re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Remember when Z wanted to have peace talks 6 or 8 weeks ago and Biden’s
handlers said no no no.

How many lives would have been saved?

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Ithought Russia had special forces operators similar to our Seal/Green Beret/Delta teams

You haven't heard a word during this war about any actions by the Russian SOF. Did they piss them all away in the opening feint on Kyiv?

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Like the rest of the Russian military, they're not very good in comparison to their western counterparts. And the Russians did waste them, using them as shock troops in conventional attacks instead of pinpoint operations against high value targets.

Early in the war Russian sabotage groups were supposed to be operating in Kyiv. If there were, they never got near Zelensky or accomplished anything else of note.

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I thought Russia had special forces operators similar to our Seal/Green Beret/Delta teams

You haven't heard a word during this war about any actions by the Russian SOF. Did they piss them all away in the opening feint on Kyiv?

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I would imagine their Spetsnaz is both smaller and lacks the extensive capabilities that US Tier 1/2 posses. Even the US special forces generally don't have the type of capability to impact a major conflict in a way it makes headlines. By that I mean even though they can have significant impacts on large scale conflicts it is still a small scale effort that may have books written about it for decades but it won't see the light of day in newspapers in real time.

I think a lot of them probably died early on due to lack of support and intelligence and the reality is they are probably far less capable than their reputation might suggest. Maybe in the Soviet days it was different. I have a gut feeling the Spetsnaz is similar in quality to better soldiers in the higher US tier 3 units like the 101st and 82nd. We have seen the milk the Russian military is made from so even taking the cream doesn't exactly instill fear in my heart.

BTW I have seen some YT videos about Spetsnaz units doing work in Ukraine in the last few months.

Remember when you still pretended that the Deep State didn’t exist and they
weren’t promoting this “war”?

Looks like trouble is brewing in Tatarstan to break away from the Russian Federation.

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WSJ story today about Europe waking up to its ammo production problem

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That’s concerning in the near term for Ukraine, medium term for the west as a whole. Others have mentioned it before me for sure, but makes you think Ukraine needs a balls to the wall offensive ASAP to push Russia as far as they can.

When this started it seemed like this delayed a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan by a while, but as the west runs low on artillery and anti-aircraft munitions that delay may be running out over time if this keeps going at the same rate. If the west gives everything it can to Ukraine, that leaves Taiwan largely on its own unless it’s allies were to formally enter the war on their behalf in event of a Chinese attack.

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this “war”

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I think that Steven Segal has been directing filming of their training.

ISW Update

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Moscow has been setting conditions for a new most dangerous course of action (MDCOA)--a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv--since at least October 2022.[1] This MDCOA could be a Russian information operation or could reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actual intentions. Currently available indicators are ambivalent—some verified evidence of a Russian buildup in Belarus makes more sense as part of preparations for a renewed offensive than as part of ongoing exercises and training practices, but there remains no evidence that Moscow is actively preparing a strike force in Belarus.

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Prominent Russian pro-war milbloggers are amplifying the possibility of the MDCOA over the winter-spring period. Former Russian military commander Igor Girkin, a prominent critical voice in the Russian milblogger space, responded to ongoing discussions within the Russian information space on December 23 about Russia’s capacity to renew an assault on northwestern Ukraine from Belarus to sever ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Kyiv and Europe....Some milbloggers have been speculating about the likelihood of a renewed Russian attack on northern Ukraine since at least October 2022. Prominent Russian Telegram channel Rybar, whose author is currently part of Putin’s mobilization working group, stated on October 20 that there were rumors of an “imminent” Russian offensive operation on Lviv, Volyn, Kyiv, Chernihiv, or Kharkiv

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Putin’s upcoming meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in St. Petersburg on December 26-27 will advance the Russian information operation around the MDCOA even if it does not directly support preparations for it. Lukashenko’s office announced that Putin and Lukashenko will meet during a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) heads of state meeting in St. Petersburg on December 26-27.

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The Russian military continues to trip limited indicators for the MCDOA, reinforcing an information operation designed to establish the plausibility of the MDCOA or actual preparations for executing the MDCOA. The Russian Ministry of Defense ostentatiously announced on November 24 that it has a field hospital in Belarus.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 23 that Russian forces are planning to deploy at least one more field hospital in Belarus.[10] Field hospitals are not necessary for training exercises and could indicate preparation for combat operations. The appearance of field hospitals in Belarus in early 2022 was among the final indicators observed before Russia commenced its full-scale invasion

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The Russian military has been much more clearly setting conditions for an offensive in northwestern Luhansk Oblast, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported observing an increased volume of railway transport of personnel, military equipment, and ammunition to combat areas on December 23.

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The Russian military may nevertheless attempt to conduct a diversionary attack on the ground or in the information space against northern Ukraine, likely in an effort to divert Ukrainian forces from defending in Donbas or in conjunction with an offensive in Luhansk or, less plausibly, elsewhere. Chief of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov stated on December 23 that Russia is trying to divert Ukrainian forces from the southeast by setting up a feint in Belarus, noting that military activity in Belarus is an element of a disinformation campaign

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ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone.[18] ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible. Belarusian forces remain extremely unlikely to invade Ukraine without a Russian strike force. Ukrainian military officials noted that Russia had not created strike groups in Belarus.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is reportedly preparing to present a peace plan in February 2023, which may be timed to exploit a failed Russian winter offensive. The Wall Street Journal, citing Ukrainian and European diplomats, reported on December 22 that Zelensky’s team is planning to present an unspecified peace plan in February 2023

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The Kremlin continues to deflect criticism about Russia’s military failures in Ukraine by rhetorically narrowing the definitions of its initial war objectives without formally changing them. When asked about the Russian invasion’s progress, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian forces achieved “significant progress” in its war objective of “demilitarization” of Ukraine on December 23.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s renewed public appearances likely indicate that he has become more concerned about his popularity and image in Russia. Putin has been seemingly making more public appearances in Russian cities and more frequently delivering vague statements about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in recent days compared to his marked absence from public activity outside the Kremlin throughout the first ten months of the war

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Key Takeaways

ISW assesses that the Kremlin has been setting conditions for a new most dangerous course of action (MDCOA)—a renewed offensive from Belarus possibly aimed at Kyiv—since at least October 2022. The Kremlin may be conducting an information operation or may actually be preparing for this MDCOA, which ISW continues to assess to be unlikely but possible.

Prominent Russian pro-war milbloggers are amplifying the possibility of the MDCOA over the winter-spring period.

The Russian military continues to trip indicators for the MCDOA, reinforcing an information operation designed to establish the plausibility of the MDCOA or preparations to execute it.

The Russian military has more clearly been setting conditions for an offensive in northwestern Luhansk Oblast.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is reportedly preparing to present a peace plan in February 2023, which could be timed to exploit a failed Russian winter offensive.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s renewed public appearances likely indicate that he has become more concerned about his popularity and image in Russia.

Russian forces conducted at least two reconnaissance-in-force operations in northern and northeastern Ukraine on December 22-23.

Ukrainian forces likely made tactical gains east and south of Bakhmut City over the past 72 hours.

Russian forces are continuing to establish defensive positions in left-bank Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and are conducting defensive operations in southern Ukraine.

The Kremlin is intensifying its censorship efforts to silence concerns over an expansion of the Russian Armed Forces and a second mobilization wave.

Ukrainian partisans continued to target Russian officials in occupied territories.

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British Defence Intelligence
UPDATE ON UKRAINE 24 December 2022
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

Russia has augmented its force in Ukraine with tens of thousands of reservists since October. Despite the easing of its immediate personnel shortages, a shortage of munitions highly likely remains the key limiting factor on Russian offensive operations.

Russia has likely limited its long-range missile strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure to around once a week due to the limited availability of cruise missiles. Similarly, Russia is unlikely to have increased its stockpile of artillery munitions enough to enable large-scale offensive operations.

A vulnerability of Russia's current operational design is that even just sustaining defensive operations along its lengthy front line requires a significant daily expenditure of shells and rockets.