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re: George Meade took command of the Army of the Potomac on this day in 1863...
Posted on 6/28/26 at 2:50 pm to michael corleone
Posted on 6/28/26 at 2:50 pm to michael corleone
It seems clear to me that you are convinced that The Battle of Gettysburg's decisive turning point was at the fight for Culp's Hill on Day 2.
I have read some historical info that indicates that the CSA did miss an opportunity to sort of by-pass Culp's Hill to the East and then attack the Baltimore Pike from the rear. Seems likely to me that this was probably a missed opportunity for the CSA on Day 2. This would fit in well with your own observations that Day 2 at Culp's Hill could very well have been a decisive missed opportunity, especially if we combine your points with a hypothetical CSA effort to by-pass and outflank Culp's Hill from the East.
Of course, this is completely hypothetical because General Lee had absolutely no intention of making that kind of attack in that sector on Day 2 - he was already committed to attacking the Unions Left Flank from South to North along Emmitsburg Road (where he thought the Union Left Flank was anchored - and it was anchored there for part of the day on Day 2).
Folks, there were so many "missed opportunities" during this whole battle and campaign, because these Armies did not have fully functional Staffs like were invented late in the 19th Century. One historian calls the whole CSA effort during this battle and campaign using the word "haphazard" and I definitely see his point. When you see how disjointed and uncoordinated the CSA offensive efforts were during the days of that campaign and battle, use of the word "haphazard" is justified.
The Yankee efforts were also somewhat "haphazard" but because they were on the Defensive, they didn't suffer so much from being haphazard.
I have read some historical info that indicates that the CSA did miss an opportunity to sort of by-pass Culp's Hill to the East and then attack the Baltimore Pike from the rear. Seems likely to me that this was probably a missed opportunity for the CSA on Day 2. This would fit in well with your own observations that Day 2 at Culp's Hill could very well have been a decisive missed opportunity, especially if we combine your points with a hypothetical CSA effort to by-pass and outflank Culp's Hill from the East.
Of course, this is completely hypothetical because General Lee had absolutely no intention of making that kind of attack in that sector on Day 2 - he was already committed to attacking the Unions Left Flank from South to North along Emmitsburg Road (where he thought the Union Left Flank was anchored - and it was anchored there for part of the day on Day 2).
Folks, there were so many "missed opportunities" during this whole battle and campaign, because these Armies did not have fully functional Staffs like were invented late in the 19th Century. One historian calls the whole CSA effort during this battle and campaign using the word "haphazard" and I definitely see his point. When you see how disjointed and uncoordinated the CSA offensive efforts were during the days of that campaign and battle, use of the word "haphazard" is justified.
The Yankee efforts were also somewhat "haphazard" but because they were on the Defensive, they didn't suffer so much from being haphazard.
This post was edited on 6/28/26 at 2:55 pm
Posted on 6/28/26 at 3:05 pm to michael corleone
Buford's main objective was to deny the Army of Northern Virginia an opportunity to concentrate its force before the Army of the Potomac could. Reynolds continued this line of thinking in his dispatch to Meade shortly before he was killed. However, it was Howard who first observed the potential of Cemetery Hill as a strong defensive position in the written record.
Posted on 6/28/26 at 3:09 pm to Champagne
The turning point was Lee’s decision to make ANY attack on Day 2. This was Botha tactical and strategic failure on his part. He made this decision absent any understanding of the ground or forces in front of him due to “Stuart’s Ride”. Longstreet argued in favor of redeployment to a superior position. Hood did the same based upon his visual of Devil’s Den and Little Round Top.
Despite Lee’s error, opportunities existed upon Day 2 but were squashed by Greene on Culp’s Hill and Chamberlain’s charge/counter attach down and across Little Round Top. These two battlefield tactical decisions by unit type commanders preserved the defensive victory that Buford and Reynolds originally envisioned. You can’t deflect out of the fact that Buford selected that ground and Reynolds confirmed it. Nor can you deflect that Greene persevered the final victory by his actions on Day 2 to stop Lee’s assault. Lee’s plan in Day 2 was for Longstreet to attack one flank and for the other to be attacked simultaneous when an oppurtunity presented itself. The oppurtunity presented itself and but for Greene’s decisions it would have succeeded.
Despite Lee’s error, opportunities existed upon Day 2 but were squashed by Greene on Culp’s Hill and Chamberlain’s charge/counter attach down and across Little Round Top. These two battlefield tactical decisions by unit type commanders preserved the defensive victory that Buford and Reynolds originally envisioned. You can’t deflect out of the fact that Buford selected that ground and Reynolds confirmed it. Nor can you deflect that Greene persevered the final victory by his actions on Day 2 to stop Lee’s assault. Lee’s plan in Day 2 was for Longstreet to attack one flank and for the other to be attacked simultaneous when an oppurtunity presented itself. The oppurtunity presented itself and but for Greene’s decisions it would have succeeded.
Posted on 6/28/26 at 3:40 pm to michael corleone
George Pickett’s famous line:
“You want me to do what?”
“You want me to do what?”
Posted on 6/28/26 at 3:49 pm to RollTide1987
A Great American hero doing his part in defeating the traitorous losers.

Posted on 6/28/26 at 3:51 pm to michael corleone
Reynolds dispatch quoted
“"The enemy is advancing in strong force, and I fear that he will go to the heights beyond the town before I can. I will fight him inch by inch, and if driven into the town, I will barricade the streets, and hold him back for as long as I can."
“"The enemy is advancing in strong force, and I fear that he will go to the heights beyond the town before I can. I will fight him inch by inch, and if driven into the town, I will barricade the streets, and hold him back for as long as I can."
Posted on 6/28/26 at 3:57 pm to michael corleone
quote:
The oppurtunity presented itself and but for Greene’s decisions it would have succeeded.
Well, I'm still not as convinced as are you that Ewell/Johnson's efforts to take Culp's Hill by Frontal Assault using disorganized infantry on Day 2 had the potential to win the whole Campaign for Lee. Two facts that come to my mind: 1) this CSA infantry attack did not commence until 7pm on Day 2, which is really late in the day for any attack to result in some kind of decisive favorable conclusion. 2) the CSA infantry did indeed take some lower parts of Culp's Hill, but were driven back out by Union reinforcing units that were dispatched for that purpose.
This Ewell/Johnson attack was not coordinated at all with Longstreet's attack on the Union Left Flank because Longstreet commenced his infantry attack at about 4:30 pm on Day 2.
I suppose that a decisive and favorable CSA result could have been achieved somehow in a manner closely resembling your point of view. I'm just not convinced about that, and that's not in alignment with your opinion, because you are very convinced that the Battle of Gettysburg turned on what happened on Culp's Hill on Day 2.
I do agree with you that Buford's outstanding work as Cavalry leader on Day 1 was extremely important, and, since Buford was on that ground before the other Union generals, it was probably Buford who saw ALL of the good defensive spots first (like Cemetery Hill) and recognized these terrain features FIRST as great defensive positions. But, as others have pointed out, Buford had no authority to order any Infantry or Foot Artillery. The various Union Corps commanders alone had that authority until Meade arrived.
Posted on 6/28/26 at 3:58 pm to JerryTheKingBawler
quote:
A Great American hero doing his part in defeating the traitorous losers.
AND he did heroic work in making the USA Safe and Welcoming for TransKids !!
And won't we all be eternally grateful for that !
This post was edited on 6/28/26 at 4:03 pm
Posted on 6/28/26 at 4:02 pm to michael corleone
quote:
The turning point was Lee’s decision to make ANY attack on Day 2.
Yes, that's true. With optimal battlefield intelligence regarding the whereabouts of the whole Union Army, Lee might have decided to forego any major attacks on Day 2 in order to attempt a strategic turning maneuver towards the South and around the Union Army's Left Flank. I think that most all of Stuart's Cavalry command would have been present by sunset on Day 2 such that an excellent Cavalry Recon operation would have enabled and facilitated Lee's Great Turning Movement.
The Union Army Generals were concerned about this very eventuality, as you know.
Posted on 6/28/26 at 4:51 pm to Champagne
Objectively , Stuart should have been subjected to a court martial for his failure to follow orders during the Pennsylvania campaign. Interesting juxtaposition of Stuart v Buford during the campaign. The decisions those two made during that campaign not only proudly impacted the outcome of the battle , but possibly the war itself.
Posted on 6/28/26 at 5:01 pm to michael corleone
Have people ever considered that the reason why the CSA cavalry and its leadership failed so badly in 1863 was because it was an amateur group of horse raiders rather than a high-functioning professional Cavalry Arm?
They failed because they were bad at their jobs. Their job was to be a highly skilled professional Cavalry Arm doing important things for the Army Commander like Strategic Recon, Tactical Recon, Screening Ops, Communications Ops, etc.
Stuart was the man in charge of the Cavalry. Have people ever considered that maybe the CSA Cav was bad because it reflected the skill-set of its Leader?
They failed because they were bad at their jobs. Their job was to be a highly skilled professional Cavalry Arm doing important things for the Army Commander like Strategic Recon, Tactical Recon, Screening Ops, Communications Ops, etc.
Stuart was the man in charge of the Cavalry. Have people ever considered that maybe the CSA Cav was bad because it reflected the skill-set of its Leader?
Posted on 6/28/26 at 5:54 pm to Champagne
JEB Stuart was a West Point grad and a cavalry officer in the army before the war. He was a professional soldier.
Posted on 6/28/26 at 5:57 pm to doubleb
quote:
JEB Stuart was a West Point grad and a cavalry officer in the army before the war. He was a professional soldier.
Yes, of course. I should not have hi-jacked the thread with my comment.
Posted on 6/28/26 at 7:30 pm to Champagne
quote:
Yes, of course. I should not have hi-jacked the thread with my comment.
No problem.
I found the discussion between you guys very interesting. Keep it up.
Posted on 6/28/26 at 8:37 pm to doubleb
I would like to return the conversation to the specific historical date of June 28th, 1863.
Folks, take a look at where General Lee had his nine Infantry Divisions on this exact date. If he had had the foresight to begin concentrating his divisions at Gettysburg starting early this morning, IMHO he would have achieved a decisive concentration of forces that would have overwhelmed the Union Army before it could concentrate. Lee would have compelled Meade to withdraw from Gettysburg and fall back to defend the Pipe Creek defense line.
Folks, take a look at where General Lee had his nine Infantry Divisions on this exact date. If he had had the foresight to begin concentrating his divisions at Gettysburg starting early this morning, IMHO he would have achieved a decisive concentration of forces that would have overwhelmed the Union Army before it could concentrate. Lee would have compelled Meade to withdraw from Gettysburg and fall back to defend the Pipe Creek defense line.
Posted on 6/28/26 at 9:09 pm to Champagne
quote:
Folks, take a look at where General Lee had his nine Infantry Divisions on this exact date. If he had had the foresight to begin concentrating his divisions at Gettysburg starting early this morning, IMHO he would have achieved a decisive concentration of forces that would have overwhelmed the Union Army before it could concentrate. Lee would have compelled Meade to withdraw from Gettysburg and fall back to defend the Pipe Creek defense line.
Isn’t it the conventional wisdom that unlike previous Northern generals, Meade acted quickly and surprised Lee? Remember too, there was no Stuart telling Lee what was going on.
Posted on 6/28/26 at 9:48 pm to doubleb
quote:
Isn’t it the conventional wisdom that unlike previous Northern generals, Meade acted quickly and surprised Lee? Remember too, there was no Stuart telling Lee what was going on.
No, I don't think the conventional wisdom is that Meade surprised Lee. Lee was fully informed in the early hours of 28 June 1863 that Meade's whole Army had crossed the Potomac River and was marching North to do battle with him.
This was not a "surprise" in the sense that Lee was caught in an irreparably adverse situation. Lee had plenty of time to get cracking and concentrate his Army at the only obvious road hub on the map, which was Gettysburg.
Lee may have dawdled a bit out of a sense of caution caused by lack of military intelligence, but, he was not surprised. I don't think most historians would use that word.
It's almost 10pm local time right now. Lee should have had his nine infantry divisions forced marching towards Gettysburg for over 12 hours by now. In fact, if Lee had been moving fast, they would already be there sleeping and waiting for Buford's cavalry. I don't think that any of Lee's nine infantry divisions were more than a 12 hour march from Gettysburg on 28 June 1863.
This post was edited on 6/28/26 at 9:49 pm
Posted on 6/28/26 at 9:57 pm to doubleb
quote:
Surprised, unexpected
Yes. I see what you mean. Indeed. Although this news should have been completely foreseen and expected by Lee, somehow, he did not expect to hear this news from a spy. Lee put all of his trust in Stuart to keep Lee informed. When Lee realized that Stuart had failed completely, Lee was deflated.
Posted on 6/28/26 at 10:01 pm to doubleb
Here's the force march timeline for each of Lee's nine Infantry Divisions if he were able to get them on the road to Gettysburg at 10 pm on 28 June 1863. All of his Divisions would have easily got to Gettysburg within 24 hours.
Corps / DivisionLocation at 10:00 PM (June 28)
Distance to GettysburgForced March Time
First Corps (Longstreet)• Lafayette McLawsChambersburg, PA~25 miles
8.3 hours• George PickettChambersburg, PA~25 miles8.3 hours• John Bell HoodChambersburg, PA~25 miles8.3 hours
Second Corps (Ewell)• Jubal EarlyYork / Wrightsville, PA~30 miles10.0 hours• Robert RodesCarlisle, PA~30 miles10.0 hours• Edward "Allegheny" JohnsonNear Carlisle / Shippensburg~33 miles11.0 hours
Third Corps (A.P. Hill)• Henry HethCashtown, PA~8 miles2.7 hours• William Dorsey PenderFayetteville, PA~17 miles5.7 hours;
Richard Anderson's Division Fayetteville, PA 17 miles 5.7 hours.
Lee's Army was not able to rapidly concentrate upon receiving the news about Meade being near Frederick MD. I'm not sure why.
Corps / DivisionLocation at 10:00 PM (June 28)
Distance to GettysburgForced March Time
First Corps (Longstreet)• Lafayette McLawsChambersburg, PA~25 miles
8.3 hours• George PickettChambersburg, PA~25 miles8.3 hours• John Bell HoodChambersburg, PA~25 miles8.3 hours
Second Corps (Ewell)• Jubal EarlyYork / Wrightsville, PA~30 miles10.0 hours• Robert RodesCarlisle, PA~30 miles10.0 hours• Edward "Allegheny" JohnsonNear Carlisle / Shippensburg~33 miles11.0 hours
Third Corps (A.P. Hill)• Henry HethCashtown, PA~8 miles2.7 hours• William Dorsey PenderFayetteville, PA~17 miles5.7 hours;
Richard Anderson's Division Fayetteville, PA 17 miles 5.7 hours.
Lee's Army was not able to rapidly concentrate upon receiving the news about Meade being near Frederick MD. I'm not sure why.
This post was edited on 6/28/26 at 10:05 pm
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