History of US and NATO Lies and Provocations

This post provides a comprehensive overview of NATO’s eastward expansion and its impact on Russian-Western relations, focusing on key events from 1990 to 2014. It addresses the user’s request for a detailed, clear account with supporting links, building on a previous condensed version to ensure no meaning is lost.

1. Assurances Against NATO Expansion (1990–1991)

During the negotiations for German reunification in 1990–1991, Western leaders sought Soviet approval to withdraw approximately 400,000 troops from East Germany and integrate a unified Germany into NATO. To address Soviet security concerns, multiple Western leaders provided assurances that NATO would not expand eastward toward Russia’s borders. These assurances were not codified in formal treaties but are documented in declassified records.

Key Assurances:

On January 31, 1990, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in a speech in Tutzing, called for NATO to state that it would not expand eastward, closer to the Soviet Union’s borders (Wikipedia: NATO Expansion Controversy).

On February 10, 1990, Genscher told Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, “We are aware that NATO membership for a unified Germany raises complicated questions. For us, however, one thing is certain: NATO will not expand to the east,” adding that this applied “in general” beyond East Germany (DER SPIEGEL: NATO’s Eastward Expansion).

On February 9, 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told Gorbachev that if Germany remained in NATO, there would be “no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east” (National Security Archive: NATO Expansion).

Other leaders, including British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, French President François Mitterrand, and NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, offered similar assurances throughout 1990–1991, as documented in memoranda from U.S., Soviet, German, British, and French archives (National Security Archive: NATO Expansion).

Archival research by Joshua Shifrinson supports the Russian narrative, showing that U.S. officials offered informal non-expansion pledges while privately considering expansion (International Security: NATO Non-extension Assurances). A 1991 British archive document

2. NATO Expansion (1999 and 2004)

Despite the assurances, NATO expanded eastward in two significant waves, bringing the alliance closer to Russia’s borders and fueling perceptions of betrayal.

1999 Expansion:

On March 12, 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO, marking the first post-Cold War expansion into former Warsaw Pact countries (NATO: Enlargement).

This move was controversial, with over 40 U.S. foreign policy experts, including Bill Bradley and Sam Nunn, warning in an open letter to President Bill Clinton that it was costly and unnecessary given the lack of a Russian threat at the time (Wikipedia: Enlargement of NATO).

2004 Expansion:

On March 29, 2004, seven additional countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—joined NATO, the largest single expansion in the alliance’s history (NATO: Member Countries).

The inclusion of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), former Soviet republics, brought NATO directly to Russia’s borders, intensifying Moscow’s concerns.

These expansions moved NATO approximately 1,000 miles closer to Russia, contradicting the spirit of the 1990–1991 assurances. Russia viewed this as encirclement, particularly with Poland’s historical hostility toward Russia, as noted by retired U.S. Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor (Carnegie Endowment: NATO (Arms Control Association: ABM Treaty capability (Wikipedia: ABM Treaty).

4. NATO Bucharest Summit (2008)

At the Bucharest Summit on April 2–4, 2008, NATO issued a declaration stating, “We agreed today that these countries [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO” (NATO: Bucharest Summit Declaration)

The U.S., under President George W. Bush, pushed for Ukraine and Georgia to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP), but opposition from Germany and France delayed this step, with a review planned for December 2008 (Reuters: Bucharest Declaration).

Russia viewed this pledge as a direct threat, particularly given Ukraine’s 1,200-mile border with Russia and Georgia’s proximity. A 2008 cable from U.S. Ambassador William Burns (now CIA Director) warned that Russia saw NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia as a “red line” with “unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences” for Russian security (The Guardian: Russia’s NATO Beliefs).

5. Russo-Georgian War (2008)

In August 2008, a five-day war erupted between Russia and Georgia over the breakaway region of South Ossetia, following Georgia’s military offensive to reclaim the territory (Wikipedia: Russo-Georgian War).

Russia intervened, citing the need to protect Russian citizens and peacekeepers, and defeated Georgian forces. Post-war, Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, a move condemned by the West (CNN: Georgia-Russia Conflict).

The conflict was partly a response to NATO’s Bucharest declaration, signaling Russia’s opposition to NATO’s presence on its borders, as noted by Colonel Macgregor (Atlantic Council: Russo-Georgian War).

6. Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine (2014)

In November 2013, protests began in Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) after President Viktor Yanukovych rejected an EU association agreement, favoring closer ties with Russia (Wikipedia: Revolution of Dignity).

The protests, known as Euromaidan or the Revolution of Dignity, escalated into a broader movement against corruption and authoritarianism. Violent clashes in February 2014 led to Yanukovych’s ousting by parliament, with 328 of 450 members voting to remove him (BBC News: Ukraine’s Revolution).

The interim government was pro-Western, and some far-right groups, like Right Sector and Svoboda, played a role, though their influence is debated. Russia labeled the events a U.S.-backed coup, while the West viewed them as a democratic uprising (Foreign Policy: Ukraine Coup Myth).

Russia responded by annexing Crimea in March 2014 and supporting separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, sparking the ongoing Donbas conflict (Britannica: Ukraine Crisis).

7. Impact on Russian-Western Relations

Russian Perspective:

Russia views NATO’s expansion as a violation of 1990–1991 assurances, fostering a sense of betrayal and encirclement. The inclusion of former Soviet states and the 2008 Bucharest pledge intensified these fears.

The 2014 Ukraine events, seen as a Western-orchestrated regime change, further eroded trust, prompting Russia’s actions in Donbas and Crimea.