re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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First and foremost before any large numbers of western tanks go to Ukraine NATO needs to gather every T-72 and T-64 left in those countries and make a deal to get them sent.

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There are only 500 of so T72’s left in NATO arsenals. There are no T64s or T80s in NATO arsenals because the T64 and it’s updated version the T80 were the USSR’s tier 1 MBTs and it didn’t sell them to other nations. Ukraine has around 600 T64s in storage but it’s unlikely that these are good for anything but spare parts and using the rusting shells as road blocks. There are still a thousand or more T55s in storage and Ukraine developed T-55AGMa modernization package for the T55 which includes increased protection and upgrading to a 120 mm NATO standard main gun with manual loader or a 125 mm Russian army standard main gun a few years ago. If the west is not going have the spine to supply Ukraine with western MBTs then we should atleast start pulling T55s out and upgrading them to T-55AGMs. They might not be as good a T90 but they would be as good as the un modernized T72s Russia is pulling out of storage. Poland, Czechs, Bulgaria and Romania all have factories that could modernize those old tanks. Obviously I would prefer the west send M1s, Challenger 2s, or Leopard2s to Ukraine, but I doubt Ukraine gets them in serious numbers.

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Orrrrrrr...the west can stay the frick out of this.

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Nah.

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Orrrrrrr...the west can stay the frick out of this.

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You are about 10.5 months too late baw.

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Darth, what we are seeing with the schools in Poland is it is taking a lot less time to get Ukrainian soldiers up to speed on western equipment. The HIMARS school was two weeks and I would say those guys soaked up everything pretty well. Every Army school I ever went to could have been cut in half easily and you would still get the content. That said, Ukrainian mechs would probably need to be sent to Knox to learn US tanks and Brads.

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The thing is that while you can train a four man crew to fight an individual tank in a matter of a two-three months, that’s only step one. After that, you have to train them to work with other tank crews on how to fight as a platoon, company, then battalion, and finally brigade. It’s a step by step process where they all learn to function together.

But even then you’re not ready to go to the front yet. In addition to the tank formations learning how to function as a team, there is the matter of training on battlefield coordination with Infantry, artillery, recon/Cavalry, air assets, etc. and those elements have to learn how to work with tanks. You have to have all combat arms elements working as one for a modern mechanized brigade to be combat effective. This is critical as we’ve seen the losses the Russians took from neglecting combined arms warfare training.

And while you’re training the combat arms elements of these new brigades, you also have to train the combat support elements on supporting the combat arm elements in the field in a combat environment.

The process of creating a combined arms brigade formation takes months. And that’s if they live in the field almost constantly without any downtime, which is impossible. Downtime is needed for maintenance and to allow soldiers at least some rest. Without rest for troops and downtime for maintenance on vehicles, your brigade will be worn out and combat ineffective before they reach the front. Realistically, having newly formed mechanized brigades, equipped with western tanks and other vehicles, fully trained ready by fall is quite an ambitious undertaking.

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What if they take Ukrainian tank crews that have already been in combat and learned all that stuff. Some of the Ukrainian tankers have almost a year’s worth of actual combat experience and their support personnel have almost a year’s worth of experience keeping 40+ year old tanks running. How long would it take them?

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Well, if they withdraw entire brigades and retrain them together, then really all you have to do is get them proficient in using new equipment. That could be done in roughly three to six months. And I say that only because Ukraine is in a wartime situation where they need formations on the front ASAP. Ideally, I’d say you’d want more time than that.

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I don’t know if it went into production.

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I just looked it up. The Raytheon conversation kit never went anywhere. However, Taiwan partnered with Elbit Systems to upgrade Taiwan’s 800 M60s to use the same gun and fire control systems as the Abrams Taiwan has purchased.

ISW Update

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Russian forces’ likely capture of Soledar on January 11 is not an operationally significant development and is unlikely to presage an imminent Russian encirclement of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage posted on January 11 and 12 indicates that Russian forces likely control most if not all of Soledar, and have likely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the western outskirts of the settlement.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks against Sil in Donetsk Oblast—a settlement over a kilometer northwest of Soledar and beyond previous Ukrainian positions.

Russian information operations have overexaggerated the importance of Soledar, which is at best a Russian Pyrrhic tactical victory. ISW continues to assess that the capture of Soledar—a settlement smaller than 5.5 square miles—will not enable Russian forces to exert control over critical Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Bakhmut nor better position Russian forces to encircle the city in the short term.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks scapegoats for the Russian defense industrial base’s struggle to address equipment and technological shortages. Putin publicly criticized Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov for aviation industry enterprises not receiving state orders during a cabinet of ministers meeting on January 11.[11] Putin stated that some enterprises have yet to receive state orders for 2023 and are not hiring more staff or preparing to increase output for potential orders in the future

This incident is likely part of an ongoing Kremlin information campaign to elevate Putin’s image as an involved wartime leader. The Kremlin could have cut out the disagreement from its official transcript (as it often does for most of Putin’s meetings, which are heavily edited and stage managed), but chose to publicize Putin’s harsh response, possibly to identify other officials within the Kremlin as the culprits for Russian defense industrial base’s challenges and possibly to threaten other officials

Manturov’s attempts to soften Putin’s timeline indicate his uncertainty that the Kremlin has the capacity to administer these contracts in a short time period. Manturov tried to explain to Putin that the ministry will authorize additional contracts “based on the opportunities that are formed by the budget, including the preferential program of the National Wealth Fund,” highlighting the differences between the Russian financial reality and Putin’s unrealistic objectives for a short-term revitalization of the Russian defense industrial sector.

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Ukrainian intelligence confirmed that senior Russian military leadership is preparing for significant military reforms in the coming year, though ISW continues to assess Russia will struggle to quickly—if at all—implement planned reforms. Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, stated on January 12 that Russian military leadership plans to increase military personnel to 1.5 million (from roughly 1.35 million as of September 2022) and form at least 20 new military divisions in 2023, which Hromov noted indicates “the Kremlin's intentions to engage in a long-term confrontation and preparations for conducting large-scale hostilities.”[14] Hromov stated that Russia’s significant personnel, weapons, and equipment losses; the effects of international sanctions; and structural weaknesses in the Russian military apparatus have reduced Russia’s force generation capabilities and ultimately raise doubts about whether Russian forces can implement these reforms within undisclosed deadlines.[15] Hromov’s statements come the day after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced a major restructuring of the senior command structure for Russian operations in Ukraine and suggest that the Russian military apparatus writ large is engaged in a concerted campaign to reform and restructure multiple tactical, operational, and strategic aspects

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Key Takeaways

Russian forces have likely captured Soledar on January 11, but this small-scale victory is unlikely to presage an imminent encirclement of Bakhmut.

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks scapegoats for the Russian defense industry base’s struggle to address equipment and technological challenges, and retains unrealistic expectations of Russian capacity to rapidly replace losses.

Ukrainian intelligence confirmed that senior Russian military leadership is preparing for significant military reforms in the coming year, though ISW continues to assess Russia will struggle to quickly—if at all—implement planned reforms.

Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and west of Donetsk City.

Russian forces continued defensive operations on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.

Russian officials and occupation authorities may be preparing for the mass deportation of Ukrainian citizens from occupied territories to the Russian Federation.

Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrei Kartapolov announced that Russian military recruitment offices may increase the age of eligibility for conscription as early as this spring’s conscription cycle.

Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, Oleg Salyukov (who was appointed as one of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov’s three “deputies” as theater commander in Ukraine), arrived in Belarus to take control of combat coordination exercises for the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV).

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The process of creating a combined arms brigade formation takes months

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I agree with you, from the ground up.

These guys already have experience they just need the training on a new platform.

Again, the mechs are a different story.

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use the newer, better plated stuff to breakthrough

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How survivable is a blast from an opposing tank in a leopard2? Is it dramatically different than the T-64s?