Favorite team:LSU 
Location:baton rouge
Biography:lsu alumni
Interests:fishing
Occupation:professional beer drinker
Number of Posts:6587
Registered on:6/30/2005
Online Status:Not Online

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BB88 made a post a week or so ago relative an article that stated there were a bunch of $200 short plays hanging out there
I view LK the same today as I did 12 months ago

1) Best play caller in college footba
2) Top 5 recruiter , NIL, roster manager
3) Top 1 college QB developer
4) Borderline shite show personal life
5) Top 1 social media shite talker


The only difference is I think his game day decisions making is much better today than in 2024. He clearly showed that during 2025.
One thing I learned from the late October/early November free fall is to make sure I ALWAYS have dry powder. I sold 900 shares last week at 285. Went all into today in increments between 232 and 228. Ave cost basis now at 229.68. Ready to roll back toward 280 plus !
Does she order shirts for every family member with their names on them too?
Not familiar with this one at all


Did the prosecutor put Proctor on the stand ? If so, did he testify at all about Sullivan’s statement ? Seems like the prosecutors may have big problems ahead.
What has Sark done to rank 3 on that list , let alone top 5 ?
Mateer needs to progress mentally more than anything else. If he does so, he has the physical tools to be a top 3 QB. He has to learn to understand the situation and what is needed for it.
Objectively , Stuart should have been subjected to a court martial for his failure to follow orders during the Pennsylvania campaign. Interesting juxtaposition of Stuart v Buford during the campaign. The decisions those two made during that campaign not only proudly impacted the outcome of the battle , but possibly the war itself.
Reynolds dispatch quoted

“"The enemy is advancing in strong force, and I fear that he will go to the heights beyond the town before I can. I will fight him inch by inch, and if driven into the town, I will barricade the streets, and hold him back for as long as I can."
The turning point was Lee’s decision to make ANY attack on Day 2. This was Botha tactical and strategic failure on his part. He made this decision absent any understanding of the ground or forces in front of him due to “Stuart’s Ride”. Longstreet argued in favor of redeployment to a superior position. Hood did the same based upon his visual of Devil’s Den and Little Round Top.


Despite Lee’s error, opportunities existed upon Day 2 but were squashed by Greene on Culp’s Hill and Chamberlain’s charge/counter attach down and across Little Round Top. These two battlefield tactical decisions by unit type commanders preserved the defensive victory that Buford and Reynolds originally envisioned. You can’t deflect out of the fact that Buford selected that ground and Reynolds confirmed it. Nor can you deflect that Greene persevered the final victory by his actions on Day 2 to stop Lee’s assault. Lee’s plan in Day 2 was for Longstreet to attack one flank and for the other to be attacked simultaneous when an oppurtunity presented itself. The oppurtunity presented itself and but for Greene’s decisions it would have succeeded.


You should read Reynold’s dispatch to Meade. Buford’smline if thinking is clearly evident is his tactical decisions. He utilized CALVARY to defend a position against an overwhelming opponent that consisted of INFANTRY. he strategically redeployed that Calvary over three separate ridges he recentered the previous day. Reynolds recognized all of this and discussed it with Buford. Hence his communication to Meade where he specifically references the high ground. The premature death of Buford has nothing to do with this whatsoever. He is widely credited by contemporary, including Hancock, with determining the specific ground to defend.
Howard arrived at Noon, over 2 hours AFTER Reynolds was killed. Buford decided to defend the position on June 30. He issued orders on the tactical redeployment before Reynolds showed up on the battlefield. Reynolds sent a written communication to Meade just before his death confirming Buford’s decisions and specifically referenced preserving the high ground SE of the town. All of your points about Howard are moot if Buford doesn’t make the decision to preserve the high ground via tactical redeployment. Had he not done so, he is overwhelmed on Day 1 and Lee occupies Culp’s Hill (as he wanted ). This would have put Meade in a position to attack Culp’s Hill on Day 2 after Longstreet and Hill are coming up on Cemetery Ridge.
Let’s not measure guys. I have been there multiple times myself, which I have posted about on past anniversaries of the battle. The reality is the Louisiana Tigers occupied part of Culp’s Hill at the end of Day 2. They were driven off of it in the morning of Day 3. Yes it’s steep and I agree that once occupied “in force” it was impossible to take. This 100% proves my point as Meade moved over 10,000 off of it to reenforce his left, leaving only 1,500 or so there to defend Culp’s Hill. Greene ordered the defense works to be built and asked for the entire brigade to remain. Had he not done those things , 700 or so would have defended it against an assault by 10 times his number. You should really watch he YouTube video of the hour by hour movements of the men on that battlefield.
The senior generals confirmed Buford’s selection. Buford selected it and preserved it. Two completely different aspects of command. Meade didn’t arrive until 1000 PM. He had nothing to do with the selection whatsoever. Meade sent Hancock to Gettysburg AFTER learning of Reynolds death. Of course this is a full day after Buford selected to preserve the position.
I stand by my position. Regardless of military intelligence , Buford picked the spot to gather the army and order a tactical withdraw over a series of multiple ridges to protect the position. Military Intelligence may have put the army in the move , but don’t have anything to do with picking the ground or preserving it. Once preserved, Greene won Day 2, the key day of the fight, by insistung that a brigade remain and that he fortify Culp’s Hill, Meade’s intelligence is meaningless without these to General’s making key tactical decisions. Meade didn’t follow up on his victory by ending the war. He didn’t counter attack on Day 3 , nor did swift it maneuver thereafter to block Lee’s retreat. You should watch the hour by hour YouTube video as it clearly reveals just how lucky Meade was at Gettysburg and how he failed to take advantage of the victory. His vote against continuing on with Overland seals it for me. He was extremely fortunate in many ways and it can’t be denied.
Meade got lucky at Gettysburg. Lee attacked a force of unknown number entrenched on high ground. Meade loses if General Greene doesn’t insist of fortifying Culp’s hill while his “sole brigade” is left to defend it on 7/2. Meade shifted everything he had to defend Longstreet’s attack on the flank. But for Greene insiting that a brigade remain on Culp’s Hill and fortifying it , Hill easily overwhelms him. This is what Lee hoped would happen when he planned the attack. Meade showed his true colors when he voted to return to Washing DC after the Wilderness. He was a reluctant general to say the least. He, unlike Sheridan, Sherman, and Grant, dis not understand what it would take to secure victory.
Beautiful little town. Just across the mountain from Telluride. In the summer you can drive the mountain edge on a gravel road from Telluride to there.
Lou Tepper, Bradley Dale Peveto, Matt House
They are the only “hot shot” type rocket company in the market. They make small engines that are built for short notice launches and repetitive launches. All small payload type engines. They have already proven less than 48 hour notice launch and 3 launches in 7 days on short notice. They have DOD, Spaceforce, and NASA contracts, along with SpaceX. Their engines were on the Artemis lunar module.