re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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The head of the Russian Central Bank, Ms. Nabiulina, urged Russians to prepare for a sharp rise in prices due to the devaluation of the Russian Ruble.

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How many of these attacks have impacted anything on the battlefield?

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That was reported earlier today. The remnants of Soviet SS-24 solid fueled ballistic missiles. The warheads were removed and sent to Russia in the 90's.

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"It's scary. It's very scary when your windows just fly out and you don't understand what's happening," Svitlana Shaperenko, a resident of Pavlograd in the Dnipropetrovsk region, tells about the work of the local chemical plant.

Residents of the city are not jokingly worried about the situation around the facility where rocket fuel is stored. It turned out that the state stopped financing the program for its disposal.

Remnants of ballistic missiles, according to the general director of the plant, Leonid Shiman, may explode, causing a man-made and ecological disaster in this and four neighboring regions.

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To date, more than 1.8 thousand tons of expired solid rocket fuel are stored on the territory of the Pavlograd Chemical Plant. It has been 20 years since its expiration date.

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ISW is publishing a special edition campaign assessment today, April 30. This report details changes in the Russian military command since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine without a clear and doctrinal command structure and his reluctance to appoint an overall theater commander have had lasting effects on the structure of the Russian command in Ukraine. Putin’s regular command changes have led to an increasingly factionalized Russian military and disorganized command structures that are degrading the Russian military’s ability to conduct a cohesive campaign in Ukraine. Factions are not a phenomenon particular to the Russian military, although their current dynamics within the Russian military are shaping decision making to an unusual degree. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin have been deliberately vague about most of these command changes. ISW’s timeline of the changes is based on official Russian statements as well as analysis of unconfirmed claims and reports from Russian, Ukrainian, and Western sources. The exact dates of command changes are based on the first reporting of a change and may not correspond with the formal date on which a change occurred. These command changes were likely not discrete events resulting from decisions made suddenly but were instead drawn-out bureaucratic affairs.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reluctance to appoint an overall theater commander for his invasion of Ukraine has had cascading effects on the Russian military including fueling intense factionalization, disorganizing command structures, and feeding unattainable expectations

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Putin appointed the first overall theater commander, Army General Alexander Dvornikov, in April 2022 in response to Russia’s failed attempt to drive on Kyiv but had replaced him by the end of May due to Dvornikov’s inability to achieve Putin’s high expectations in the first months following the retreat from Kyiv.

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The Russian military began to introduce commanders for operational directions in June and July of 2022 under the leadership of overall theater commander Colonel General Gennady Zhidko in an attempt to organize its offensive in eastern Ukraine.

The attritional but partially successful offensive operations in eastern Ukraine likely gave Putin the informational backing to dismiss the remaining commanders who had failed earlier in the invasion to drive on Kyiv: Western Military District Commander (WMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Zhuravlyov, Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, and former theater commander Dvornikov from his position as SMD commander

Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov reported that Colonel General Sergey Kuzvovlev was operating as interim SMD commander in late July, likely indicating that the position passed to him on Dvornikov’s dismissal as First Deputy Commander of the SMD.

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The start of Ukrainian counteroffensives in August and September of 2022 led to widespread Russian panic, prompting more command changes while delaying the decision to dissolve the operational direction commands as entities distinct from military districts.

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The success of Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson Oblasts led to more profound command changes and the rise of the anti-Gerasimov faction within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)

The failure of two generals who were establishment MoD figures and Gerasimov affiliates likely solidified Putin’s decision to appoint a commander not affiliated with Gerasimov to the position of overall theater commander after the Kharkiv debacle.

The Kremlin likely did not intend to replace Lapin as CMD commander in late October 2022

Surovikin's tenure as overall theater commander increased Prigozhin’s influence and role in Ukraine as Wagner began receiving significant supplies from the Russian military and assumed responsibility for the offensive to capture Bakhmut

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Gerasimov and his affiliates likely attempted to convince Putin that they could successfully conduct Russia’s upcoming winter-spring offensive as the Ukrainian fall counteroffensive culminated from December 2022 to early January 2023.

Gerasimov likely had some success convincing Putin that Wagner was wasting personnel and resources given that Wagner lost access to prisoner recruitment and access to ammunition from the Russian MoD at the start of 2023

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The highly attritional capture of Soledar in January likely prompted Putin to acquiesce to Gerasimov’s campaigning and appoint Gerasimov as the overall theater commander for the winter-spring offensive operation

Gerasimov spearheaded a ruthless campaign to eliminate irregular armed formations such as Wagner and its affiliates with the newfound favor he had obtained with Putin. Gerasimov began to rapidly integrate the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR and LNR) into the Russian Armed Forces, dismiss proxy commanders, and introduce professionalization measures that upset many ultranationalists and proxy fighters.

Gerasimov’s camp reportedly appointed Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev, who had been removed from his position commanding the WMD in late December, as the SMD commander around January 23

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Russian military commanders within the anti-Gerasimov faction increasingly began to call attention to Russian military failures during the winter-spring offensive but were unsuccessful in convincing Putin to make their desired changes in February.

Teplinsky was successful in his efforts to discredit Gerasimov and regain command in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed on March 26 that the Russian military command dismissed Muradov and speculated that Lieutenant Colonel General Sergey Kuzmenko would become EMD commander

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Russia’s war in Ukraine is not existential despite the Kremlin’s claims otherwise, although the war does appear to be increasingly existential for the character and composition of the Russian military.

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The Kremlin and the Russian MoD have attempted to use command changes to generate desired informational effects to offset increasingly diminishing results

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Putin’s affinity for rotating personnel and not outright dismissing commanders is emblematic of his style of domestic rule, a style of leadership not well suited for leading a military engaged in a costly war

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The results of a potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive will likely determine which faction Putin favors going forward and likely prompt further command changes in some form

Putin is unlikely to appoint a new overall theater commander in the current circumstances, however.

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16 Tu-95Ms are now Airborne from several Air Bases across Western Russia.
I guess fricking around with Russian Crimea is bringing on a found out tonight.

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