re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

The problem with a negotiated peace right now is neither side are close to what that peace would look like

Russia wants a de-western Ukraine, to keep the 4 oblasts they have partially captured, zelinksy removed from office and a Russian friendly government installed.

Ukraine wast return to pre 2014 borders.

Russia feels it can win this long term as it believes it can outlast the wests resolve and that they stockpile of equipment (even if old) and their larger pool of manpower will win long term

Ukraine has been fighting since 2014 with the war expanding in 2022. They view this as a war of survival with Ukraine as a nation hingeing on the outcome

A successful Ukraine counter offensive would push Russia closer to ukraines view of negotiated peace. Russia is in control of when this ends. All they need to do is pull back to pre 2022 borders and the west will pressure Ukraine to accept with promises of NATO/EU membership

Russia losing a spring offensive would put 2014 borders less Crimeria on table and if offensive is in the south May put crimeria loss on the table as well.

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Look at Ukraine’s continued reliance on mass artillery fire. Despite Ukraine’s serious shortage of shells, my field research suggests that the country has not substantially decreased its artillery consumption in months. If junior officers had the authority to exploit opportunities as they arose, mounting co-ordinated attacks from infantry and armoured vehicles, supported by short but pinpoint barrages of precision-guided artillery, this would drastically reduce the number of shells needed.

The ongoing culture war in the Ukrainian armed forces makes it harder to distribute new technology evenly across the force. “The problem is not the technology, it is the culture,” I was told by one official from Aerorozvidka, an ngo founded by volunteer experts that has co-developed battle-management software and nimble r18 drones for the Ukrainian armed forces. Individual units use a range of different apps to conduct their operations. This hampers co-ordination between units, and reinforces the old Soviet habit of distinct orders flowing separately to different units. “This is essentially two Soviet militaries fighting one another”, lamented the official.

Ironically, some technology has even reinforced Soviet culture. For example, networked battle-management systems, which provide a real-time picture of the battlefield and allow messages to flow back and forth, allow higher-ranking commanders to micromanage battles from afar, despite often-limited knowledge of the local terrain and circumstances of the unit. The result is often greater inflexibility—it is hard to improvise when a general is breathing down your neck—and higher losses of men and materiel. It can also result in tensions. Some junior officers steeped in the Western tradition have started to ignore orders from above. That is dangerous in military organisations, which rely on the prompt and faithful execution of lawful orders.

The ongoing culture war is making Ukraine’s transformation into a 21st-century fighting force an uphill battle. The West could help by stepping up its training efforts, even for Ukraine’s most senior officials. But for this to make a difference, Ukraine’s armed forces will first have to cast aside their Soviet cultural inheritance, delegate authority to lower ranks, and give junior officers permission to use their initiative without facing punishment. Technology should be used to empower units, not micromanage them, and successful experiments, such as those with drones, need to be scaled up across the force. Such a transformation could help reduce Ukraine’s casualties in this ongoing war of attrition.

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Thanks for sharing.

I suspect this section may explain some of the reported frustrations on our end with them.

Changing a culture takes at least two generations. Ukraine doesn’t really have time for that.

So the Russians are threatening Chavis Yar?

That's a really good summary that goes a little deeper than the guy on the podcast (the name is escaping me at the moment) went and explains some of the specific hang ups a little better.

Like I said earlier, the Ukraine command better get a handle on that kind of thing because they definitely will not prevail fighting Russia in a Soviet-style static shelling war. Seeing this kind of issue being brought to light now makes me wonder if some of this infighting and decision making from afar isn't what is going on with the defense of Bakhmut. They've had ample time to do a tactical withdrawal, but are flirting awfully dangerously with losing a lot of men and equipment over what may amount to pride and stubbornness over an insignificant objective (in the grand scheme of things).

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Most (not all) of the old school guys have been taken out of command roles. The ones that werent receptive to American "help" went first.

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That article was posted today and the author said he witnessed the kind of things he was speaking about still going on while on "a recent research trip" to Ukraine. So it's still happening.

I think it's probably a bigger problem than anyone from any western government, certainly not anyone from the Ukrainian government, is willing to publicly let on.

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I think it's probably a bigger problem than anyone from any western government, certainly not anyone from the Ukrainian government, is willing to publicly let on.

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It's why NATO countries continue to increase their training commitments for Ukraine. Just this morning, for example, Belgium committed 100 instructors to train Ukrainians.

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Lots of people in Russia are reacting very dramatically to the news of the ICC arrest warrant for Putin. According to @wartranslated, Murz, who somehow manages to say the craziest stuff and still not get thrown out of any windows, sees parallels to the Russian revolution of 1917 and predicts a coup:

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To me the ICC arrest warrant was about sending 2 messages, regardless of any enforceability or lack thereof of the actual charge.

Firstly while the US and Russia may not be signatories ALL of western Europe is, this is them making a statement to Russia that they are united and providing further framework to "encourage" leaders who are slow or reluctant in combating Russia.

Secondly in naming Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova as complicit in the war crime of deporting children from the Ukraine, that it is being taken seriously by Europe and gives them a further fulcrum over recalcitrant members - who is going to come out in favour of deportation of children?

Putin also has a patsy to throw under the bus if he wants to appease Europe with potential ramifications of causing infighting at home if he does.

I am VERY interested which countries were behind pushing this through, especially with how visibly they named the defendants so early and publicly.

Lvova-Belova is a mid-level functionary. There are lots of people at levels in between her and Putin who now have to worry if they are the next to be indicted -- oh, and who know that they will probably never again be able to go on a summer vacation in most of Europe.

If you'd like to read a highly optimistic outlook for Ukraine, here's one in a German outlet by Marcus Keupp, the author of Military Economics and a lecturer at the ETH Zurich Military Academy.

He argues that Russia is thinning themselves out to the point where they are wafer-thin, and the new NATO armor will crush them. He says that most Western observers are still buying into the same myths of Russian strength that they did before the war.

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The battles for Bakhmut tie up a large number of Russian forces, soldiers who, in turn, are missing elsewhere. In this way, Ukraine can conserve its reserves – and build up forces for offensives in the spring. Moreover, the more Zelenskyi emphasizes the "importance" of Bakhmut, the more urgently Prigozhin wants to conquer it. Russia falls for a trick.

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The war will probably be over in October.

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