re: 737 Max software is still trying to Maximum Overdrive the plane

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False. The software was created to try to override shitty hardware.

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False. The software was created to try to override shitty hardware.

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This thing ain't flying this year or next year, and if it gets certified at some point, it will be under a different name.

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There was/is an option for "AOA disagree" MX message on display.

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The only thing you can shutoff is the electric stab trim.

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During flight tests to certify an airplane, pilots must safely fly an extreme maneuver, a banked spiral called a wind-up turn that brings the plane through a stall. While passengers would likely never experience the maneuver on a normal commercial flight, it could occur if pilots for some reason needed to execute a steep banking turn. Engineers determined that on the MAX, the force the pilots feel in the control column as they execute this maneuver would not smoothly and continuously increase. Pilots who pull back forcefully on the column — sometimes called the stick — might suddenly feel a slackening of resistance. An FAA rule requires that the plane handle with smoothly changing stick forces. The lack of smooth feel was caused by the jet’s tendency to pitch up, influenced by shock waves that form over the wing at high speeds and the extra lift surface provided by the pods around the MAX’s engines, which are bigger and farther forward on the wing than on previous 737s... As the pilot pulled on the control column, this uncommanded movement in the background would counter the jet’s tendency to pitch up and smooth out the feel of the column throughout the maneuver... This original version of MCAS, according to two people familiar with the details, was activated only if two distinct sensors indicated such an extreme maneuver: a high angle of attack and a high G-force.

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About a third of the way through flight testing in 2016, as first reported by The Seattle Times in March, Boeing made substantial changes to MCAS. The flight-test pilots had found another problem: The same lack of smooth stick forces was also occurring in certain low-speed flight conditions. To cover that issue too, engineers decided to expand the scope and power of MCAS. Because at low speed a control surface must be deflected more to have the same effect, engineers increased the power of the system at low speed from 0.6 degrees of stabilizer nose-down deflection to 2.5 degrees each time it was activated. On the stabilizer, maximum nose down is about 4.7 degrees away from level flight. So with the new increased authority to move the stabilizer, just a couple of iterations of the system could push it to that maximum. Because there are no excessive G-forces at low speed, the engineers removed the G-force factor as a trigger. But that meant MCAS was now activated by a single angle-of-attack sensor... While the changes were dramatic, Boeing did not submit documentation of the revised system safety assessment to the FAA. An FAA spokesman said the safety agency did not require a new system safety analysis because it wasn’t deemed to be critical...

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