re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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Ukrainian POW gets medical treatment

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Ukrainian POW gets medical treatment

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I've been thinking a while about the Prigozhin mutiny, and I think I've finally come to a few conclusions:

1) I don't think that Prigozhin lost as significantly as others do, for (reasons to follow).

2) Putin lost as soon as Prigozhin began the mutiny. At that point, he had two options -- both bad. He could fight and defeat Wagner in a bloody battle that would have cost him a great deal of men and equipment (leading to imminent Ukrainian victories), or he could make a deal with Prigozhin, which makes him look weak.

3) The fact that the mutiny was directed at Shoigu and Gerasimov puts the two of them even more sharply in focus under the microscope. If Putin were to agree with Prigozhin's demand to fire them, that would indeed make Putin look weak. But keeping them now, after the mutiny, makes Putin even more responsible for their actions. No longer will people be able to pretend that Putin is ignorant of complaints about their failed leadership. If and when Ukraine succeeds in its counteroffensive and retakes the "land bridge," the Russian public will blame Putin himself, and not merely Shoigu and Gerasimov.

4) Putin still needs Wagner and Prigozhin. He still needs the troll farm. He still needs Wagner to work in Africa and elsewhere on Russia's behalf. That's why Wagner recruiting offices are still open across Russia. It's also why Putin isn't going to try to whack him.

5) Wagner soldiers are mostly loyal to Prigozhin. All of Wagner, not just Prigozhin, has mocked the pathetic and ineffective regular Russian troops. They have all made fun of and insulted Shoigu and Gerasimov. I think that very, very few will sign any kind of contract to work for the MoD and have Shoigu and Gerasimov as their bosses (for less money than Wagner pays, by the way). Those men will stay with Wagner.

6) There is a significant battlefield impact in the long run. Wagner has been out of Bakhmut for a month, which would normally be an appropriate amount of time to re-equip and resupply and give men a couple of weeks leave. This would now be the time to reinsert them into the fight, perhaps near Kreminna, where Russia has been attempting offensive action. The fact that Wagner was rotated out and will not be rotated back in will significantly lessen the availability of Russian reserves. Not to mention that Wagner was by far the most effective of all Russian units.

7) If Ukraine's offensive is successful, and the stink of failure on Shoigu and Gerasimov extends to Putin (as I think that it would), then many in Russia will say that Prigozhin tried to prevent those failures. "Prigozhin did everything he could to get Putin to get rid of Shoigu and Gerasimov, but Putin wouldn't listen to how incompetent they were," they will say.

8) If Ukraine's offensive is successful, then this episode will guarantee that Putin himself will bear much of the blame, and much of the Russian public will regard him not only as weak, but also as incompetent.

9) Prigozhin, assuming that he is still alive and well and in control of thousands of troops at that time, would have another opening.

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A serving FSB officer and two lightly armed furries were among supporters of the Wagner Group who went out with their own weapons on the streets of Moscow on 24 June. All three were arrested before they could join the Wagnerites.

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two lightly armed furries

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#Russian Interior Ministry General Alexander Travnikov was involved in a serious ATV accident. He is in a hospital in critical condition.

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The armed rebellion of PMC "Wagner" became the reason for large-scale purges in the ranks of the RF Armed Forces and a crash test of the ministry for loyalty. For several days now, investigators and representatives of the FSO have been working both on the leadership of military command and control bodies and on unit commanders.

“Indecisiveness” in suppressing the rebellion is the pretext on the basis of which they remove objectionable people and persons who have actually failed in the issues of combat training, mobilization and logistical support. At one time, Bulgakov, Mizintsev, Gorshenin were filmed for the collapse of the MTO system of the RF Armed Forces and reports that did not correspond to the situation. But the formal reason was the support of PMCs - and this is how it was presented to the public.

Exactly the same thing is now unfolding in all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The support of PMCs has become a litmus test against which the RF Armed Forces are scourged. Surovikin has not been seen since Saturday - it is not known for certain where General Armageddon is located, there is a version that he is under interrogation.

The actual leadership of the course of the special military operation is carried out by the commander of the Airborne Forces, Mikhail Teplinskiy. Valery Gerasimov formally retains the post of chief of the General Staff, but has nothing to do with resolving issues of the NMD.

But these cleansings concern not only the leadership - it also touched ordinary fighters with officers. Romanov writes about the pilots who refused to strike at mixed convoys with PMCs and civilians: they are now facing criminal prosecution. Two Majors report on border guards who did not open fire from small arms at a convoy of hundreds of pieces of equipment.

Such cases are an example of bureaucratic delirium and inertia of the system. In the conditions of the SVO and the loss of both the sides and the flight personnel, capable pilots are worth their weight in gold - they can prove their usefulness at the fronts in word and deed. The border guards, according to military bureaucrats, should have decided to commit suicide.

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Latest Update - Gonzalo Lira is still under house arrest in the Democratic utopia of Ukraine.

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ItNeverRains

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