re: Was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki necessary?

Yes

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So either they weren't necessarily ready to surrender or you believe American commanders were aware of who's wildly differing advice the emperor was following on any given day?

In other words, according to your answer, the allies would have had no idea if Japan was ready to surrender because the emperor couldn't make up his mind.

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This is probably the best point any of you have made so far.

Maybe you’re right on that.

If I post it again will you promise not to ask me for any more links?

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In other words, according to your answer, the allies would have had no idea if Japan was ready to surrender because the emperor couldn't make up his mind.

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yeah that’s what I’m reading as well

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I said the terms we agreed to after the bombs were essentially the same as what they had offered before.

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Ok cool.... But that does not matter..... AGAIN A MESSAGE needed to be sent at that time in history.... I don't understand why you won't get this.... It would end ANY argument...........

LINK

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The latest and best scholarship on the surrender, based on Japanese records, concludes that the Soviet Union’s unexpected entry into the war against Japan on Aug. 8 was probably an even greater shock to Tokyo than the atomic bombing of Hiroshima two days earlier. Until then, the Japanese had been hoping that the Russians — who had previously signed a nonaggression pact with Japan — might be intermediaries in negotiating an end to the war . As historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa writes in his book “Racing the Enemy,” “Indeed, Soviet attack, not the Hiroshima bomb, convinced political leaders to end the war.” The two events together — plus the dropping of the second atomic bomb on Aug. 9 — were decisive in making the case for surrender.

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The United States knew from intercepted communications that the Japanese were most concerned that Emperor Hirohito not be treated as a war criminal. The “emperor clause” was the final obstacle to Japan’s capitulation. (President Franklin Roosevelt had insisted upon unconditional surrender, and Truman reiterated that demand after Roosevelt’s death in mid-April 1945.)

Although the United States ultimately got Japan’s unconditional surrender, the emperor clause was, in effect, granted after the fact. “I have no desire whatever to debase [Hirohito] in the eyes of his own people,” Gen. Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander of the Allied powers in Japan after the war, assured Tokyo’s diplomats following the surrender.

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Another link

LINK

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But Hasegawa and other historians have shown that Japan’s leaders were in fact quite savvy, well aware of their difficult position, and holding out for strategic reasons. Their concern was not so much whether to end the conflict, but how to end it while holding onto territory, avoiding war crimes trials, and preserving the imperial system. The Japanese could still inflict heavy casualties on any invader, and they hoped to convince the Soviet Union, still neutral in the Asian theater, to mediate a settlement with the Americans. Stalin, they calculated, might negotiate more favorable terms in exchange for territory in Asia. It was a long shot, but it made strategic sense.

On Aug. 6, the American bomber Enola Gay dropped its payload on Hiroshima, leaving the signature mushroom cloud and devastation on the ground, including something on the order of 100,000 killed. (The figures remain disputed, and depend on how the fatalities are counted.)

As Hasegawa writes in his book “Racing the Enemy,” the Japanese leadership reacted with concern, but not panic. On Aug. 7, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo sent an urgent coded telegram to his ambassador in Moscow, asking him to press for a response to the Japanese request for mediation, which the Soviets had yet to provide. The bombing added a “sense of urgency,” Hasegawa says, but the plan remained the same.

Very late the next night, however, something happened that did change the plan. The Soviet Union declared war and launched a broad surprise attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria. In that instant, Japan’s strategy was ruined. Stalin would not be extracting concessions from the Americans. And the approaching Red Army brought new concerns: The military position was more dire, and it was hard to imagine occupying communists allowing Japan’s traditional imperial system to continue. Better to surrender to Washington than to Moscow.

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that using them as a message to the Russians is something i may have done myself.

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We did NOT USE them to send any message to Russia... We could have done that ourselves..... But if you want to play that game..... We sent a message to the WHOLE WORLD... And AGAIN the Russians did NOT attack Pearl Harbor...

There is not much else that needs to be said..... you are just brining shite up to keep this thread going at this point.......

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This DOES NOT mean that the terms were the same before and after the bomb. Do you think it does?

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I'm not privy to every little thing but the main sticking point was the preservation of the emperor (i.e. not killed or jailed, allowed to remain as a puppet), which is what happened even after the bombs.

Further, it's clear involving the Russians sooner would have been enough to end the war without the use of the bombs.

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No details of course for a direct comparison.

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how could i possibly do that without having been there or having access to the principals?

a lot of the info is probably out there but i'm not willing to write a dissertation for the sake of a td thread.

you're trying to hold me to an unreasonable standard you're not even holding yourself to.

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I'm not privy to every little thing but the main sticking point was the preservation of the emperor (i.e. not killed or jailed, allowed to remain as a puppet), which is what happened even after the bombs. Further, it's clear involving the Russians sooner would have been enough to end the war without the use of the bombs.

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Jesus man, your whole argument is this.

How hard is it to understand that

1. Japan wanting to surrender on their own terms with the emperor clause

DOESN NOT EQUAL

2. Us essentially pardoning the empower after an unconditional surrender

This should be a basic concept