re: George Meade took command of the Army of the Potomac on this day in 1863...

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If Meade decides to do with the Pipe's Creek scenario, it's over for Lee and the Confederacy right there. Grant has Vicksburg and control of the Mississippi and Meade has Lee trapped in Pennsylvania with his supply lines potentially cut and no one in a position to "rescue" him with his back to the Susquehanna

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You are assuming that Meade steps back to the Pipe Creek Defense line, and that Lee attacks him there and fails, because frontal attacks against infantry dug-in and supported by field artillery was virtually impregnable in 1863? Yes, I agree with your scenario.

But if Lee could have found a way to beat Meade one more time at Pipe's Creek, then there might be a different result.

Lee is stretched even at Gettysburg, Pipe's Creek would have exacerbated his situation. Also it probably extends his time , time he really does not have to the equation. He's trying a risky move invading an enemy territory in force with a force that is lesser than the opponent. Then factor he does not have a savior coming to help him if it really goes bad and Union reserves come in to block his retreat.

Lee was fortunate that the battle was at Gettysburg and he was able to slip away back across to Maryland and into VA. I'm not sure many understand how close Lee was to annihilation with his foray into Pennsylvania. Union incompetence keeps him intact

Meade had sufficient reserves and a plan for a counterattack that never got going good.

Lee was vulnerable, very vulnerable.

The sixth Corp had just gotten to the battlefield late on July 2nd after marching 32 miles.

The fifth Corp was in position on the front lines with the idea that they could counterattack if the Confederste attack was repulsed.

npshistory.com TD Harman
Good analysis of Meade’s planned counterattack

“He is new to command, he will be cautious.”

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I think Meade is vastly underrated in the pantheon of U.S. generals.

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Meade was an engineer. Which means, for the time, he was at or near the top of his West Point graduating class.

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I think most analysis would say Lee was vulnerable.

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I'm not going to argue over the usage of the word "vulnerable" because the phrase "Lee was vulnerable" has no real meaning. It's a conclusion that your podcaster offered to you, and the podcaster provided absolutely no hard analysis to support the conclusion. Heck, he didn't even bother to define what he meant by with word "vulnerable."

If I agree with you for the sake of conversation that Lee was vulnerable, what in your view does that mean? When did he stop being vulnerable? We could argue that Lee's Army was "vulnerable" for just about the whole war.

We could agree that Lee's Army was vulnerable as soon as he crossed to the North of the Potomac River and marched to Penn. He was vulnerable then and I guess he stopped being vulnerable when full blown Winter set in.

I guess I can agree with that.

I can strongly agree that Lee put his Army in a vulnerable position BEFORE the Battle of Gettysburg when he was unable to rapidly discern the whereabouts of the enemy field army and failed to make arrangements to rapidly concentrate his own army at a major road hub.

In May 1863, Lee explained to President Davis that the plan was to invade the North and catch the enemy field army on the road and defeat the enemy army in detail. Then Lee executed that plan in a faulty manner. He was certainly vulnerable during the Gettysburg Campaign before the Battle.

Coddington's book called The Gettysburg Campaign is still the highest standard available.

Good thoughts.

I don't think that we can be certain about your numbers because scholars are not positive about the actual strength of the Army of the Potomac before the Battle, but I agree that Lee was outnumbered.

Relative to Union numbers during the whole Gettysburg campaign, we may not be sure about the exact number of soldiers, but, I agree with your point that Lee's Army would have been outnumbered - and it WAS outnumbered.

But, it was the most powerful version of Lee's Army that existed. And it is a fact that the Army of the Potomac's own numbers were less than usual, so Lee's Army would never be as equal to the Yankee numbers in the East as it was on this date in 1863.

And I agree that the longer the Gettysburg Campaign lasted, the greater the risk to Lee's Army, as more Union forces in the Eastern Theater were concentrated to oppose Lee.

Lee needed to execute a decisive and rapid offensive that would catch Meade's Army in column on the road to Gettysburg and threaten to defeat in detail the Army of the Potomac.

It could have happened that way. Lee could have had all 9 of his Infantry Divisions right now on the morning of June 30th, 1863, settle in, resting and waiting for Buford's cavalry and Meade's First Corps and Eleventh Corps. These two Union corps along with the rest of the seven corps of the Army of the Potomac were strung out along the roads, in road column, marching North. VULNERABLE, to be sure.

Lee's plan to defeat Meade in detail was the right plan, but, Lee's execution of the plan was faulty. At Gettysburg on June 30th 1863, Lee's Army was NOT there waiting for the Yankees. The opposite was true. The Yank cavalry was waiting for Lee to show up.

I also agree with you that Lee beating Meade at Pipe's Creek would NOT have been an easy thing to do. It was an entrenched and prepared defensive position and Union combat units from all over the East would have been marching to the fight, with many of them heading towards Lee's flank and rear, as you point out.

At a time when Lee needed to move his Army with decisive rapidity and skill, Lee was cautious and hesitant, because he was very disturbed as he realized that his knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was totally inadequate.

Put it this way, if Grant, Lee or Stonewall Jackson were on charge of the Union army, do you think there would have been a major counterattack right after Picket failed.

That because Lee had left his army become vulnerable to such an attack.

There’s evidence that Meade and Hancock had discussed that, but the plans were never carried out. National Park Service

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At a time when Lee needed to move his Army with decisive rapidity and skill, Lee was cautious and hesitant, because he was very disturbed as he realized that his knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was totally inadequate.

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Yes, very good point. The fog of war was thick. Stuart was gone, and he wasn’t on his home turf.

He was also slowed down with all the “loot” he had taken to sustain his army. Food, pigs, livestock, and anything they could use. All the “baggage” slowed him down.