re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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Iran needs to stay
The frick out of this…

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ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, March 5. This report analyzes the ongoing Battle for Bakhmut and Russian prospects for further offensive efforts. Ukrainian forces may be conducting a limited fighting withdrawal in eastern Bakhmut and are continuing to inflict high casualties against the advancing mixed Russian forces. Russian milbloggers have also lowered their expectations of Russian forces’ ability to launch additional offensives, which would likely culminate whether or not Russian forces actually capture Bakhmut. If Russian forces manage to secure Bakhmut they could then attempt renewed pushes towards one or both of Kostyantynivka or Slovyansk but would struggle with endemic personnel and equipment constraints. The likely imminent culmination of the Russian offensive around Bakhmut before or after its fall, the already culminated Russian offensive around Vuhledar, and the stalling Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast are likely setting robust conditions for a future Ukrainian counteroffensive.

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Ukrainian forces are likely conducting a limited tactical withdrawal in Bakhmut, although it is still too early to assess Ukrainian intentions concerning a complete withdrawal from the city. Ukrainian forces may be withdrawing from their positions on the eastern bank of the Bakhmutka River given recent geolocated footage of the destruction of the railway bridge over the river in northeastern Bakhmut on March 3.[1] Russian war correspondents and milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured eastern, northern, and southern parts of Bakhmut on March 5 and claimed to be reporting from positions in eastern Bakhmut

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The Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut remains strategically sound as it continues to consume Russian manpower and equipment as long as Ukrainian forces do not suffer excessive casualties. Ukrainian forces are unlikely to withdraw from Bakhmut all at once and may pursue a gradual fighting withdrawal to exhaust Russian forces through continued urban warfare. Russian forces are unlikely to quickly secure significant territorial gains when conducting urban warfare, which usually favors the defender and can allow Ukrainian forces to inflict high casualties on advancing Russian units—even as Ukrainian forces are actively withdrawing. The Bakhmut city center is located on the western bank of the Bakhmutka River, and Russian forces will need to fight through the area if they are unable to advance directly north or south of Bakhmut to the west of the city center.

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The Russian military’s attritional campaign to capture Bakhmut has likely prompted Russian milbloggers to adopt more realistic expectations for further Russian operations in Ukraine. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) commander and Russian milblogger Alexander Khodakovsky questioned whether Russian forces are prepared for potential Ukrainian counteroffensive operations after possibly "getting carried away by Bakhmut [and] Vuhledar" and suggested that Russian forces may have set conditions for Ukrainian counteroffensives by heavily expending combat power and resources on these operations.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces would likely have to conduct a short operational pause following the potential capture of Bakhmut.[7] Another prominent Russian milblogger offered a more ambitious assessment that Russian forces would take Kostyantynivka by the end of spring 2023 and launch an offensive on the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration between the summer and fall of 2023

The Russian military will nevertheless likely fail to meet Russian milbloggers’ expectations despite these more realistic assessments. The timeline offered by even the most ambitious assessment suggests that Russian campaigning to capture all of Donetsk Oblast would be a years-long effort. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin similarly assessed that it would take Russian forces up to two years to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative borders.[11] Russian forces currently do not have the manpower and equipment necessary to sustain offensive operations at scale for a renewed offensive toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, let alone for a years-long campaign to capture all of Donetsk Oblast.

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The Russian offensive to capture Bakhmut will likely culminate whether Russian forces capture the city or not, and the Russian military will likely struggle to maintain any subsequent offensive operations for some months. The conventional Russian military recently massed and lost significant numbers of mobilized personnel for a since-culminated offensive push near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast. Russian "major" offensives in the Kupyansk, Svatove, and Kreminna directions in Luhansk Oblast are also failing to generate any significant successes on the frontlines.[12] The Russian military relied on Wagner Group forces to make any advances in the nine-month effort for Bakhmut and has since reinforced Wagner forces in Bakhmut with Russian airborne elements and mobilized personnel.[13] Russian forces likely lack the capability to further reinforce the Bakhmut area significantly without pulling forces from another area of the front line due to the lack of untapped reserves, with the possible exception of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division that was last reported in Luhansk but uncommitted to the fighting

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Endemic personnel and equipment constraints will likely prevent Russian forces from launching another prolonged offensive operation like the Battle for Bakhmut in the coming months. Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov stated on March 3 that Russian military casualties in Bakhmut equate to one Ukrainian loss per seven Russian losses.[16] White House officials reported on February 17 that the Wagner Group, which has predominantly fought in the Bakhmut area, has suffered 30,000 casualties with about 9,000 fighters killed since the start of the full-scale invasion in Ukraine

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The Russian Armed Forces will continue to rely on irregular formations in further offensive operations in the coming months. The Russian military command largely relied on Wagner convict forces to carry out costly infantry frontal assaults, with Western intelligence officials and prison advocacy groups estimating that 40,000 to 50,000 convicts joined the Wagner Group.[21] Wagner has since started using its elite elements after losing much of its convict force

Russian forces have previously relied on unconventional forces from the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR/LNR) militias, Chechen units, and the Wagner Group in attritional campaigns to capture Mariupol, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk, although the campaign to capture Bakhmut has represented a major inflection in the Russian military’s reliance on such forces.[23] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on March 4 that Russian forces would fail to seize Bakhmut and the front line would collapse if Wagner forces stopped fighting.[24] Prigozhin announced on February 9 that Wagner had stopped recruiting from prisons while the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly incorporated convicts into conventional and LNR Militia formations

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The defensive operation and further strengthening of Ukrainian positions in Bakhmut will continue.

This decision was made at a meeting of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

In addition, the issue of the supply of weapons and equipment and their distribution by operational directions was considered at the meeting.

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??Bulgaria sent weapons worth $1 billion to Ukraine through intermediaries, — Euractiv

Bulgarian arms companies do not sell weapons and ammunition directly to Ukrainian companies, because there is a practice when this happens through foreign programs," — said ex-head of the country's Ministry of Defense Velizar Shalamanov.

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??russia has refrained from buying ballistic missiles from Iran due to fears that Ukraine will then receive long-range missiles, — the Financial Times writes.

Tehran and moscow have been warned, and, according to NATO estimates, the sale of missiles to russia may prompt the US to provide Ukraine with the ATACMS missile system, which has a range of 300 km.

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I bet this happens daily….on both sides.

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I bet this happens daily….on both sides.

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It's important to pay attention to this upcoming analysis. I tend to be straightforward about problems on the Ukrainian side to maintain an accurate perspective. Acknowledging the problem is the initial step to addressing it. We need to focus more on objective analysis.

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Rob and I were in Bakhmut last week and the situation looked difficult. From artillery ammo shortages, increasingly contested lines of communication, and an attritional battle in unfavorable terrain - this fight doesn’t play to Ukraine’s advantages as a force. More to follow.

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Key section from this good piece. The ratio of losses worsened for Ukraine once it lost control of Bakhmut’s flanks. The conditions are less favorable for defending Bakhmut than Vuhledar/elsewhere and Kyiv needs as many forces as possible for its strategically critical offensive.

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The way I see it, there can only be 3 reasons for remaining in Bakhmut:
1. Command have simply miscalculated.
2. Rate of attrition suits ????
3. It serves another purpose e.g. buying time for training/offensive actions.
But, until we have the benefit of hindsight, no one knows.

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#2 is wrong

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It is difficult to analyze the problem from the outside. Without knowing the state of Ukrainian defenses behind Bakhmut or the loss ratios, whether the Ukrainians are wise to continue defending Bakhmut is impossible to say.

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1. I am not exactly from the outside. 2. The loss ratios are not as optimistic as people assume in the comment section.

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I’m pretty sure Wagner would be considered a battlefield combatant by any international court.

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