re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

UK to procure 100-300-kilometer-range missiles for Ukrainian army
April 30, 2023, 04:49 AM



The UK Ministry of Defense has published a list of weapons it plans to procure for the Ukrainian Armed Forces within the framework of International Fund for Ukraine (IFU).

The military equipment will be procured for the needs of the Ukrainian Defense Forces within the framework of the Ukraine Support Fund, the UK Government website reported on April 26.

Additionally, missiles or rocket-propelled shells with a range of 100-300 kilometers and ground, sea, or air launch capability will be purchased, with a useful payload of 20-490 kilograms. The requirements for the missiles are:

Low probability of interception (LPI);
Mission planning capability;
Assured navigation (with hardened Global Navigation Satellite System capability) in the face of advanced countermeasures and EM spectrum denial;
Air defense penetration methods to increase probability of a successful strike.
Technical Readiness Level of at least 8.

The New Voice of Ukraine



International Fund for Ukraine (IFU)

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Didn't see this posted here or on any western news channels. Nothing new though, it's only been happening for 9 years.

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I'll try to repost my thoughts on these types of things in front line cities

As sad as it is, if you are going to reside as a civilian in a front line city you have to accept that dumb munitions might hit you (mortar shells for example). Those individuals have to accept a very high level of risk to continue to live there. It doesn't mean these places were targeted or anything other than poor aim. I would feel the same about civilan deaths in a place like Kherson or Bakhumt because it's still a front line city.

Now deep behind the line (Kyiv for example), where smart munitions are being used and civilians are still dying, different story.

On both sides equally for 9 years. Casualties have been 50/50 in Ukrainian occupied/Russian occupied territory.

But nutters gotta nut.

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The German government confirms the delivery of the following systems, additionally to what has been sent already:

- 1x IRIS-T SLM air defense system
- 8x Zetros Trucks
- 2x load-handling trucks 8x6 with 8 roll-off containers

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Getting this IRIS-T system (the 2nd to be delivered, out of the four that Germany has promised) is a big key for Ukraine's air defense. Part of Ukraine's problem is that they may need to concentrate forces in some areas in preparation for their offensive, and they need to defend them, but they don't have enough air defense assets to protect their cities and also the front lines.

About a week ago, journalist Shashank Joshi of The Economist pointed out on Twitter that the commentariat was universally discussing whether or not the Ukrainian spring offensive would be successful, without anyone really defining what success would mean. Joshi cynically pointed out that this would allow everyone to claim that their predictions of success or failure were correct.

I put forward my own opinion, which is that, assuming the focus of the offensive is in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukraine needs to reach the Sea of Azov by midsummer for the offensive to be called successful. If the focus instead turned out to be in the northeast, the capture of Starobilsk would count as success, as would a strike across the Dnipro in Kherson Oblast that then pushed to the Crimean border.

I was surprised to get responses saying that those were unrealistic expectations. One person told me that taking Tokmak would be a success, and that I was obviously actually pro-Russian.

In any case, Joshi's post has sparked a couple of people to try to actually answer the question, and retired Australian Gen. Mick Ryan is the latest:

LINK

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1/ Undoubtedly, H-Hour (the time set for a planned attack) for the forthcoming Ukrainian offensives is drawing near. For months, Ukrainian planners and strategic leaders preparing. How might we assess the success of the offensives to come? 1/22

2/ In my previous post on this topic, I described the rationale for measures of success & failure. I also listed five principles for their development and application. Success in the coming offensives can be measured at different levels and over different timescales.

3/ Progress will be assessed by multitudes of analysts, journalists, politicians and citizens. At the same time, some will quickly jump on short term tactical setbacks instead of waiting a few days to assess the full implications of such incidents.

4/ I propose a set of measures of success for the forthcoming offensives. Some of the measures are tactical, some more strategic or political. Together, they are a linked set of measures that can be used to assess whether the degree to which Ukrainian offensives are successful.

5/ In this thread, I have only covered measures of success. The full set of measures of success and failure are in my latest Futura Doctrina post here: LINK

6/ Measure 1: #Ukraine achieves surprise (tactical and operational levels, some political impact – short term). Generating surprise leads to shock. Shock should lead to slower Russian decision making and responses to Ukrainian operations.

7/ While relatively easy to assess on the ground, limitations on sharing information with news organisations may make this harder to assess in the short term. It is, however, a key component for the success of the Ukrainian offensives.

8/ Measure 2: #Ukraine is able to destroy or degrade Russian tactical and operational reserves, C2 and logistics before the offensive (tactical, operational and strategic impacts – short term). The Ukrainians will want to limit the Russian’s ability to respond to their attacks.

9/ Finding and neutralising mobile Russian reserves, HQ and logistics before - and at the beginning of - the offensives will be important. Achieving this is reliant on excellent intelligence, various long range strike mechanisms, as well as air, missile and drone defences.

10/ Measure 3: Ukraine takes back its territory (tactical and operational, but with political ramifications). This might seem obvious, but this needs to be an explicit measure of success. I don’t propose a certain percentage of territory that should be recaptured.

11/ But if most of Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are recaptured, this would be a very successful outcome. And it would be good foundation for subsequent operations against Crimea and Donetsk in the future.

12/ Measure 4: Ukraine is postured to retake Crimea at the end of the offensives (Operational, strategic and political – medium term). As I have written previously, the last campaign of the war may be the campaign Ukraine conducts to take back Crimea.

13/ Therefore, the coming offensives will be successful if the Ukrainian armed forces are well placed for follow on operations to take back Crimea – either through making it untenable for the Russians to stay, or an actual military operation to seize it.

14/ Measure 5: Ukraine captures / destroys Russian forces (tactical and operational, but with political and strategic ramifications). Related to the recapture of its territory is the capture or destruction of Russian forces. The Russians have to be beaten and be seen to be beat.

15/ A successful Ukrainian offensive will also ensure sufficient Russian combat power is destroyed to prevent Russia conducting any follow-on offensives for the remainder of 2023.

16/ Measure 6: Ukraine preserves sufficient forces to continue defending some areas and conduct subsequent offensives in others (Operational and strategic – medium term). The Ukrainians will invest a significant part of their combat power in this offensive.

17/ But, they will want to do so in a way where they don’t sustain massive casualties. The degree to which Ukraine can inflict disproportionate casualties and destruction on the Russians in the coming offensives will be a an important measure of success.

18/ Measure 7: Ukraine’s supporters believe the offensives have been a success (political and strategic). For Ukraine to achieve success in its operations, and the Ukrainian people, foreign leaders and populations will need to think they have succeeded.

19/ It will not be long until we can put these measures into action. The Ukrainian military has been preparing for its offensives for some time, and they are clearly ready to force the Russians out of as much of Ukraine as possible.

20/ The aim of my two articles on measuring success and failure has been to provide some sense of ‘what victory looks’ like for #Ukraine in the coming months. It is not an exclusive list. And none of the measures are designed to predict specific outcomes.

21/ And not all of them have to be met. But on the whole, these measures of success should provide a useful yardstick for those observing – and measuring success – in the Ukrainian offensives to come. End.

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I’m just about 100% sure that there’s no way Storm Shadow could be launched using the Mig-29. This is simply because of the sure weight of the Storm Shadow (3,000 lbs) would be far to heavy for any of the hard points on the wings and underneath is a problem because the missile is pretty large and the Mig’s intakes for their engines would be in the way. So that leaves you with the Su-27 (of which we have no idea how many Ukraine even has left) or the Su-24 of which we know they still have maybe a dozen left. The good thing is that Storm Shadows are programmed on the ground what the target is and it can uploaded with known air defense locations. But I absolutely think it’s possible to launch them with the Su-24 or Su-27 it’s just a matter of how much tinkering with the aircraft’s hard points and fire control systems would need to happen in order to use them. I really think this goes back to the same issue with the ATACMS which is there just aren’t a lot of them. The UK is averaged to have 1,000-1500 and France even less at around 750. They are already working on it’s replacement so I don’t see many, if any, more being made either. That’s not to say they still couldn’t give them 50 and say use them well because there aren’t more coming but a lot of man hours and time would be in put towards making just handful of weapons work on Ukraine’s aircraft when maybe there are other options that aren’t quite as great but still solve the issue of strikes deep behind the Russian lines. I think it’s the smart thing to do and I’m glad the Brits are thinking outside the box a little too on this and being open to new weapons from new countries.

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why isn't Britain just giving some to Ukraine and then buying more of them to replace the ones it's sending?

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Because outside of the US, money doesn't grow on trees.

Russia has apparently hit something big in the Ukrainian town of Pavlohrad. Some Russian sources are saying an ammo dump, but it seems bigger than that.

Video


Apparently, there is a old chemical plant there that made rocket fuel.

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Ukrainian sources say it was 38 old ballistic missiles (SS-24) with 1,800 tons of rocket fuel. They were stored at the Pavlohrad Chemical Plant. They were not decommissioned due to lack of funds. (This was the case until 2019):

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LINK

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Heard it was a railway thing, and that it was a bunch of S300 ammo that blew. Who knows

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Those are the claims that I am reading on Russian sources.

Ukraine has very few of those rockets left, so that would be very bad for them.

Everyone apparently agrees that a bunch of rockets blew up. Ukraine says that they were very old rockets from a system no longer used, while Russia claims that they were for S-300 systems.