Board
- Food/Drink Board
- Ticket Exchange
- TD Help Board
Customize My Forums- View All Forums
- Show Left Links
- Topic Sort Options
- Trending Topics
- Recent Topics
- Active Topics
Started By
Message
re: The stupidity of World War I
Posted on 8/7/15 at 12:42 am to blueboy
Posted on 8/7/15 at 12:42 am to blueboy
quote:
So you think they assassinated a member of the royal family because they thought it would keep Austria out of Serbia? And yes, it was "them" and yes, they were communists.
Good night. This world saddens me.
It saddens me that there are people like you who think they know something about history but are very misinformed or confused. Ending Austrian rule over Slavic lands was their goal. period. They were Serbian nationinalist not communist. If anything they were closer to anarchist than communist or even socialist. At his trial he said the following....
quote:
"I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be freed from Austria
Those are not the words of a communist. Sorry, I know you want to be right here, but you're just not.
ETA: and one more thing, they (The Black Hand and Young Bosnians) wanted Austria out of Bosnia which they saw as being Slavic/Servian territory. They wanted to unite all of the Slavic/Serbian lands into one country.
Good night.
This post was edited on 8/7/15 at 12:55 am
1
Posted on 8/7/15 at 1:01 am to blueboy
quote:
So you think they assassinated a member of the royal family because they thought it would keep Austria out of Serbia?
They assassinated Franz Ferdinand because Ferdinand's desire for Serbia was to make it part of a new tripartite entity, along with Austria and Hungary, once he (Franz Ferdinand) came to power.
The Black Hand, the organization for which Princip worked for, was an ultra-nationalist terrorist organization with ties to Serbian military intelligence. While Serbia would have profited a great deal from such a partnership, Princip and the Black Hand dreamed of a united and free nation of Slavs. Such a partnership would have made that dream disappear.
Also, those in the Serbian military who were allied with the Black Hand were very confident of their chances in a military campaign against the Austro-Hungarians. They were recent victors of the Balkan Wars, wars that made Serbia more powerful and weakened the Ottoman Empire in the process.
This post was edited on 8/7/15 at 1:04 am
Posted on 8/7/15 at 1:05 am to athenslife101
quote:
Meh, that's semantics. The population of Europe was much smaller so of course there would be less casualties. Over 25% of the entire german population died in the 30 years war and that's just Germany.
Also, the 30s year makes sense. I'm reading a book on it now and the outbreak is pure Machiavellian.
It's a very underrated war as far as destruction goes. But it did go on for 30 years.
Posted on 8/7/15 at 2:10 am to ksayetiger
quote:And we gave zero fricks........UNTIL Saddam threatened the Petro Dollar with his oil bourse, and refused to align his central bank with the international banking cabal.
Saddan killed more people than hitler did.
But you probably think that's just coincidence, amirite?
Yeah, war is necessary.....if you're among the uber rich and well-connected.
Posted on 8/7/15 at 2:24 am to TX Tiger
I wouldn't waste bandwidth on a mongoloid who is still trying to justify the Iraq war.
Posted on 8/7/15 at 2:33 am to biglego
Good point. 
Posted on 8/7/15 at 5:22 am to East Coast Band
quote:
All wars are rather pointless and stupid.
How awesomely simple minded.
You must be a British loyalist who supports slavery and thinks Hitler was pretty keen.
Posted on 8/7/15 at 5:41 am to Andre
quote:
Are you really comparing Saddam Hussein to Hitler?
The frick is wrong with this comparison? They both tried to wipe out an entire race of people in incredibly cruel ways
Posted on 8/7/15 at 6:34 am to RollTide1987
quote:
by RollTide1987
Solid post. I tried telling him Princep was a nationalist and not a communist. Course he wouldn't listen. He was right damn it! I'd love to know where he came up with this notion of Princep being a communist.
Posted on 8/7/15 at 6:43 am to Darth_Vader
Such rampant, needless death and a great exercise in futility. It was like no one had the balls to admit that it was a mistake and we should just stop. Due to the constant stalemate, there were tons of opportunities to call a cease fire.
When you consider that several national leaders were also cousins, what a tragedy.
Listening to Blueprint, just a total blunder that just set Europe up for round two and Hitler.
When you consider that several national leaders were also cousins, what a tragedy.
Listening to Blueprint, just a total blunder that just set Europe up for round two and Hitler.
Posted on 8/7/15 at 6:49 am to fr33manator
quote:
Listen to Dan Carlin's "Blueprint for Armageddon"
I've been listening to this series on my morning run. It's pretty great.
Posted on 8/7/15 at 6:49 am to East Coast Band
quote:
All wars are rather pointless and stupid.
It looks like after the American Civil War that military leaders worldwide would have learned their lesson about using Napoleonic tactics in a modern war. The advancements in weaponry and old outdated tactics led to horrendous amounts of killed and maimed soldiers on all sides of both wars.
When one fails to learn from the past, the past will always be repeated.
Posted on 8/7/15 at 7:29 am to bbqguy
quote:
It looks like after the American Civil War that military leaders worldwide would have learned their lesson about using Napoleonic tactics in a modern war. The advancements in weaponry and old outdated tactics led to horrendous amounts of killed and maimed soldiers on all sides of both wars.
When one fails to learn from the past, the past will always be repeated.
Well to be fair, the two main armies in 1914 were France & Germany. At that time the British army was so small that the Kiaser joked about sending out German police to arrest it. The Austrians were seen as still relevant but 2nd class to France and Germany. Russia was viewed as a lumbering huge steamroller with poorly trained and equipped pheasants. Sure they would be dangerous eventually, but not now.
Now having said that what were the tactics of France and Germany?
For Germany it was the Schlieffen Plan which was a variation of the strategy that had defeated France in the Franco-Prussian War. It was a, relatively speaking, lightning offensive intended to knock out France in six weeks. The Germans knew that for them to have a chance of winning a war against both Russia and France, one of the two would have to be knocked out quick so They could then turn their full attention on the other. The Germabs figured France could reach full mobilization quicker than Russia so they decided it would have to be France that was taken out first. Thus the Schlieffen Plan was born with the aim of knocking out France quick so Germany could then turn their full weight against Russia before Russia could mobilize their massive army.
For France, they had their Plan XVII. It was not really a carefully timed & detail strategic plan like what the Germans had but rather a rough blueprint to quickly mobilize the French Army and invade Germany in Alsace lorraine area to regain those areas France lost to them in the Franco-Prussian War. Past that, the French really didn't have a plan. They wee just going to launch an offensive and see what happened next.,
So you see, both the main armies in the West at the start of the war went to war with a plan to attack, to go on the offensive. The offensive was seen at that time as the means to win a war. Both sides came to this conclusion due to the lessons learned in the Fraco-Prussian war which was the last European war between two great powers. In that war France had lost due to its reliance on the defense built around forts. And the Prussians had shown fast moving offensives were the way to win a war.
And in their defense, it's been the norm for centuries for generals to take the results from the last war and apply them to fighting the next war. This is true even today. What they failed to grasp though was that advances in artillery, the machine gun, and even something as simple as barbed wire had shifted the balance of power from the offensive to the defensive. But how could they know these things in the summer of 1914 when these things were just now being tested on a large scale for the first time? Yes there had been some smaller conflicts like the wars in the Balkins, Spanish-American War, and the Boer Wars. But in these wars these new weapons of war had seen only limited use. The generals of 1914 were faced with a totally new type of warfare that had never been seen in history. They were force to have to totally relearn how to fight a war while that war was going on. That's a tall task for anyone.
This post was edited on 8/7/15 at 7:33 am
Posted on 8/7/15 at 7:34 am to Darth_Vader
quote:
I tried telling him Princep was a nationalist and not a communist.
If anything, the Serbian Black Hand were militant nihilists - pursuing goals of "Yugoslavism" and Pan-Serbian nationalism.
One can easily see the vestiges of it today in Serbian nationalism. They may have been influenced by Communist organizations during the Cold War, but, hell, at the time of the Ferdinand operation, the Soviet Union did not, as yet, exist. There was no Comintern, and Tito was working as a mechanic. So, any communist leanings would have been brought in by individual members - the organization did not espouse communism, nor can an outside influence be identified as providing any sort of communist objectives.
At least through the lens of objective history.
This post was edited on 8/7/15 at 7:35 am
Posted on 8/7/15 at 7:38 am to Ace Midnight
Great point. I've studied WWI for decades and never once came across anything linking Pricep or the Black Hand to communism.
Posted on 8/7/15 at 7:52 am to Darth_Vader
I read a book in college, "The Social History of the Machine Gun". Fairly interesting.
(Oh, and DV, you're right. The Black Hand were nationalists {if anything, anarchists} not communists)
(Oh, and DV, you're right. The Black Hand were nationalists {if anything, anarchists} not communists)
Posted on 8/7/15 at 8:10 am to Darth_Vader
quote:
It's true, these girls would walk around and look for military aged guys who looked fit for duty. They'd go up to them in public, usually not even say a word, just hand them a white feather, then walk away. It was highly effective.
Unfortunately, they would also hand the white feathers to vets and people home on leave. Talk about the ultimate insult...
Posted on 8/7/15 at 9:15 am to RollTide1987
A USMC veteran named Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson wrote the best book that I know of that details the evolution of infantry tactics during World War One.
A couple of interesting facts that I'd like to share:
1) The WW I German Army believed in and emphasized a totally de-centralized approach to infantry training and development of infantry assault tactics.
At the beginning of and for the first two years of the War, the responsibility for development of infantry tactics and infantry training rested in the German Army down at the Corps level, not higher. Not at Army level, not at Army High Command level, but, rather, at each of the more than 20 Corps in the entire German Army.
With such a de-centralized approach to infantry tactical development and training, it makes sense that there was some variation in German infantry tactics in 1914 and 1915. Rommel's book "Infantry Attacks" details his experiences as a WW I infantry combat commander from 1914 onward. Rommel's units were among the few that used tactics that can be said to be quite advanced for those years, even during the 1914 campaign.
2) Imperial Germany's own conservative policy with regard to the size of its Officer Corps limited the size of the army and directly contributed to defeat. The German Army in 1914 was unnecessarily too small, and could have been larger.
In September of 1914, the German armies approached Paris. If they had had only two more Corps at that critical point, they would have won the 1914 Campaign in the West, and quite probably the war.
Germany COULD have mobilized those two extra corps, HAD they used a system of combat officer accession different from what they used. Pre-war Germany wanted its Officers to be of correct "aristocratic" background. As such, the number of trained Officers was limited -- only enough to create the just over 20 Corps of the German active duty army. If Germany had relaxed the "aristocratic" constraint and had more Officers available by accession of "blue collar" young men, those extra Corps could and would have been mobilized and could have been present near Paris in September of 1914.
The first link is to a paper that touches on our topic of WW I infantry tactics. The paper was written by a student Officer.
LINK
Dr. Gudmundsson's book is explained a bit in this link.
LINK
A couple of interesting facts that I'd like to share:
1) The WW I German Army believed in and emphasized a totally de-centralized approach to infantry training and development of infantry assault tactics.
At the beginning of and for the first two years of the War, the responsibility for development of infantry tactics and infantry training rested in the German Army down at the Corps level, not higher. Not at Army level, not at Army High Command level, but, rather, at each of the more than 20 Corps in the entire German Army.
With such a de-centralized approach to infantry tactical development and training, it makes sense that there was some variation in German infantry tactics in 1914 and 1915. Rommel's book "Infantry Attacks" details his experiences as a WW I infantry combat commander from 1914 onward. Rommel's units were among the few that used tactics that can be said to be quite advanced for those years, even during the 1914 campaign.
2) Imperial Germany's own conservative policy with regard to the size of its Officer Corps limited the size of the army and directly contributed to defeat. The German Army in 1914 was unnecessarily too small, and could have been larger.
In September of 1914, the German armies approached Paris. If they had had only two more Corps at that critical point, they would have won the 1914 Campaign in the West, and quite probably the war.
Germany COULD have mobilized those two extra corps, HAD they used a system of combat officer accession different from what they used. Pre-war Germany wanted its Officers to be of correct "aristocratic" background. As such, the number of trained Officers was limited -- only enough to create the just over 20 Corps of the German active duty army. If Germany had relaxed the "aristocratic" constraint and had more Officers available by accession of "blue collar" young men, those extra Corps could and would have been mobilized and could have been present near Paris in September of 1914.
The first link is to a paper that touches on our topic of WW I infantry tactics. The paper was written by a student Officer.
LINK
Dr. Gudmundsson's book is explained a bit in this link.
LINK
This post was edited on 8/7/15 at 9:25 am
Posted on 8/7/15 at 9:31 am to Champagne
quote:
Champagne
Wow, that's an interesting perspective. Thanks for the links. It's an interesting notion that the German Army of 1914, widely regarded at that time as the best in the world, was too small. That's an interesting angle that in my opinion has been largely overlooked. Had the Germans had the two corps that you mention, they could have covered Moltke’s right wing which means the Battle of the Marne would have either probably never happened at all or would have probably had a far different outcome. The German's would have taken Paris and thus knocked France out of the war within the timetable laid out in the Schlieffen Plan. This would also have created a situation for the British similar to what was seen in 1940 when France was defeated. The British would be faced with trying to withdraw their forces from France. Could they have done this in 1914? Or would the Germans have trapped the BEF and forced them to surrender?
Posted on 8/7/15 at 9:37 am to Champagne
Tyng's "Campaign of the Marne" is my second favorite book on WW I. Tyng's book was written in the 1930s, so it is completely devoid of any influence of WW2 events on the historian's interpretation of what happened in France in 1914.
I believe that the 1914 Campaign in the West was the most important campaign of WWI, because Germany came closest to winning the war during that campaign.
Here's a link to the whole book.
LINK
Here are the most important points that I can recall from this book.
1) France's victory in 1914 was a great and well-earned military victory.
At the Battle of the Marne in Sept, 1914, France's army commander in chief, General Joffre, enjoyed the benefit of numerical superiority over the German armies near Paris at that critical point. Joffre was able to accomplish this through competent, insightful and very modern generalship.
It's true that the French Army's initial plan was flawed. Plan 17 was terribly flawed, but, once Joffre realized the error, he energetically motored his way to ultimate victory. I use the word "motored" because Joffre got around very quickly to Army and Corps commanders IN PERSON in order to make sure that each subordinate commander totally understood and energetically executed Joffre's intent. Joffre accomplished this by using a very fact automobile and a driver who was a professional race car driver.
In contrast, Moltke, the commander of the German armies in the West, never left his headquarters and communicated by radio and telephone. Both radio and telephone in 1914 were not terribly good, and compounding that deficiency was the fact that the German signal corps in 1914 was not as proficient as it could have been, even by 1914 standards.
So, Moltke left his Army commanders to their own devices, and, as one might reasonably conclude, the results were not as effective as Joffre's methods.
With regard to the French Soldier of 1914, it's important to note that the historical record shows that he was as proficient, brave and capable as his German counterpart. Of course, there is always room for argument here, but, when one studies the battles of 1914, my conclusion is justified.
2) At the Battle of the Marne, the British Expeditionary Corps barely fought because its commander's opinion was that his Tommies had fought enough, had taken enough casualties, and were tired and in need of rest.
So, the British at the Marne marched very, very slowly forward into the gap between the German First and Second Armies. The British contribution in 1914 was significant and admirable, for sure, and the individual British Soldier was the best in France at that time. This is important to note as we detail the failures of the British commander at the Marne in 1914.
I believe that the 1914 Campaign in the West was the most important campaign of WWI, because Germany came closest to winning the war during that campaign.
Here's a link to the whole book.
LINK
Here are the most important points that I can recall from this book.
1) France's victory in 1914 was a great and well-earned military victory.
At the Battle of the Marne in Sept, 1914, France's army commander in chief, General Joffre, enjoyed the benefit of numerical superiority over the German armies near Paris at that critical point. Joffre was able to accomplish this through competent, insightful and very modern generalship.
It's true that the French Army's initial plan was flawed. Plan 17 was terribly flawed, but, once Joffre realized the error, he energetically motored his way to ultimate victory. I use the word "motored" because Joffre got around very quickly to Army and Corps commanders IN PERSON in order to make sure that each subordinate commander totally understood and energetically executed Joffre's intent. Joffre accomplished this by using a very fact automobile and a driver who was a professional race car driver.
In contrast, Moltke, the commander of the German armies in the West, never left his headquarters and communicated by radio and telephone. Both radio and telephone in 1914 were not terribly good, and compounding that deficiency was the fact that the German signal corps in 1914 was not as proficient as it could have been, even by 1914 standards.
So, Moltke left his Army commanders to their own devices, and, as one might reasonably conclude, the results were not as effective as Joffre's methods.
With regard to the French Soldier of 1914, it's important to note that the historical record shows that he was as proficient, brave and capable as his German counterpart. Of course, there is always room for argument here, but, when one studies the battles of 1914, my conclusion is justified.
2) At the Battle of the Marne, the British Expeditionary Corps barely fought because its commander's opinion was that his Tommies had fought enough, had taken enough casualties, and were tired and in need of rest.
So, the British at the Marne marched very, very slowly forward into the gap between the German First and Second Armies. The British contribution in 1914 was significant and admirable, for sure, and the individual British Soldier was the best in France at that time. This is important to note as we detail the failures of the British commander at the Marne in 1914.
This post was edited on 8/7/15 at 9:44 am
Page 3 of 7
Popular
Back to top
Follow TigerDroppings for LSU Football News