re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

I would think there’s anywhere between 4,000-7,000 Ukrainian troops left in the city. If I had to put money on it I would say it’s closer to 4K than 7,000. That’s still a lot of battle experienced soldiers that you don’t want to lose. Unfortunately this feels a little like the British 30th Infantry Brigade that attracted the German’s fire to buy time to evacuate the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk. The Ukes need to buy time to get their new equipment to the front. Bakhmut is the Ukrainian Dunkirk basically. The 30th were captured in the end though so let’s hope that part isn’t the same for Ukraine which I don’t think will happen. They are disciplined enough to do a fighting withdrawal when that time comes unlike Russia who just abandons their tanks and hits the woods on foot.

I ended up on the Russian website Top War this morning, and I came across this story from December:

On the Benefits of Conquest for the Conquered

It's a sick article that tries to use events such as ancient Rome's conquest of Greece to justify their current invasion.

The News section is interesting, though. There are a lot of Russian military vets in the comments of the stories.

EDIT: Fascinating stuff in the Opinion section as well, such as this gem:

How a Nuclear Strike on New Zealand Could Prevent a Third World War

I don't even have words for that.

I wonder why Stormy didn't post the ISW report last night. It's very interesting, so I want to post this part:

quote:

---

Bakhmut is not intrinsically significant operationally or strategically as ISW has previously observed. Taking Bakhmut is necessary but not sufficient for further Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast, and Russian forces have already taken such heavy losses fighting for the city that their attack will very likely culminate after they have secured it—if not before. The loss of Bakhmut is not, therefore, of major operational or strategic concern to Ukraine, as Secretary Austin and others have observed.

But Ukraine’s fight for Bakhmut has become strategically significant because of the current composition of Russian forces arrayed in the area. Some Western reports have recently suggested that Ukraine is expending its own elite manpower and scarce equipment on mainly Wagner Group prison recruits who are mere cannon fodder, noting that such an exchange would be to Ukraine’s disadvantage even at high ratios of Russian to Ukrainian losses. That observation is valid in general, although the pool of Russian convict recruits suitable for combat is not limitless and the permanent elimination of tens of thousands of them in Bakhmut means that they will not be available for more important fights.

Russian forces fighting in Bakhmut are now drawn from the elite elements of the Wagner Group and from Russian airborne units as well as from lower-quality troops. Ukrainian intelligence has supported ISW’s assessment that Russian forces near Bakhmut have recently changed tactics and committed higher-quality special forces operators and elements of conventional forces to the fight.[5] ISW has previously reported on the increasing presence of Russian Airborne (VDV) forces around Bakhmut since late December into early January, indicating that conventional Russian troops may be supporting or even supplanting Wagner’s operations around Bakhmut.[6] The Wagner Group is still likely using prisoners to support operations in Bakhmut, albeit to a much more limited extent than in previous months due to massive losses suffered by those recruits in attritional frontal assaults. But Wagner has now also committed its very best soldiers to the fight, and it is they who are being attrited along with the conscripts.

The Battle of Bakhmut may, in fact, severely degrade the Wagner Group’s best forces, depriving Russia of some of its most effective and most difficult-to-replace shock troops. The Wagner attacks already culminated once, causing the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to commit some of its elite airborne troops to the fight. It may well culminate again before taking the city, once more forcing the Russian military to choose between abandoning the effort or throwing more high-quality troops into the battle. The opportunity to damage the Wagner Group’s elite elements, along with other elite units if they are committed, in a defensive urban warfare setting where the attrition gradient strongly favors Ukraine is an attractive one.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin apparently fears that his forces are being expended in exactly this way. Prigozhin made a number of statements on March 5 and 6 that suggest that he fears that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is fighting the Battle of Bakhmut to the last Wagner fighter and exposing his forces to destruction. Prigozhin claimed that he wrote a letter to the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine (presumably Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov) with an urgent appeal for the Russian command to allocate ammunition to Wagner but that his representative was denied access to Russian headquarters and could not deliver the appeal.[7] Prigozhin later published a response to the Zelensky-Zaluzhnyi-Syrskyi meeting on March 6 and claimed that Ukraine has formed a number of offensive groups in Donetsk Oblast to “unblock” Wagner’s blockade of Bakhmut and that he has been “raising the alarm” to call for ammunition and reinforcements for Wagner.[8] Prigozhin claimed that if Wagner does not receive needed ammunition and reinforcements and the blockade of Bakhmut breaks, all is essentially lost and that he will stay with Wagner to the end.[9] Prigozhin’s plea to the Russian General Staff and suggestion that he will stay with Wagner until the bitter end suggests that he is working to position himself as the ultimate martyr for the ideological cause that Bakhmut has come to represent in the Russian milblogger information space. More importantly, it shows that he sees his elite forces to be in grave danger.

The severe degradation or destruction of the elite Wagner fighting force would have positive ramifications beyond the battlefield. Prigozhin has ostentatiously ramped up efforts to disseminate Wagner’s militarism and ideology throughout Russia by advertising Wagner’s role in Bakhmut. The Wagner Group has recently opened several recruitment centers at sports clubs throughout Russia, opened a youth branch, and is visiting schoolchildren to lecture them about Wagner’s structure and show them unfiltered combat footage from Ukraine.[10] Wagner’s success in Bakhmut thus far has given Prigozhin a major advantage in the information space, bolstering his reputation and increasing his popularity in a way that will likely have long-term impacts in the Russian domestic sphere. Prigozhin is one of the most extreme of the Russian pro-war nationalists. He is one of the very few with a serious military force loyal to himself. He has even seemed at times a possible threat to Putin or a possible successor. Which may be why Putin is allowing the Russian MoD to hang him out to dry. Badly damaging Prigozhin’s power and reputation within Russia would be an important accomplishment from the standpoint of the long-term prospects for restoring sanity in Russia. That is an aim in America’s interests as well as in Ukraine’s, and it raises the stakes in the Battle of Bakhmut beyond matters of terrain and battlespace geometry.

---

TLDR: the longer Ukraine defends Bakhmut, the more it degrades Wagner, and that both benefits Ukraine on the battlefield in the short term, and it is good for the long term, as Ukraine and NATO absolutely do not want Prigozhin to seize power if Putin falls.


EDIT: Apologies to StormyMcMan for my impatience.

quote:

---

The return of the voluntary recruitment and crypto-mobilization campaigns likely indicates that the Kremlin will not launch another mobilization wave before the summer of 2023 at the earliest because the spring conscription cycle is due to begin on April 1. Western officials previously reported that Putin had been delaying announcing the second mobilization wave since January and was leaning towards conducting “silent mobilization” out of concern for the stability of his regime.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely again advised Putin to launch another mobilization over the winter as an involuntary call-up at that time would be less likely to overwhelm already struggling Russian military recruitment centers between bi-annual conscription cycles. ISW had observed numerous indicators that Russia was preparing to execute the second mobilization wave since fall 2022, but Putin passed the mobilization window to avoid further antagonizing Russians who did not support previous involuntary call-ups.[21] The Russian MoD will likely be unable to embark on mobilization processes until after Russia completes its spring conscription cycle given that Russian military recruitment centers appear to have the administrative capacity to prepare and generate roughly 130,000 conscripts per bi-annual cycle.[22] That limitation appears to be relatively inflexible and likely explains why the 300,000 reservists called up in the fall seem to have been trained in batches rather than all at once

---

quote:

---

A reportedly captured Russian military manual suggests that Russian forces intend to use the newly created “assault detachment” elements in urban warfare. Ukrainian news outlet Censor.NET originally published the alleged manuals that detail the formation and use of the assault detachment on December 12.[24] ISW previously reported on the “assault detachment” on February 27 and assessed that this newly minted formation is likely an effort to compensate for current combat power limitations by breaking maneuver forces into smaller and more agile structures, thereby partially institutionalizing practices previously used to tactical effect by the Wagner Group in urban combat.[25] A Ukrainian reserve officer amplified documents in the manual on March 5 that recommend assault detachment tactics to be applied in an urban context.[26] The document recommends that Russian forces begin their assaults by targeting the defense‘s frontline with tanks or explosives to make holes in fences and buildings to ensure safe passage of an assault company and suggests how to seize observation points, confuse the enemy, seize multi-story buildings, and take cover. The documents also makes suggestions for Russian forces operating in an assault platoon to break into small groups and clear multi-story and multi-entrance buildings. The Ukrainian reserve officer noted that while the Russian military attempts to create more flexible military formations, instructions are “blindly applied across the battlefield based on a few successful examples.”[27] ISW previously assessed that the documents indicate that the Russian military attempts to simplify combined arms warfare to compensate for the challenges posed by manpower and equipment losses and inexperienced and untrained mobilized personnel.[28] Assault detachments may suffer significant losses in urban warfare given the extensive use of untrained personnel and attritional tactics.

---

quote:

---

Russian forces utilized a new type of guided aerial bomb against Ukrainian targets amid continued precision missile shortages. Ukrainian news outlet Defense Express reported on March 4 that Russian forces used the UPAB-1500V guided aerial bomb against an unspecified target in Chernihiv Oblast within the past few weeks. Defense Express noted that Russian bomber aircraft can release the bombs up to 40km from the intended target and that the aircraft can maintain a low altitude of 14km, both of which would lessen the risk of Ukrainian air defenses taking out the Russian bombers.[29] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ignat stated that a Russian Su-34 may have been trying to launch a UPAB-1500V when Ukrainian forces shot the jet down.[30] Ignat stated on March 6 that Russian forces will undertake every possible measure to procure more weapons and warned not to underestimate Russia’s ability to procure artillery shells, drones, and missiles for use in Ukraine

---

quote:

---

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian authorities indicated that Ukraine will continue to defend Bakhmut for now.

Bakhmut is not intrinsically significant operationally or strategically as ISW has previously observed. But Ukraine’s fight for Bakhmut has become strategically significant because of the current composition of Russian forces arrayed in the area. The Battle of Bakhmut may, in fact, severely degrade the Wagner Group’s best forces, depriving Russia of some of its most effective and most difficult-to-replace shock troops.

Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin apparently fears that his forces are being expended in exactly this way. The severe degradation or destruction of the elite Wagner fighting force would have positive ramifications beyond the battlefield.

The Kremlin is returning to its previously unsuccessful volunteer recruitment and crypto-mobilization campaigns to avoid calling the second mobilization wave. The return of the voluntary recruitment and crypto-mobilization campaigns likely indicates that the Kremlin will not launch another mobilization wave at least before the summer 2023 due to spring conscription cycle on April 1.

A reportedly captured Russian military manual suggests that Russian forces intend to use the newly created “assault detachment” elements in urban warfare.

Russian forces utilized a new type of guided aerial bomb against Ukrainian targets amid continued precision missile shortages.

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks northwest of Svatove and near Kreminna.

Russian forces secured territorial gains in Bakhmut but have not yet encircled the city or forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw.

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks near Avdiivka and west of Donetsk City.

Russian forces continue struggling to maintain fire control over the Dnipro River Delta in Kherson Oblast.

Russian military command is failing to properly equip its forces despite forces increasingly conducting close combat in Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials reported on alleged Russian war crimes in Ukraine.

---

quote:

---

The return of the voluntary recruitment and crypto-mobilization campaigns likely indicates that the Kremlin will not launch another mobilization wave before the summer of 2023 at the earliest because the spring conscription cycle is due to begin on April 1. Western officials previously reported that Putin had been delaying announcing the second mobilization wave since January and was leaning towards conducting “silent mobilization” out of concern for the stability of his regime.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely again advised Putin to launch another mobilization over the winter as an involuntary call-up at that time would be less likely to overwhelm already struggling Russian military recruitment centers between bi-annual conscription cycles. ISW had observed numerous indicators that Russia was preparing to execute the second mobilization wave since fall 2022, but Putin passed the mobilization window to avoid further antagonizing Russians who did not support previous involuntary call-ups.

---

IMO, a critical mistake by Putin. I really thought that he would use the war's anniversary to do another big mobilization drive. He's losing too many men, and the Wagner and LPR/DPR springs have run dry. Look at the UA report for today:





Another thousand men lost. This is yet another reason why Ukraine is continuing to defend Bakhmut, even if they are most certainly taking significant losses of their own.

Russia has almost no operational reserves right now. They still have a couple of brigades in reserve in the Kreminna area, and they have a couple in Mariupol, but they need these for troop rotations.

Lots of destroyed equipment too. The Oryx list of visually-documented Russian tank losses hit 1810 yesterday.




That tank list passed 1500 on November 19th. If we recognize that not all combat losses are visually recorded and uploaded, and if we further remember that tanks will also break down, suffer barrel loss, etc., then we can conclude that Russia has lost over 400 tanks in the last four months.

Russia is making/refurbishing some 40-70 tanks per month right now, depending on who you believe, so they are in no way compensating for their losses.

The Drive

The other big story this morning:

quote:

---

Winged JDAM Smart Bombs Are Now Operational In Ukraine

The Ukrainian Air Force can now employ Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range precision-guided bombs, or JDAM-ERs, against Russian forces, says the U.S. Air Force's top officer in Europe. Ukraine's stockpile of these bombs, which can hit targets up to 45 miles away thanks to their pop-out wing kits, is currently relatively small. However, they could already present real problems for Russia's military as The War Zone has previously explored in detail.

U.S. Air Force Gen. James Hecker, head of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), as well as NATO's Allied Air Command and U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA), provided details about Ukraine's use of the JDAM-ER at a media roundtable that The War Zone and other outlets attended earlier today. The roundtable occurred on the sidelines of the 2023 Air and Space Forces Association's Warfare Symposium, which opened today in Aurora, Colorado.

---

quote:

---

It's also not clear what platforms Ukrainian forces are using to deliver these weapons. Gen. Hecker did bring up the JDAM-ER immediately after highlighting the integration of U.S.-made AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) onto Ukrainian Air Force MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker fighters. Given the existing work that would have had to have been done to allow those Soviet-era jets to fire AGM-88s – something The War Zone has explored in depth in the past – it is possible, if not probable that they are the ones now dropping JDAM-ERs. MiG-29s and Su-27s also simply represent the bulk of Ukraine's tactical aviation fleets. A limited number of Su-24 Fencers could also be hosts and even Su-25 Frogfoots, to a lesser degree.

Hecker also stressed that the total number of JDAM-ERs that Ukraine currently has is limited. "They have enough to do a couple of strikes," he said.

---

quote:

---

Even a small number of JDAM-ERs will present new challenges for Russian forces. As The War Zone has noted in the past, a standard JDAM provides a precision-guided fire-and-forget weapon that an aircraft can launch at fixed targets in any weather and then immediately turn away to put distance between it and enemy defenses. The INS portion of the guidance package means that the bomb should retain a significant degree of accuracy even if the GPS signal is jammed or otherwise lost. The JDAM-ER's wing kit then expands the reach of the weapon and helps further improve survivability.

At today's media roundtable, Gen. Hecker specifically noted that JDAM-ER gives Ukrainian forces the ability to hit entirely new target sets that may be beyond the reach of existing air-launched weapons and ground-based systems, including U.S.-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and variants and derivatives of the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) provided by other countries.

HIMARS and MLRS are among Ukraine's farthest-reaching precision-strike weapons, but the maximum range of their rockets is around 43 miles. On top of that, they contain 200-pound class warheads. Ukraine's JDAM-ERs could potentially be up to 2,000-pound class types, giving much more destructive capability and drastically expands what target sets it can reliably destroy.

---

Summary: Ukraine now has weapons that can strike targets further away than HIMARS, with much, much bigger warheads. This also fully brings the Ukrainian air force back into the equation as having significant battlefield impacts.

LINK

quote:

---

Bakhmut:
Ukrainian forces for 2 days have halted the breakthroughs on the northern sectors of the frontline via reinforcing the area heaviest fighting continues .
Towards the south more counterattacks are taking place, Russian units are being hit hard by art south of Ivanivske.

---

quote:

---

Bakhmut PT2:
Russian units are experiencing problems south of the area of Ivanivske the open fields and defensive positions around the road make it extremely hard for them.
They also don't help themselves by attacking in narrow assault groups which means less artillery is needed.

---

I'm reading more and more stuff this morning that indicates that Ukraine might not just be slowing Russia down in Bakhmut -- they might actually be pushing Russia back.

@DefMon3 posted this yesterday:

quote:

---

The AFU might have moved back over the Bakhmutovka river. This is based on geolocated video and claim by Yuri Butusov.
There are rumors saying the AFU has some success in the northern part. My assumption is the AFU are trying to push RuAF back towards M03

---

And yesterday, the UA General Staff reported that Russia attacked Ukraine in the direction of Yahidne, which is very interesting, because Russia took Yahidne on February 25th, so any fighting near there would indicate a significant pushback north of Bakhmut.

I’m glad they have the JDAM kits finally but one thing people should remember is that while you can get 40-45 miles from the JDAM-ER in order to achieve that distance you would have to release the bomb at altitude since it has no self propulsion and is a glide bomb. The farther up you release, the farther it can glide but you also put the aircraft and pilot in a dangerous spot flying high with all the air defenses on the battlefield.

quote:

---

I’m glad they have the JDAM kits finally but one thing people should remember is that while you can get 40-45 miles from the JDAM-ER in order to achieve that distance you would have to release the bomb at altitude since it has no self propulsion and is a glide bomb. The farther up you release, the farther it can glide but you also put the aircraft and pilot in a dangerous spot flying high with all the air defenses on the battlefield.

---

Yes, Ukraine's air force is small enough that they have to protect the planes that they still have operational, and so they will very rarely try to get too close to the front lines.

But Ukraine is also not pushing its HIMARS right up to the front lines, either, so this likely still represents a small range extension of Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities, along with a much larger ordinance.

Tell me if my thinking here is correct: the technique that Ukrainian pilots will try to employ is to fly very low until the last minute, go into a steep ascent to release the bomb, and then quickly turn around.

Oh boy. Expect an invasion of Politards into here at any moment.

Intelligence Suggests Pro-Ukrainian Group Sabotaged Pipelines, U.S. Officials Say

quote:

---

WASHINGTON — New intelligence reviewed by U.S. officials suggests that a pro-Ukrainian group carried out the attack on the Nord Stream pipelines last year, a step toward determining responsibility for an act of sabotage that has confounded investigators on both sides of the Atlantic for months.

U.S. officials said that they had no evidence President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine or his top lieutenants were involved in the operation, or that the perpetrators were acting at the direction of any Ukrainian government officials.

---