re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Transcript of today’s US DoD live press briefing by Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder. There was only one part that was really relevant to Ukraine, about the tanks/training, and I’ve quoted it below.

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3372743/pentagon-press-secretary-air-force-brig-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/

Q: … tanks? The Secretary on Friday said the first of the M1 tanks for training purposes is getting over to Ukraine fairly soon. Was that – one of those tanks off of the Lima production line, one of the refurbished hulls? And when roughly may the rest of the tanks get over there? Has that timeline been accelerated?

GEN. RYDER: So – so these tanks will be for training purposes only. These will not be the refurbished tanks that eventually go to Ukraine, and that is because those refurbished tanks are being produced to Ukraine’s specifications and – and they will be used in actual combat.

By providing these training tanks, which are not coming from the active Army stocks – these are coming from other sources within the inventory – to – that – that will enable us to do the training concurrent with the production of the tanks, which, again – a refurbishment of the tanks, which, again, allows us to expedite the timeline so that they can be training on operations, on maintenance, on sustainment. Then, the two – the – the personnel will marry up with the tanks obviously before the end of the year for delivery to Ukraine.

Q: Could I ask one quick one on training? Will they be using distributed simulation from Fort Benning at the Army Armor School there, in terms of, you know, long-distance simulated training via VTC or – to help – help that along or is it basically on the ground training with drivers right there?

GEN. RYDER: Yeah, so – Tony, so I – I – I don’t have an answer to that question right now. Certainly, in the days ahead, we’ll – we’ll have more information. The training will take place at Grafenwoehr in Germany, and as you know, they use a variety of means to conduct that training.

The – the training that they will be doing in Germany will be actually on the tanks. There’ll be 31 of them – 31 training tanks provided to Ukrainian personnel so that they can, again, train like they’re going to fight. So thank you.

Isw update

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Key Takeaways

Russian milbloggers speculated that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered additional military command changes on April 20.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has launched an information operation to undermine the credibility of Russian state-affiliated private military groups (PMCs).

Kremlin authorities proposed equalizing pay between mobilized personnel and volunteers, likely in an attempt to incentivize military service.

Saratov Oblast Investigative Committee detained a former Wagner Group commander who told Russian human rights organization Gulagu.net about Wagner’s murder of children and other civilians in Bakhmut.

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a naval drone attack against the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) base in Sevastopol in the early morning of April 24.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in New York City on April 24 to chair a session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 24 that Russian ships are ferrying Iranian ammunition across the Caspian Sea to resupply Russian troops fighting in Ukraine.

Krasnoyarsk Krai deputy Konstantin Senchenko resigned on April 24 following the resignation of Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Aleksandr Uss on April 20.

Ukrainian forces have made marginal gains south of Kreminna as of April 24 and continue to target Russian logistics nodes in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast.

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.

Some Russian sources denied claims from other Russian milbloggers that Ukrainian forces established enduring positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.

The Kremlin continues crypto-mobilization efforts likely in an attempt to avoid a second wave of formal mobilization.

The Wagner Group may be attempting to fill law enforcement roles in occupied territories.

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ISW statement on upcoming offensive

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ISW is aware of concern regarding the effect of ISW’s maps and assessments on Ukrainian operational security. Recent media coverage speculating about potential Ukrainian courses of action has used and in some cases misrepresented ISW assessments to make predictions in ways that are inconsistent with the intent of ISW’s products and do not reflect ISW’s institutional views. While our aim is indeed to enable informed reporting about the war by providing granular insights into the situation on the ground, the nature and purpose of our assessments is to evaluate the war as it unfolds and not to provide insight into Ukrainian planning. Inferring predictions of Ukrainian operations from ISW maps and assessments that do not explicitly offer such predictions is inappropriate and not in accord with their intended use.

ISW is committed to doing everything we can to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security or telling the Russians anything they don’t already know—that is why we focus heavily on reporting what Russian sources say and show (and why we do not collect on Ukrainian forces or operations). We are also focused on ensuring that our products are accurate and reliably sourced. We prioritize both accuracy and protecting Ukrainian operational security over the rapidity of reporting. There is far more speculation about and forecasting of future Ukrainian operations by other organizations and individuals than we engage in, and we will continue to adhere to our conservative approach.

ISW will make no forecasts whatsoever about what Ukrainian forces might or might not do, let alone where or when they might do it. We will be particularly careful to avoid statements that might be construed as offering such forecasts in the coming weeks. We ask journalists and media organizations to avoid attributing such forecasts to our reports when we have not made them. We will also avoid commenting or offering assessments about whether particular Ukrainian advances or operations might or might not be part of counter-offensive efforts, with a particular eye on avoiding anything that might suggest where we think the Ukrainian main effort is or will be. Our published Russian order of battle of 23 APR explicitly stated that we do not offer any assessment at all about what parts of the front might be more or less advantageous for a Ukrainian counter-offensive, for example.

Our approach to mapping changes in control-of-terrain is inherently conservative and delayed. Our mapping of previous Ukrainian counter-offensives was regularly days behind events because of the requirements for confirmed sourcing our methodology uses. We will not, therefore, be aggressively adjusting our control of terrain maps to keep them up-to-the-minute but will rather be adjusting them as sufficient evidence emerges such that any changes we make will likely have been broadly reported. That was the case, for example, with the Kharkiv counter-offensive—media reports of Ukrainian advances were well ahead of our map changes.

ISW is committed to helping policymakers and the public understand what is occurring in Ukraine as accurately as possible without in any way compromising Ukraine’s ability to liberate its occupied lands.

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Interesting that they put those together. The M-55S tanks' guns are generally not powerful enough to take out T-72s,

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British made 105 to up gun from Soviet 100 and other modernizations.

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Interesting that they put those together. The M-55S tanks' guns are generally not powerful enough to take out T-72s, so the Bradleys will have to engage enemy tanks with their TOWs. The M-55S will operate against smaller enemy vehicles and in infantry support -- clearing trenches and such.

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Yep. If you look at the pic on Twitter and pay attention to the location of the bore evacuator, you can see the T-55 has a 105mm gun instead of the normal 100mm. I imagine the 105mm they are using is the M68 105mm main gun used on Western tanks from the M48A5, M60A3, Merkiva, and the original M1 Abrams. When firing APFSDS it can defeat the armor of the T-64 and T-72.

Yes, I went down a rabbit hole when it was originally announced Ukraine was getting Leopard 1s and posted some of the info regarding their main gun back in Feb.

Tigerdroppings.com See last post, military today link is dead now unfortunately.

The M-55S's feature the same 105mm British Royal Ordnance L7 105mm rifled gun as part of their upgrade package.

Tank Historia.com M55S

While not up to scratch from longer ranges, according to this discussion with the right ammunition they can theoretically be effective against T-72s frontal armour up to 1-2km away.

Historum.com 105mm L7 Penetration

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That depends on alot of variables. What ammo the 105mm gun is using, how far away its firing from, and whether the target is at an oblique angle. The exact model of the target tank is important, too.

Against the front of a T-72 tank (with no obliquity), I don't think regular APDS rounds are going to penetrate... Not from any range. Even the older APFDS rounds would have trouble. The M735 could allegedly pierce 350mm of RHA from 1000 meters.


Against KE threats, the T-72s armor is speculated to be equivalent to

T-72A: 410mm turret, 360mm hull.
T-72M: 380mm turret, 335mm hull.

Note: The T-72M was the export variant of the Russian T-72, with somewhat inferior armor to the domestic T-72A. (It used spaced armor instead of composite armor)


So yes, a 105mm L7 with the older M735 rounds could make frontal penetrations, but only against the hull and from close range.

ren0312 said:
I heard that by 1985, the L7 had a round that was capable of penetrating close to 500mm of RHA, which countries had this in NATO, and how widely distributed was this? Did countries like Demark, Belgium, Italy, Austria, Greece, Sweden, Canada, Spain, Norway, and Turkey have this round in 1985?

I think you are referring to the M833 APFSDS round that reached service in 1983. Or possibly the DM-33 APFSDS round that reached service in 1984.

According to the Bob Makenzie armor page, the M833 can pierce 480mm of RHA at 1000 meters. Meanwhile, the DM-33 can pierce 470mm of RHA at 2000 meters.

Keep in mind, these are just estimates, and they aren't the only figures floating around on the internet.

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Interview with a Ukrainian fighter pilot LINK

British Defence Intelligence
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE
UPDATE ON UKRAINE 25 April 2023

Over April 2023, Russia's average daily casualty rate has highly likely fallen by around 30 per cent. This follows exceptionally heavy Russian casualties over January-March 2023.

Figures released by the Ukrainian General Staff suggest a reduction from a daily average of 776 Russian casualties in March, to an average of 568 so far in April. Defence Intelligence cannot verify Ukraine's exact methodology, but the general trend is likely accurate.

Russia's losses have highly likely reduced as their attempted winter offensive has failed to achieve its objectives, and Russian forces are now focused on preparing for anticipated Ukrainian offensive operations.

Russia announced that T-14 Armata tanks have been deployed to the front. If that's the case, I assume that we will soon see videos of them in action. Until then, I will assume that it's propaganda.

If Cane's is too salty you must not be from Louisiana or anywhere nearby.