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re: We are now 162 years removed from the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg...
Posted on 7/2/25 at 1:29 am to RollTide1987
Posted on 7/2/25 at 1:29 am to RollTide1987
Ewell had just taken command of Stonewall Jackson’s 2nd corps just a few weeks prior when Jackson was shot by friendly fire. He had never been in command of that many forces before which is s big reason I think Ewell was so hesitant. Had Jackson been in command still I believe it’s fairly certain to assume that he pushes onward, likely capturing the high ground, even with tired and scattered forces it still would have likely been enough as the federals were steadily being beaten backwards the first day before the union had time to bring up reserves or fortify defensive positions such as Cemetery Hill. Jackson, like Lee would have known that if they waited, the union’s superior numbers of men and artillery would dig in, making it almost impossible to push a superior force off dug in positions on the high ground, requiring to attack uphill. Had Ewell been able to capture Cemetery Hill that first night, theres a solid chance that General Meade being new to command would not have wanted to fight with the high ground belonging to Lee. There are many what ifs with this battle as the fortunes could have gone either way several times. What if JEB Stuart’s cavalry was near to occupy Buford’s or what if Lee had taken Longstreet’s idea of maneuvering their army between Meade’s army and Washington. My theory is if Ewell takes Cemetery Hill the first night that Gettysburg turns into a series of localized engagements instead of a huge battle. The south generally had better officers and cavalry that could maneuver easier and faster than the larger union army could. Once the north wised up and learned to use their numerical advantage to their benefit, along with putting officers like Grant, Sherman and Hancock in charge who accepted high casualties of their own forces to wear down the smaller confederates, it was just a matter of time.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 5:53 am to LSUPilot07
Interesting note on how technology makes a huge difference in a battle. Most of Buford’s Calvary possessed breach loading rifles. This provided them with a 5/1 or 6/1 fire power advantage over the confederate infantry. This is why he was able to hold off five times the number of troops for several hours until Reynolds was able to bring his corps up.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 9:05 am to geauxbrown
I haven't read anything directly about Longstreet, but, looking back on my years of reading military history, I am more inclined to be less judgmental of any particular personality (military leader) involved in a conversation.
Why? Because personalities are less decisive in military history than the Military System used by these personalities. A superior military system will defeat an inferior military system. The decisive factor is the military system, not the merits of one particular race over another - for example, we often like to say that the Germans are better warfighters than the French - but the truth is that the German's used a better military system than the French.
Longstreet and Lee were products of the US military system's methods of training Officers, and, back then, those methods were quite primitive. No wonder why they often did not perform like a talented and well-educated modern military Officer.
Why? Because personalities are less decisive in military history than the Military System used by these personalities. A superior military system will defeat an inferior military system. The decisive factor is the military system, not the merits of one particular race over another - for example, we often like to say that the Germans are better warfighters than the French - but the truth is that the German's used a better military system than the French.
Longstreet and Lee were products of the US military system's methods of training Officers, and, back then, those methods were quite primitive. No wonder why they often did not perform like a talented and well-educated modern military Officer.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 9:11 am to michael corleone
quote:
Interesting note on how technology makes a huge difference in a battle. Most of Buford’s Calvary possessed breach loading rifles. This provided them with a 5/1 or 6/1 fire power advantage over the confederate infantry. This is why he was able to hold off five times the number of troops for several hours until Reynolds was able to bring his corps up.
True, but remember that the range of Buford's carbines was shorter than the enemy infantry's long rifles. That fact dictated Archer's and Davis's tactics as they brought their brigades against Buford. The Confederate infantry could sit at a range out of reach from the Union Cavalry and kill the Cavalry with impunity. That was the proper tactical method. But this method took time and the Cavalry's mission was simply to delay and gain time, which is exactly what they did, just as you say.
Buford's dismounted Cavalrymen would mount up and fall back a bit just as the Confederate rifle fire became too effective. But, as you say, those repeating carbines were more deadly than the enemy's long rifles, once Buford decided that the line must be held for a longer time at that moment.
But if the Confederate Army had executed their campaign properly, Buford's first shots would have been at JEB Stuart's cavalry, not Heth's infantry, and these first shots would have happened on June 30th, not July 1st.
This post was edited on 7/2/25 at 9:15 am
Posted on 7/2/25 at 11:29 am to Champagne
quote:
But if the Confederate Army had executed their campaign properly, Buford's first shots would have been at JEB Stuart's cavalry, not Heth's infantry, and these first shots would have happened on June 30th, not July 1st.
That’s where Lee messed up.
If job one was to win s big battle on Northern soil, then he should have planned for this first. He did not and let Stuart run off looting and raiding.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 11:39 am to Harry Boutte
quote:
"The North can make a steam-engine, locomotive or railway car; hardly a yard of cloth or shoes can you make. You are rushing into war with one of the most powerful, ingeniously mechanical and determined people on earth--right at your doors. You are bound to fail. Only in your spirit and determination are you prepared for war. In all else you are totally unprepared, with a bad cause to start with. "At first you will make headway, but as your limited resources begin to fail, and shut out from the markets of Europe by blockade as you will be, your cause will begin to wane. ... if your people would but stop and think, they must see that in the end you will surely fail." -W. T. Sherman to David Boyd, 1860
It really is a shame Sherman isn’t a more broadly celebrated American hero. He and Grant were modern military thinkers.
Lee was still largely fighting yesterday’s war in his overall strategy. On Virginia soil, Lee was great in battle. He should have understood the south was fighting a defensive war of survival and stayed home and dug in.
When Lee left Virginia to fight he lost. Suffering his two biggest defeats in Maryland and Pennsylvania, where battlefield victory doesn’t conclude the war, was bad overall strategy.
Sherman understood warfare had become modern, the means of production were tantamount, and you destroy those means to end a war.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 11:50 am to ned nederlander
That’s easily said; but, in 1863 Lee didn’t have many good options. The Virginia countryside had been scavenged clean and couldn’t support his army sufficiently. The lack of transportation infrastructure (and, frankly, the lack of cooperation from states rightist governors. Georgia, we’re looking at you) meant Lee had to go where the food was. It was hoped by going North he could force the Union into a deciding Cannae-type battle. Yes, Lee was a product of his time and the grand, Napoleonic battle was very much in his thinking.
Grant gets short shrift as just a talentless mauler who simply relied on numbers. His river and Vicksburg campaigns should tell people he was a great tactical and operational commander.
Grant gets short shrift as just a talentless mauler who simply relied on numbers. His river and Vicksburg campaigns should tell people he was a great tactical and operational commander.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 11:52 am to ned nederlander
Today marks the Anniv of the charge the dwarfed Pickett's charge. Longstreet's assaults were almost a success but darkness and fatigue put an end to it. Wofford's brigade almost carried the day and got to the foot of LRT after advancing through the Wheatfield which was an absolutely bloody mess.
Last October we walked every brigades July 2ns assault path. It was awesome, albeit thorny, buggy, and sorgum-y but awesome
Last October we walked every brigades July 2ns assault path. It was awesome, albeit thorny, buggy, and sorgum-y but awesome
Posted on 7/2/25 at 12:00 pm to RollTide1987
quote:
2. The Confederate Army of Northern Virginia was super arrogant. They believed their foe to be naturally inferior to them and operated on the assumption that they couldn't lose no matter the odds. Lee was extremely guilty when it came to this line of thinking.
No general who isn’t grossly incompetent or grossly overconfident would’ve commanded as Lee did at Gettysburg.
In the end he just thought his men were better and would figure it out.
Against the AoP and leadership circa 1862 he was probably right.
But asking them to win on enemy soil, with no intel on the enemies whereabouts against superior numbers on that ground and against a vastly improved AoP was asking them to do the impossible.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 12:12 pm to tide06
quote:
No general who isn’t grossly incompetent or grossly overconfident would’ve commanded as Lee did at Gettysburg.
Lee was not a bad general nor was he a military genius.
Lee had the benefit of outstanding Corps Commanders, Division Commanders and Brigade Commanders (to an extent), at least in the first two years of the war.
Most of Lee's singular "victories" were because the Corps Commander or in some cases the Division Commander made outstanding moves. His Order to Stuart is absolutely consistent with his leadership style, he knew he had good people and gave them the ability to freelance to a degree and it worked more often than it didnt.
But when a decision was solely on Lee....not always great a great outcome.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 12:46 pm to RollTide1987
If Ewell gets up that hill, there's no guarantee he could hold it given what he would have to go through to get up it as evidenced by Pickett's problem. Attacking a well positioned army across open terrain uphill is a tall order.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 12:51 pm to SoFla Tideroller
Grant was as good a strategic commander as there was. Sure his tactics are taught, but he understood the wider picture in any theater as evidenced in Vicksburg.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 12:52 pm to Lakeboy7
quote:
Lee was not a bad general nor was he a military genius.
I’d argue he was pretty damn close to a genius… he just got overconfident and his logistical situation back in VA was untenable.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 1:14 pm to RollTide1987
quote:
162 years removed
Seems like yesterday
Posted on 7/2/25 at 1:20 pm to doubleb
Lee had a strength that turned out to be his most glaring weakness. He was a risk taker. At Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg his risk taking pays off, but at Antietam and Gettysburg his risk taking bites him. He also had the benefit of facing overly cautious Union commanders even in Meade.
But an argument could be made that Gettysburg is about the time that McClellan's overall planning and organization of the Army of the Potomac are coming together. Even though he had been relieved before that. I often wonder what would have happened if even Meade was in charge at Chacellorsville, because on paper and even from a training aspect, the Army of the Potomac was becoming a formidable force even before Chancellorsville. It just did not have confidence.
The right commander really does make all the difference.
But an argument could be made that Gettysburg is about the time that McClellan's overall planning and organization of the Army of the Potomac are coming together. Even though he had been relieved before that. I often wonder what would have happened if even Meade was in charge at Chacellorsville, because on paper and even from a training aspect, the Army of the Potomac was becoming a formidable force even before Chancellorsville. It just did not have confidence.
The right commander really does make all the difference.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 1:36 pm to ned nederlander
quote:
Lee was still largely fighting yesterday’s war in his overall strategy. On Virginia soil, Lee was great in battle. He should have understood the south was fighting a defensive war of survival and stayed home and dug in.
He did understand that. Lee was an engineer, his genius was in defense and defensive works, but the war was dragging on beyond what the resources of the South could endure. Lee had to take the fight to the North.
quote:
It really is a shame Sherman isn’t a more broadly celebrated American hero.
This is an excerpt from David F. Boyd's article on Sherman in The American College publication, "General W.T. Sherman as a College President", 1910. Boyd served as the professor of classic languages at the Louisiana State Seminary under Sherman, and, after the war, would serve as the first president of Louisiana State University.
When the world knew but little of him I looked up to Sherman as a singularly gifted man; his mind so strong, bright and clear, and original and quick, as to stamp him a genius; his heart, under his stern, brusque, soldierly exterior, the warmest and tenderest; of a happy nature himself, he strove to make all around him happy, and his integrity and scorn for a mean act were as firm as the rock.
Such was Sherman as I knew him intimately for two years in the pine woods of Louisiana, before he became a great figure in American History. I respected and loved him then as I do now and as I did ever after, though I became a southern soldier, and I revere his memory now. And as I believe that he was the ablest and best college president I ever knew, so do I believe that he was the master, grand strategist of our Civil War.
…
The question of the leading men of Louisiana was to keep him thereat the head of the school, his opposition to secession notwithstanding. [General Braxton] Bragg, [general P.G.T.] Beauregard (who had two sons with us), [general] Dick Taylor, Governor Thomas O. Moore and others of influence, were warm personal friends of Sherman. They wrote him and begged him to stay on Louisiana—I saw the letters at the time—telling him that his opinions were well known; that he would not be asked or expected to take up arms against for the South; that no one would molest him, but that all wanted him to remain in Louisiana at the head of the school which he had inaugurated so auspiciously, and was conducting so successfully. But he did go—resigning an office with a salary of $4,500 a year and a house free of cost, to return to the north a poor man, with nothing assured for the support of his family. This was Sherman’s first sacrifice for the Union.
I happened to be with him in his private room when the mail came, telling us of the actual passage of the Ordinance of Secession of South Carolina. Sherman burst out crying and began, in his nervous way, of pacing the floor and deprecating the step which he feared might bring destruction on the whole country. For an hour or more this went on. Every now and then he would stop and addressing himself to me, he would exclaim, as if broken hearted, “You people of the South believe there can be peaceable secession. You don’t know what you are doing. I know there can be no such thing as peaceable secession. If you will have it, the North must fight you for its own preservation. Yes, South Carolina has by this act of secession precipitated war. Other Southern states will follow through sympathy. This country will be drenched in blood. God only knows how it will all end. Perhaps the liberties of the whole country, of every section and every man will be destroyed, and yet you know that within the Union no man’s liberty or property in all the South is endangered. Then why should any Southern state leave the Union? Oh, it is all folly, madness, a crime against civilization!”
LINK
Posted on 7/2/25 at 2:56 pm to Harry Boutte
Man, I love a good ole Civil War thread.
Kinda off topic but was reading about Grant’s Overland Campaign last night. Lee showed his true tactical genius at The Wilderness, and Cold Harbor. He obviously did many times before, most notably Chancellorsville, but he inflicted insane casualties on the much larger and better supplied Union army. Day 3 of Cold Harbor was a bloodbath of epic proportions for Grant but it didn’t matter because he could just keep throwing bodies in the meat grinder while Lee couldn’t.
Kinda off topic but was reading about Grant’s Overland Campaign last night. Lee showed his true tactical genius at The Wilderness, and Cold Harbor. He obviously did many times before, most notably Chancellorsville, but he inflicted insane casualties on the much larger and better supplied Union army. Day 3 of Cold Harbor was a bloodbath of epic proportions for Grant but it didn’t matter because he could just keep throwing bodies in the meat grinder while Lee couldn’t.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 3:51 pm to WAC13
quote:
Lee showed his true tactical genius at The Wilderness, and Cold Harbor.
His genius on defense in friendly territory is in contrast to his ineffectiveness on offense in hostile territory. But even Lee couldn't sustain the 50% losses he suffered during the Overland Campaign.
quote:
Day 3 of Cold Harbor was a bloodbath of epic proportions for Grant but it didn’t matter
But it did matter - a lot. It was Grant's greatest regret of the war.
There were Prussian observers at Petersburg taking notes on the defensive works.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 4:01 pm to Harry Boutte
Such things mean nothing to a gentleman.
Posted on 7/2/25 at 4:07 pm to KiwiHead
"Lee will take more chances, and take them quicker, than any man in the Army"
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