George Meade took command of the Army of the Potomac on this day in 1863...

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Within 72 hours, Meade would be commanding the Union Army as it engaged in the largest and bloodiest battle ever fought on North American soil.

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Meade was at the Oregon/Oregon State football game?

The path from Ol’ Fuss n Feathers to Grant was tortuous.

Meade got lucky at Gettysburg. Lee attacked a force of unknown number entrenched on high ground. Meade loses if General Greene doesn’t insist of fortifying Culp’s hill while his “sole brigade” is left to defend it on 7/2. Meade shifted everything he had to defend Longstreet’s attack on the flank. But for Greene insiting that a brigade remain on Culp’s Hill and fortifying it , Hill easily overwhelms him. This is what Lee hoped would happen when he planned the attack. Meade showed his true colors when he voted to return to Washing DC after the Wilderness. He was a reluctant general to say the least. He, unlike Sheridan, Sherman, and Grant, dis not understand what it would take to secure victory.

This Gettysburg Campaign Anniversary date kind of snuck up on me. I spent a week on the Battlefield back in late May.

June 28th, 1863, was a very important day for that Campaign. It was on this day that Commanding General Lee finally was convinced that the Union Army of the Potomac had crossed the Potomac River heading North to find and do battle with Lee.

IMHO, the great "What If" of the Gettysburg Campaign is this: What if Lee had been convinced just one day earlier that the Union Army had crossed the Potomac? And, armed with this info, What If General Lee had been able to orchestrate a rapid and decisive concentration of his Army at the road hub in the town of Gettysburg?

General Lee almost won the Battle on Day One of the Three Days of Gettysburg. If Lee had concentrated his whole Army just a little bit closer to the town of Gettysburg, Lee would have had enough of a numerical advantage to defeat the Army of the Potomac's lead Corps on Day One, thus forcing Hancock and Meade to order a retreat to the Union Pipe Creek defense line. Lee would have been able to seize Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill on Day One, so, Generals Meade and Hancock would logically have decided to simply take the Union Army back down the road a bit to the Pipe Creek defense positions that they had already talked about and planned for. General Meade would then have lead his Army to the Pipe Creek defense line during the evening and night hours of July 1st to dawn of July 2nd, 1863.

Who know what would have happened next? Lee would have won the field at Gettysburg, but the enemy Army of the Potomac would not have been destroyed, only forced to retreat.

This is probably the great "What If?" of the Gettysburg Campaign, IMHO.

Maybe Lee could have launched another attack or two, defeat the Army of the Potomac and then force Washington DC to ask for an Armistice.

I’m sorry, fat finger. I meant to give you an upvote.

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Buford picked the spot to gather the army

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He did not do that. Not unilaterally. Sure, he was among those who understood the benefits of the high ground at Gettysburg, but other more senior officers were the ones who decided that Gettysburg is where the battle should be fought. Howard and Hancock both were more responsible for that decision than Buford was. That decision, however, ultimately rested with Meade and Meade was the one who decided to trust his subordinate's recommendations to fight at Gettysburg and not at Pipe Creek (where Meade originally intended).

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Once preserved, Greene won Day 2, the key day of the fight, by insistung that a brigade remain and that he fortify Culp’s Hill, Meade’s intelligence is meaningless without these to General’s making key tactical decisions.

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This is a very simplistic interpretation of events. Some 21,000 Confederate soldiers attacked the left flank of the Union army on the afternoon of July 2. Meade naturally moved soldiers from his right flank to defend his left. Which is the one thing Lee did not want to afford Meade with the opportunity to do. But because communication was so poor with regards to the Confederate army during the battle, Ewell did not attack until hours after Longstreet began his attack. While Greene initially held out against Johnson's attacks on his own, Union reinforcements -- returning from the fighting on the Union left -- eventually helped Greene stop Johnson in his tracks.

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Meade didn’t follow up on his victory by ending the war.

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Meade lost over 23,000 men over the course of the Battle of Gettysburg. His army was absolutely exhausted after weeks of marching and fighting a pitched battle in the hot June-July sun. His army was down three of its corps commanders, a number of its division commanders, and countless brigade/regimental commanders. There was no possible way he could have ended the war in July 1863 given the shape of his army in the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Gettysburg.

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I stand by my position. Regardless of military intelligence , Buford picked the spot to gather the army and order a tactical withdraw over a series of multiple ridges to protect the position. Military Intelligence may have put the army in the move , but don’t have anything to do with picking the ground or preserving it. Once preserved, Greene won Day 2, the key day of the fight, by insistung that a brigade remain and that he fortify Culp’s Hill, Meade’s intelligence is meaningless without these to General’s making key tactical decisions. Meade didn’t follow up on his victory by ending the war. He didn’t counter attack on Day 3 , nor did swift it maneuver thereafter to block Lee’s retreat. You should watch the hour by hour YouTube video as it clearly reveals just how lucky Meade was at Gettysburg and how he failed to take advantage of the victory. His vote against continuing on with Overland seals it for me. He was extremely fortunate in many ways and it can’t be denied.

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You replied to the wrong guy. You are arguing with Roll Tide about the role of Military Intelligence in the Gettysburg Campaign. I see that your opinion/conclusion is that Military Intelligence played no decisive role during the Gettysburg Campaign. That might be a minority opinion.

You also brought up a topic probably best saved for July 1st next week - the topic of whether Day Two or Day One was the most decisive day of the battle. I've often thought that Day One was the decisive day of the battle. I've also never been made aware of any theory that makes the case that Greene's decision to fortify Culp's Hill on Day Two was the decisive inflection or turning point of the whole Battle of Gettysburg.

About 30 days ago from today, I was visiting the battleground of Culp's Hill. A man almost needs mountain climbing equipment to get up and down that hill. There is no "walking" up or down that hill. It is very steep in most places and absolutely covered in huge boulders that are larger than a man.
Even without Greene's breastworks, I got the impression from being on that battleground that Culp's Hill would be impregnable once occupied in force by good Infantry.

The senior generals confirmed Buford’s selection. Buford selected it and preserved it. Two completely different aspects of command. Meade didn’t arrive until 1000 PM. He had nothing to do with the selection whatsoever. Meade sent Hancock to Gettysburg AFTER learning of Reynolds death. Of course this is a full day after Buford selected to preserve the position.

Let’s not measure guys. I have been there multiple times myself, which I have posted about on past anniversaries of the battle. The reality is the Louisiana Tigers occupied part of Culp’s Hill at the end of Day 2. They were driven off of it in the morning of Day 3. Yes it’s steep and I agree that once occupied “in force” it was impossible to take. This 100% proves my point as Meade moved over 10,000 off of it to reenforce his left, leaving only 1,500 or so there to defend Culp’s Hill. Greene ordered the defense works to be built and asked for the entire brigade to remain. Had he not done those things , 700 or so would have defended it against an assault by 10 times his number. You should really watch he YouTube video of the hour by hour movements of the men on that battlefield.

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I have jogged up that hill

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Yep. I didn't get to climb over every square inch of Culp's Hill but I went by foot up and down where many of the Union Army monuments are there marking the positions of Greene's units. "Walk" is the wrong word to use. I could not "walk" up or down where I was. I had to squat low and take one step at a time and it would have been quite easy for me to take a misstep and take a very bad tumble to the ground and maybe a bit down the rocky slope.

The infantry formations that the CSA attacking infantry were trained to use and did use attacking Culp' Hill was the linear regiment formation in which the regiment is formed into two lines the second line about ten yards or so behind the first line. There is no way for that formation to get up that hill even without the presence of an enemy - the individual attacking soldiers would have to take it step by step up the hill while his buddies provided covering fire. The woods were very thick, so this covering fire would essentially have to be at close range (15 to 40 yards from the enemy). Culp's Hill was well-forested back in 1863. Wow. What a place to visit !!

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Howard arrived at Noon, over 2 hours AFTER Reynolds was killed. Buford decided to defend the position on June 30.

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Buford decided to defend the ground WEST of town.

However, it was Howard who first noticed the defensible ground south of town. Buford sadly passed away in the autumn of 1863 and so we never received any kind of summary regarding his line of thinking. What we do have is Howard and those who were there beside him on July 1, 1863. When he pulled up on Cemetery Hill that morning, he turned to his staff and told them that it was good ground. To which one officer replied, "It is the only ground, General."

It was Howard who decided to leave an entire division of the Eleventh Corps in reserve atop Cemetery Hill. Not Buford. Not Reynolds. Howard.