re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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The Russians initially offered relatively light resistance, but: meanwhile, they have rushed the 3rd Motor Rifle Division — rebuilt with help of mobilised reservists without any training — and few other units from Belgorod, and then attacked, apparently, from east towards west. From the area around Arapivka, Volodymyrivka, and Kuzemivka, without any feints, without any diversions, with plentiful of air support and artillery support (that, however, was poorly directed) — straight over that empty area towards west.

Obviously, Ukrainians detected them early, brought their units in position, and brought in their artillery to bear.

Apparently, the first to go was the T-90s-equipped 27th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. It attacked Kurylivka on 24 September, and lost a number of T-90s knocked out or abandoned in the process (even days later, Ukrainians were still collecting pieces of that unit around the battlefield). The next was a BTG of the 237th Tank Regiment, equipped with T-80s and BMP-2s taken out of storage. This attacked Petropavlivka and was completely smashed, sometimes on Sunday and/or Monday, 25–26 September. Think, somebody counted some 10–11 T-80s, a similar number of BMPs and MT-LBs, and about 40 other vehicles on just one video shown that battlefield on the ‘next morning’, but can’t find that link any more. Considering a Motor Rifle BTG can be expected to have a company of 10–11 MBTs, two or three companies of IFVs (like BMPs), and then similar-sized artillery support: as said, more or less an entire BTG was smashed there.

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Ukraine spent the summer sending its 2nd tier conscripts to the front in the Donbas as it lovingly collected NATO-donated weapons and trained units in the rear. With generous NATO help, Ukraine was able to accumulate forces for two full scale offensives - one in Kherson (which failed spectacularly) and one in Kharkov (which succeeded in pushing past the Russian screening force and reaching the Oskil). Much of that carefully accumulated fighting power is now gone or degraded. Rumors circulated of a third offensive towards Melitipol, but Ukraine does not seem to have the combat power to achieve this, and strong Russian forces are in the region behind prepared defensive lines.

On the whole, therefore, Ukraine’s window for offensive operations has closed, and what remains is closing quickly. The last zone of intense Ukrainian operations is around Lyman, where aggressive Ukrainian attacks have so far failed to either storm or encircle the town. It is still possible that they take Lyman and consolidate control of Kupyansk, but this would likely represent the culmination of Ukrainian offensive capability. For now, the area around Lyman is a killing zone that exposes attacking Ukrainian troops to Russian air and ground fires.

The large scale view of force ratios is as follows:

Ukraine has spent much of the combat power that they accumulated with NATO help during the summer, and will have an urgent need to reduce combat intensity for refitting and rearming at precisely the same time that Russian combat power in the theater begins to surge.

Simultaneously, NATO’s ability to arm Ukraine is on the verge of exhaustion. Let’s look at this more closely.

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Anyone who expects the war to slow down during the winter is in for a surprise. Russia is going to launch a late autumn/winter offensive and achieve significant gains. The arc of force generation (both Russia’s increasing force accumulation and Ukraine’s degradation) coincide with the approach of cold weather.

Let’s make a brief note about combat in the cold. Russia is perfectly capable of waging effective operations in the snow. Going back to World War Two, the Red Army was more than capable of offensive success during the winter, starting in 1941 with the general counteroffensive at Moscow, again in 1942 with the destruction of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad, and in 1943-44 with two successful large scale offensives beginning in the winter. Now, of course World War Two is not directly applicable in all ways, but we can establish that from a technical standpoint there is a clearly established capability to wage operations in cold weather.

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As for where Russia will choose to commit its newly generated forces, there are four realistic possibilities, which I will enumerate in no particular order:

Reopening the Northern Front with an operation around Kharkov. The attractiveness of this option is clear. A Russian move in force towards Kharkov would immediately collapse all of Ukraine’s gains towards the Oskil by compromising their rear areas.

An offensive on Nikolayev out of the Kherson region. This would move further towards the goal of a landlocked Ukraine, and would take advantage of the fact that Ukrainian forces in this region are badly chewed up after their own failed offensive.

Massive commitment to the Donbas to finish the liberation of DNR territory by capturing Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. This is less likely, as Russia has demonstrated comfort with the slow tempo of operations on this front.

A push north from the Melitopol area towards Zaparozhia. This would safeguard the nuclear powerplant and end any credible threats to the land bridge to Crimea.

Other possibilities I regard as unlikely. A second advance on Kiev would make little operational sense, as it would not support any of the existing fronts. I would expect action around Kiev only if the new force generation is significantly larger than the headline number of 300,000. Otherwise, Russia’s winter offensives are likely to be concentrated on mutually supporting fronts. I think some movement to reopen the northern is likely, as it would completely compromise Ukraine’s gains in the Izyum-Kupyansk direction. There are rumors that forces are being moved into Belarus, but I actually think the Chernigov-Sumy axis would be more likely than a new Kiev operation, as it could be supportive of an offensive on Kharkov.

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What's the world coming to when you can't fap in your foxhole without someone trying to drop a grenade on your head.

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I was just looking over the maps from the Battle of Kursk while I contemplated the similarities to today's war. For those who don't know, the areas around Belogord (very close to Ukraine) were the battleground for one of the largest battles in WW2. Russia suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties to defeat the Germans at Kursk. LINK

War never changes

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5. Their weapons systems tend to be crude but reliable. This is true for everything from their rifles up to their tanks. To quote Stalin, “quantity has a quality all its own”. He didn’t come up with this idea. It was already well engrained in Russia ling before he was born.

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He brings up tremendous Russian victories in WWII to wave the flag, but he forgot to mention that those great WWII victories were enabled by guess what? Tremendous help from the West.

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