re: Why Trumpsigned EO to end birthright citizenship

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It's not my stance.

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I would guess the drafters of the 2nd Amendment contemplated and envisioned that weapon technology would likely advance beyond simply what was available in the late 18th century.

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In 1802, all former acts were repealed, and the provisions concerning children of citizens were re-enacted in this form: 'The children of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States, or who, previous to the passing of any law on that subject by the government of the United States, may have become citizens of any one of the said states under the laws thereof, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of their parents being so naturalized or admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States; and the children of persons who now are, or have been citizens of the United States shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States: provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never resided within the United States.' Act April 14, 1802, c. 28, § 4 (2 Stat. 155).

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The provision of that act, concerning 'the children of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States,' not being restricted to the children of persons already naturalized, might well be held to include children of persons thereafter to be naturalized. 2 Kent, Comm. 51, 52; West v. West, 8 Paige, 433; U. S. v. Kellar, 11 Biss. 314, 13 Fed. 82; Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 177, 12 Sup. Ct. 375.

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But the provision concerning foreign-born children, being expressly limited to the children of persons who then were or had been citizens, clearly did not include foreign-born children of any person who became a citizen since its enactment. 2 Kent, Comm. 52, 53; Binney, Alienigenae, 20, 25; 2 Am. Law Reg. 203, 205. Mr. Binney's paper, as he states in his preface, was printed by him in the hope that congress might supply this defect in our law.

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In accordance with his suggestions, it was enacted by the statute of February 10, 1855, c. 71, that 'persons heretofore born, or hereafter to be born, out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed and considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States: provided, however, that the rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the United States.' 10 Stat. 604; Rev. St. § 1993.

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It thus clearly appears that, during the half century intervening between 1802 and 1855, there was no legislation whatever for the citizenship of children born abroad, during that period, of American parents who had not become citizens of the United States before the act of 1802; and that the act of 1855, like every other act of congress upon the subject, has, by express proviso, restricted the right of citizenship, thereby conferred upon foreign-born children of American citizens, to those children themselves, unless they became residents of the United States. Here is nothing to countenance the theory that a general rule of citizenship by blood or descent has displaced in this country the fundamental rule of citizes hip by birth within its sovereignty.

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So far as we are informed, there is no authority, legislative, executive, or judicial, in England or America, which maintains or intimates that the statutes (whether considered as declaratory, or as merely prospective) conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of citizens have superseded or restricted, in any respect, the established rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion. Even those authorities in this country which have gone the furthest towards holding such statutes to be but declaratory of the common law have distinctly recognized and emphatically asserted the citizenship of native-born children of foreign parents

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The fourteenth amendment of the constitution, in the declaration that 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside,' contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only,—birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the constitution. Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory, or by authority of congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by n abling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts.

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The power of naturalization, vested in congress by the constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away. 'A naturalized citizen,' said Chief Justice Marshall, 'becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national legislature is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual. The constitution then takes him up, and, among other rights, extends to him the capacity of suing in the courts of the United States, precisely under the same circumstances under which a native might sue.' Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 827. Congress having no power to abridge the rights conferred by the constitution upon those who have become naturalized citizens by virtue of acts of congress, a fortiori no act or omission of congress, as to providing for the naturalization of parents or children of a particular race, can affect citizenship acquired as a birthright, by virtue of the constitution itself, without any aid of legislation. The fourteenth amendment, while it leaves the power, where it was before, in congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no authority upon congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship.

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Glad you don't agree with that line of argument.

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Man, that was easy.

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Wrong use of the Left. I'm preventing MAGA from adopting Leftist principles like making the Constitution a "living document" (their goal in this scenario)

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Not what I said or what was implied by my words.

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No, it goes down 9-0 at SCOTUS. And it should. We need to end it, but ending it through executive order is about as legal as forgiving student loans that way.

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I used the quote feature. Those were your words.

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based on textualism and historical analysis (like what Scalia preferred)

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The bulk of the opinion is dedicated to analyzing citizenship under common law and its applicability in the post-Revolution United States, but, as will be discussed below, the majority was curiously disinterested in the mountain of evidence that the United States rejected the adoption of jus soli and failed to account for how any true adoption of jus soli was inconsistent with the majority’s actual holding.

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The Wong Kim Ark majority spent a significant number of pages detailing what it perceived to be the continued use of English common law principles for defining citizenship in the United States post-Revolution.140 Much of the opinion can be summed up, in the Court’s own words, thusly: “The same rule [of jus soli] was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.”141 Using a select few quotes from the legislative history in which Senators stated that the Citizenship Clause would apply to the children of Chinese immigrants and Gypsies, and not just to Europeans, the Court further concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment also adopted these same common law principles

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These conclusions, however, are in direct conflict with history. The American Revolution was, by its inherent nature and through its express principles, an effective throwing off of the common law’s yoke of jus soli and its perpetual allegiance in favor of a consent-based compact theory of government. The common law’s jus soli and compact theory are fundamentally opposed to each other and cannot exist in tandem. Further, the Fourteenth Amendment was an effort to fully implement the principles of the Revolution, which had not been possible under the specter of slavery—a fact proved by the Dred Scott majority’s pained mishandling of those principles.

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It is hardly surprising, then, that the Wong Kim Ark majority brusquely dismisses any judicial, legislative, or scholarly authority that might present problems for its conclusion about the adoption of true jus soli. The majority barely addressed the legislative history, except to note without context Senator Cowan’s remarks that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause would be applied equally to all U.S.-born children, regardless of the race of the parents. It refused to address, however, the rest of the debates, which evidence that the equal application of citizenship regardless of race did not equate to the universal application of citizenship regardless of whether the parents were subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States.

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The true anomaly of Wong Kim Ark is that, despite the majority’s in-depth analysis and apparent adoption of common law jus soli as the basis of U.S. citizenship, the narrow holding undermines the reasoning used to get there. Under a true application of jus soli, the Court’s analysis and holding would have been quite simple: “Wong Kim Ark was born on United States soil. His parents are not ambassadors or foreign ministers. He is therefore a citizen of the United States.”

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But this was not, in fact, the Court’s conclusion. Indeed, the majority went out of its way to limit its application of jus soli to the specific instances of permanent domicile and lawful presence, and seemed to tie those two factors into its conception of jus soli:

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It is hardly surprising, then, that the Wong Kim Ark majority brusquely dismisses any judicial, legislative, or scholarly authority that might present problems for its conclusion about the adoption of true jus soli. The majority barely addressed the legislative history,

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