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We are now 162 years removed from the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg...
Posted on 7/1/25 at 9:23 am
Posted on 7/1/25 at 9:23 am
And one of the battle's most enduring what-ifs continues to intrigue students and casual observers of the battle: what if Ewell had attacked Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, 1863?
For context: the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia emerged triumphant north and west of Gettysburg when the First and Eleventh Corps broke and ran to the ridges and hills southeast of town. The most prominent rally point for Union forces was Cemetery Hill. Robert E. Lee famously sent orders to his Second Corps commander, Lt. General Richard S. Ewell, to "take that hill if practicable." Many argue had Ewell determined the task at hand to be practicable, Confederate troops could have pushed the Union forces off the high ground - thus changing the course of the battle and perhaps history.
But was the task at hand truly practicable? Let's examine this question. What many people fail to remember is that two of Ewell's divisions had been HEAVILY engaged north of town. Robert Rodes's division had suffered around 2,000 casualties in the fighting on Oak Hill and Oak Ridge while Jubal Early's division had suffered a further 1,200 casualties on the open plains north of town. Additionally, the brigades of both Rodes and Early were scattered, exhausted, and low on ammunition. Ewell's third and final division, that of Edward Johnson, would not arrive on the field until close to nightfall.
Further still, what many students of the battle fail to remember is the full text of Lee's order to Ewell: "Take that hill if practicable, but avoid a general engagement." No doubt Ewell had trouble reconciling this considering a general engagement had just been fought. However, orders were orders and at the end of the day, Ewell determined that taking Cemetery Hill would not be practicable given the state of his forces and the fact that the commanding general wanted him to do it without bringing on a major confrontation - the latter of which being impossible given the fact that some 10,000 Federals occupied the ground that Lee wanted Ewell to attack.
Ultimately, I feel that Ewell should not be blamed for his decision to not assault Cemetery Hill in the waning hours of July 1, 1863. His decision to not do so made tactical military sense given the state of his corps and the precise wording of his orders from Lee.
For context: the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia emerged triumphant north and west of Gettysburg when the First and Eleventh Corps broke and ran to the ridges and hills southeast of town. The most prominent rally point for Union forces was Cemetery Hill. Robert E. Lee famously sent orders to his Second Corps commander, Lt. General Richard S. Ewell, to "take that hill if practicable." Many argue had Ewell determined the task at hand to be practicable, Confederate troops could have pushed the Union forces off the high ground - thus changing the course of the battle and perhaps history.
But was the task at hand truly practicable? Let's examine this question. What many people fail to remember is that two of Ewell's divisions had been HEAVILY engaged north of town. Robert Rodes's division had suffered around 2,000 casualties in the fighting on Oak Hill and Oak Ridge while Jubal Early's division had suffered a further 1,200 casualties on the open plains north of town. Additionally, the brigades of both Rodes and Early were scattered, exhausted, and low on ammunition. Ewell's third and final division, that of Edward Johnson, would not arrive on the field until close to nightfall.
Further still, what many students of the battle fail to remember is the full text of Lee's order to Ewell: "Take that hill if practicable, but avoid a general engagement." No doubt Ewell had trouble reconciling this considering a general engagement had just been fought. However, orders were orders and at the end of the day, Ewell determined that taking Cemetery Hill would not be practicable given the state of his forces and the fact that the commanding general wanted him to do it without bringing on a major confrontation - the latter of which being impossible given the fact that some 10,000 Federals occupied the ground that Lee wanted Ewell to attack.
Ultimately, I feel that Ewell should not be blamed for his decision to not assault Cemetery Hill in the waning hours of July 1, 1863. His decision to not do so made tactical military sense given the state of his corps and the precise wording of his orders from Lee.
Posted on 7/1/25 at 9:25 am to RollTide1987
i just finished a biography on Buford, damn good officer. Shame he passed away before the end of the war
Posted on 7/1/25 at 9:25 am to RollTide1987
Just would have been Pickett's Charge two days early. Ewell made the right call.
Posted on 7/1/25 at 9:39 am to RollTide1987
quote:
But was the task at hand truly practicable?
Once the Union dig in on the hills the battle was over.
Funny thing is that Meade’s underlings were so shell shocked with previous encounters with Lee.. they briefly discussed pulling back because of being overrun on day one. When they were basically in the best position they had been in the entire war to that point.
What the question is.. what is Lee wasnt as equally as overconfident in the situation? What if he had listened to Longstreet, had taken a breath, and then turned and headed toward Washington? Putting the Confederate army between the Union army and Washington? Forcing the Union to fight on less favorable ground, having to hurriedly form an offensive to save Washington? And possibly playing into Lee’s hands?
Posted on 7/1/25 at 9:45 am to RollTide1987
quote:
For every Southern boy fourteen years old, not once but whenever he wants it, there is the instant when it's still not yet two o'clock on that July afternoon in 1863, the brigades are in position behind the rail fence, the guns are laid and ready in the woods and the furled flags are already loosened to break out and Pickett himself with his long oiled ringlets and his hat in one hand probably and his sword in the other looking up the hill waiting for Longstreet to give the word and it's all in the balance, it hasn't happened yet, it hasn't even begun yet, it not only hasn't begun yet but there is still time for it not to begin against that position and those circumstances which made more men than Garnett and Kemper and Armistead and Wilcox look grave yet it's going to begin, we all know that, we have come too far with too much at stake and that moment doesn't need even a fourteen-year-old boy to think This time. Maybe this time with all this much to lose than all this much to gain: Pennsylvania, Maryland, the world, the golden dome of Washington itself to crown with desperate and unbelievable victory the desperate gamble, the cast made two years ago; or to anyone who ever sailed a skiff under a quilt sail, the moment in 1492 when somebody thought This is it: the absolute edge of no return, to turn back now and make home or sail irrevocably on and either find land or plunge over the world's roaring rim.
William Faulkner, intruder in the dust
Posted on 7/1/25 at 9:47 am to CleverUserName
Lee who fought a masterful war on the whole was
repeatedly wrong about most things Gettysburg
Wrong place, wrong moves repeatedly and wrong time. He should of listened to Old Pete
repeatedly wrong about most things Gettysburg
Wrong place, wrong moves repeatedly and wrong time. He should of listened to Old Pete
Posted on 7/1/25 at 9:56 am to RollTide1987
This brave men died so we wouldn’t have to get offended by looking at statues of them.
Tyfys
Tyfys
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:03 am to Tmcgin
quote:
Lee who fought a masterful war on the whole was
repeatedly wrong about most things Gettysburg
Wrong place, wrong moves repeatedly and wrong time. He should of listened to Old Pete
a lot of people believe Lee was off his game at Gettysburg for a number of reasons but the ones I read about often are 1. PTSD/exhaustion 2. Overconfident and believed they were unbeatable
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:04 am to Pedro
If Jackson were alive at Gettysburg does he side with Longstreet and tell Lee to drive towards Washington?
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:31 am to elprez00
Newt Gingrich's books on the subject were very interesting. The end result was the same, but that battle was not. Lee flanks and does not attack at Gettysburg at all...but beats the Army of the Potomac after forcing them to come to him.
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:31 am to geauxtigers87
He definitely wasn’t at full strength. I’m sure exhaustion had a lot to do with it, along with dealing with the pressures from politicians in Richmond, constantly being outnumbered, supplies and ammunition being sparse at best, etc. He had an almost impossible task and he did his duty with the utmost honor and bravery.
I’ve read accounts that said he was dealing with health issues related to his heart at the time of Gettysburg. Not sure if that’s true but it wouldn’t be surprising due to the enormity of the situation he and the rest of the Confederacy found themselves in
I’ve read accounts that said he was dealing with health issues related to his heart at the time of Gettysburg. Not sure if that’s true but it wouldn’t be surprising due to the enormity of the situation he and the rest of the Confederacy found themselves in
This post was edited on 7/1/25 at 10:45 am
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:32 am to RollTide1987
Was Ewell ordered to attack and take that hill at all hazards? Or by vigorous assault pressed to the utmost? Or maybe "assault that hill, take that hill and hold that hill until relieved"?
He got vague orders.
JEB Stuart also got vague orders. Stuart's orders should have been given face to face - "I intend to invade the North into southern Pennsylvania. Once the Union Army is extended in columns of pursuit, I shall strike them when the opportunity presents in order to defeat them in detail. To this end, I order that you shall screen my main force, keep contact with the forward columns of the Union Army and promptly inform me of their whereabouts. Your mission is the most important part of my plan. If I intend to defeat them in detail, I must know immediately when they are over-extended and no longer within mutual supporting distance. Do you understand?"
He got vague orders.
JEB Stuart also got vague orders. Stuart's orders should have been given face to face - "I intend to invade the North into southern Pennsylvania. Once the Union Army is extended in columns of pursuit, I shall strike them when the opportunity presents in order to defeat them in detail. To this end, I order that you shall screen my main force, keep contact with the forward columns of the Union Army and promptly inform me of their whereabouts. Your mission is the most important part of my plan. If I intend to defeat them in detail, I must know immediately when they are over-extended and no longer within mutual supporting distance. Do you understand?"
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:48 am to Champagne
quote:
He got vague orders.
Yep.
Lee ordered to advance “if at all practicable”.
In southern speak.. that means “Go take the hill. Now.” Not assess the situation and determine if that order was correct.
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:52 am to WAC13
quote:
I’ve read accounts that said he was dealing with health issues related to his heart at the time of Gettysburg.
This is correct. A 1992 medical study concluded that Lee had suffered a near-fatal heart attack in March 1863, leading directly to chronic heart disease owing to poor blood flow to the heart. While most historians agree that his heart condition was a serious concern, they also agree that it did not impact his strategic and tactical decision-making during the campaign. Why do they come to this conclusion? Because the decisions Lee made at Gettysburg were typical of his aggressive, yet hands-off command style that came to define his leadership.
Why then did it seem like Lee was "off his game"? Because the Army of the Potomac was beginning to come into its own from a leadership standpoint. Division and brigade commanders were finally in place who knew how to lead men into combat and make smart tactical decisions in the heat of battle. The leadership at the top was also starting to see improvement with men like Reynolds and Hancock finally rising into the ranks of the high command.
They Army of the Potomac was also fighting on the defensive, on good ground, and outnumbered the Army of Northern Virginia. It is much harder to attack than to defend, and the attacking force almost always suffers a higher casualty rate than the force on the defensive. Math finally caught up to Lee in Pennsylvania.
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:53 am to WAC13
quote:
He definitely wasn’t at full strength. I’m sure exhaustion had a lot to do with it, along with dealing with the pressures from politicians in Richmond, constantly being outnumbered, supplies and ammunition being sparse at best, etc. He had an almost impossible task and he did his duty with the utmost honor and bravery.
You mean Rhett Butler was right?
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:55 am to CleverUserName
quote:
Lee ordered to advance “if at all practicable”.
In southern speak.. that means “Go take the hill. Now.” Not assess the situation and determine if that order was correct.
You ignore the second part of the order: "if at all practicable - without bringing on a general engagement."
What is a corps commander supposed to do with an order like that?
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:58 am to RollTide1987
I drove through Gettysburg last week
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:59 am to RollTide1987
The Grays whipped arse on the first day but they didn't press their advantage.
Posted on 7/1/25 at 10:59 am to RollTide1987
Very well said.
The job that Mead did to plug and fill his infantry units, cavalry and artillery was exceptional, especially during Picket’s Charge. Grant seemingly gets all the credit for defeating the Rebs but Mead’s decision making abilities those three days were masterful and possibly saved the Union.
The job that Mead did to plug and fill his infantry units, cavalry and artillery was exceptional, especially during Picket’s Charge. Grant seemingly gets all the credit for defeating the Rebs but Mead’s decision making abilities those three days were masterful and possibly saved the Union.
This post was edited on 7/1/25 at 11:02 am
Posted on 7/1/25 at 11:32 am to RollTide1987
Lee lost the Battle of Gettysburg plain and simple by making mistakes that would have led to the court martial of a newly-commissioned second lieutenant. Lee was a better man but Longstreet was a better general.
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