re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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What's next in the hypothetical that Ukraine doesn't secure any significant success with their new toys they're amassing now? Does the west just stop all aid except maybe some small arms and ammo? Do all the NATO countries just start mobilizing for the eventual shooting war with Russia and start transitioning to a wartime economy and build up massive surpluses? Because if the flow of weapons that gives UA the tech advantage stops, Russia will eventually roll over the entire country and Poland is gonna get extremely antsy with Ruskies at the border.

Crazy Europe-wide hypothetical with a lot riding on Ukraine being able to perform with our equipment this spring and summer...and perform well.

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If Ukraine's spring offensive is unsuccessful, then I think that a lot of aid eventually dries up -- not completely, though, because in that situation, Ukraine still becomes the place that helps contain Russian aggression in the long term.

But I think that Macron, Scholz, and company start ratcheting up the pressure for Ukraine to make a deal. Congress says no more money. And Zelensky decides to start negotiating.

That's what I think. I don't think that Russia rolls over anyone, though. By the end of this summer, it's conventional military strength will be less than a third of what it was 14 months ago. They have lost so much equipment, experienced soldiers, etc. -- and they'll have no money to rebuild, as Russia will be broke for a decade.

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But you're correct in that those big stockpiles shrink pretty quick.The needs on the ground often don't line up with what the brass have been theorizing for years.

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We procure for efficiency, not wartime needs...

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A Russian State Duma bill aiming to raise the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin is not planning to conduct full mobilization in the future. The Russian State Duma received a bill for consideration on March 13 that would implement Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s proposal for raising the conscription age.[20] The bill would raise the maximum conscription age from 27 to 30 immediately while raising the minimum conscription age from 18 to 21 with a one-year annual increase between 2024 and 2026.[21] Shoigu proposed the conscription age increase at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) board meeting on December 21, 2022, and Russian officials have since offered oscillating statements on whether the increase would apply to upcoming conscription cycles in the spring and fall of 2023.[22] The bill’s immediate increase of the maximum age likely seeks to expand the conscription age range to fulfill some portion of the Russian military’s immediate manpower demands in Ukraine and then subsequently shrink the overall conscription demands on Russian society in the following years. The gradual increase of the minimum conscription age means that three-year groups of potential Russian conscripts will essentially receive deferments of three, two, and one years each, while the current year groups eligible for conscription face continued attritional fighting in Ukraine. The Kremlin may be attempting to shield a new generation of Russians from the demographic and social impacts of attritional fighting in Ukraine by siloing these impacts among one generational group of Russians. The timeline given for the contraction of the conscription age range may also suggest that the Kremlin does not expect the war in Ukraine to last longer than the next three years.

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The Russian military is reportedly employing the newly created “assault detachments” in different manners across different tactical situations. A Ukrainian reserve officer who has previously reported on a captured Russian military manual on the new “assault detachment” reported on March 12 that Russian forces are using both formalized permanent assault (“storm”) units and ad hoc temporary assault detachments in Ukraine.[23] The Ukrainian officer reported that Russian forces have integrated permanent assault units into battalion, regiment, and brigade structures and that their size ranges from that of a company to that of a reinforced battalion.[24] Russian forces reportedly assemble temporary assault detachments within a regiment or battalion for specific operations and do not give these temporary detachments a number, name, defined structure, regular commander, or specific armaments.[25] Permanent Russian assault detachments reportedly have designated commanders and are most often comprised of one or two tanks, several armored personnel carriers, and 40 to 80 personnel.[26] Russian forces reportedly will form temporary assault detachments to respond to situations as they arise, and these formations apparently often retreat after initial losses and suffer from significant communication and coordination problems.

The Russian military is likely attempting to concentrate combat-ready forces and equipment in permanent formations trained to conduct small-scale assaults while distancing severely degraded formations from offensive operations of tactical importance. Russian forces are reportedly employing these assault formations to attack well-fortified Ukrainian positions and conduct urban warfare.[30] These non-doctrinal formations would likely struggle to conduct a mechanized advance across open country in Ukraine, and Russian forces are likely implementing them for conditions on the current frontlines and not for any wider operational goals.

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Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine Iryna Vereshchuk confirmed that Russia has illegally deported 2,161 Ukrainian orphans to Russia.[31] The Ukrainian government previously verified the illegal deportation of a total of 16,207 children to Russia, including those deported alongside their families, and estimated that the total number of children may be closer to 150,000

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Key Takeaways

A member of the Kremlin-affiliated Valdai Discussion Club accused Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of pursuing political objectives in Russia that are endangering Wagner forces in Bakhmut. This attack on Prigozhin is in line with ISW’s March 12 assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be deliberately expending Wagner forces in Bakhmut to derail Prigozhin’s political aspirations.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to maintain Chechnya’s relevance in the Russian political and military sphere.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Iranian officials in Tehran on March 13 to expand bilateral cooperation and bolster sanctions mitigations.

Russian milbloggers continue to speculate about a prospective Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine, suggesting increasing concern in the Russian information space about Ukrainian combat capabilities as Russian forces pin themselves on offensive operations in Bakhmut.

A Russian State Duma bill aiming to raise the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin is not planning to conduct full mobilization in the future.

The Russian military is reportedly employing the newly created “assault detachments” in different manners across different tactical situations.

Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine Iryna Vereshchuk confirmed that Russia has illegally deported 2,161 Ukrainian orphans to Russia.

Russian forces continued ground attacks throughout the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and made marginal gains northeast of Kupyansk and east of Siversk.

Russian forces continued making advances in and around Bakhmut but have not succeeded in completing a turning movement, envelopment, or encirclement of the city as of March 13.

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast front line.

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct raids against areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.

Subordination of mobilized Russian military personnel to Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR/LNR) formations is generating increasing discontent.

Russian occupation officials continue to introduce new provisions to discourage and restrict the use of the Ukrainian language in educational facilities.

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British Defence Intelligence
UPDATE ON UKRAINE 14 March 2023
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

In recent weeks, Russian artillery ammunition shortages have likely worsened to the extent that extremely punitive shell-rationing is in force on many parts of the front. This has almost certainly been a key reason why no Russian formation has recently been able to generate operationally significant offensive action.

Russia has almost certainly already resorted to issuing old munitions stock which were previously categorised as unfit for use.

A presidential decree of 03 March 2023 laid down measures for the Ministry of Trade and Industry to bypass the authority of the managers of defence industries who fail to meet their production goals. Russia is increasingly applying the principles of a command economy to its military industrial complex because it recognises that its defence manufacturing capacity is a key vulnerability in the increasingly attritional 'special military operation.

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Much like Stalingrad before it

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I also wonder if Russia’s continued attacks are not a combination of a few things as well

1) if it’s Wagner forces, Putin views them as expendable

2) Putin needing a “win”

3) Russia MOD telling Putin that the kill ratios are in Russia's favor, even with the high losses.

4) does Russia see Bakhmut as the same think as Ukraine, a place to draw in enemy forces so they can make an offensive move elsewhere. (But so far those elsewhere attempts have failed)

Russia appears to be on the move again in Bakhmut. There are videos this morning of Wagner troops inside the AZOM metal plant, which Ukraine had used for several days as a fortress to hold Russia at bay in the north of the city.




Map from @NOELreports:




So, that's a setback for Ukraine. On the other hand, there are also new videos showing that Russia decided again to run over the same minefield in Vuhledar as before. There are already two tanks and a BTR destroyed. Maybe they thought that the mines wouldn't explode this time?

It appears the metal plant is on the east side of the river. I thought Ukraine was pulling back to the west side a blowing bridges last week.

They must still be sending assault teams to impede the Russia troops, but not holding after a prolonged fight.

And Vuhledar is turning into a tank/BMP bone yard with all the videos posted of destroyed armor.

Russia shows modernization of T-62 tanks



The Russian 103rd Armored Repair Plant has just shed light on the modernization of ?-62 tanks.

Russia currently plans to modernize approximately 800 outdated Soviet-era ?-62?/MV tanks.

Modernization is conducted by installing a new radio, thermal sight, explosive reactive armor, and other protection.

more images in the link...

Ukrainian Military Portal

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For whatever reason, the Ukrainians seem to think that Bakhmut is essential to hold for their upcoming spring offensive. Many third-party observers disagree. Personally? I think it's become part of the propaganda war. Much like Stalingrad before it, Bakhmut has very little strategic significance to the overall campaign. However, the propaganda coup of either successfully taking or holding the city would be very large indeed.

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As I said the other day, the only way this stand Ukraine is taking in Bakhmut makes sense is if their trying to pull in and tie down as many Russian forces as possible to set up a double envelopment later in the Spring to encircle and destroy the Russians now trapped in the city.

In other words, Stalingrad 2.0.

That’s the only logical reason I can see for Ukraine to fight so hard to hold Bakhmut.

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Here's the BTR in Vuhledar after hitting the mine.

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that will just buff out......