re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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think you are just changing accounts and responding to yourself.

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Is it bad that I kind of what them to stay and keep posting? At this point is just entertaining and funny

That poster seems to be making fun of ppl in this thread. My twitter bio has the Ukraine flag like you

Now can we get back on track

Is the 100k Orcs dead correct?
How are we doing on front lines?

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Well seeing as Ukraine is only reporting 89k (a number likely overstated) I'd go with no, but seeing as you are just making shite up why not?

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Miley said 100k filthy russian orcs dead
EU lady says 100k Ukrainian freedom fighters. Maybe they made up those numbers

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Who is we?

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The Slava Ukraini Internet Freedom Fighters (SUIFF)

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Is the 100k Orcs dead correct?
How are we doing on front lines?

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To your first question, no one really knows how many casualties have occurred on either side. At this point in the war, 100K is very plausible for either side.

Here are a few recent videos from the Bahkmut area showing the ground littered with Russian dead. These are from a drone so they aren't very graphic. The third video shows a nightime (thermal) arty strike on a Russian position.

https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1597482760289255426
https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1597465667594498048
https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1598139763495927809

RUSI, a British military think tank, has put out a report on military lessons learned from the war (caveat: the analysis is only on the war through July). It's a long report, but the executive summary is interesting and I'm curious to hear more experienced military folks' thoughts on it, particularly on their lessons to be drawn for NATO militaries (below):

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Beyond assessments of the Russian armed forces, there are significant lessons to be drawn from the conflict for the British and other NATO militaries. The foremost of these are:

In due course, it will be possible to extend this study to cover the later phase of the war when Ukraine moved on to offensive operations. As the UAF expend significant ammunition, however, and now depend on their international partners for equipment, it is important that those partners draw the appropriate lessons from the war so far, not least so that they can prepare themselves to deter future threats and to best support Ukraine. Ukraine’s victory is possible, but it requires significant heavy fighting. With appropriate support, Ukraine can prevail.

There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth. Survivability depends on dispersing ammunitions stocks, command and control, maintenance areas and aircraft. Ukraine successfully evaded Russia’s initial wave of strikes by dispersing its arsenals, aircraft and air defences. Conversely, the Russians succeeded in engaging 75% of static defence sites in the first 48 hours of the war. Nor is setting up a headquarters in a civilian building sufficient to make it survivable. The British Army must consider the vulnerability of higher-echelon enablement. The RAF must consider how many deployable spares kits it has to enable dispersion of its fleets.

Warfighting demands large initial stockpiles and significant slack capacity. Despite the prominence of anti-tank guided weapons in the public narrative, Ukraine blunted Russia’s attempt to seize Kyiv using massed fires from two artillery brigades. The difference in numbers between Russian and Ukrainian artillery was not as significant at the beginning of the conflict, with just over a 2:1 advantage: 2,433 barrel artillery systems against 1,176; and 3,547 multiple-launch rocket systems against 1,680. Ukraine maintained artillery parity for the first month and a half and then began to run low on munitions so that, by June, the AFRF had a 10:1 advantage in volume of fire. Evidently, no country in NATO, other than the US, has sufficient initial weapons stocks for warfighting or the industrial capacity to sustain largescale operations. This must be rectified if deterrence is to be credible and is equally a problem for the RAF and Royal Navy.

Uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (CUAS) are essential across all branches and at all echelons. Although critical to competitiveness by providing situational awareness, 90% of UAS employed are lost. For the most part, UAS must be cheap and attritable. For land forces, they must be organic to units for the purposes of both situational awareness and target acquisition. The primary means of CUAS is EW. Another critical tactical requirement is to be alerted to the presence of UAS. For the Royal Navy, CUAS is critical for protecting vessels operating beyond the protection of a task force. For the RAF, the provision of look-down sensing to locate UAS to contribute to air defence is critical. This allows defensive resources to be prioritised on the right axes.

The force must fight for the right to precision. Precision is not only vastly more efficient in the effects it delivers but also allows the force to reduce its logistics tail and thereby makes it more survivable. Precision weapons, however, are scarce and can be defeated by EW. To enable kill chains to function at the speed of relevance, EW for attack, protection and direction finding is a critical element of modern combined arms operations. Sequencing fires to disrupt EW and create windows of opportunity for precision effects is critical and creates training requirements. In modern warfare, the electromagnetic spectrum is unlikely to be denied, but it is continually disrupted, and forces must endeavour to gain advantage within it.

For land forces, the pervasive ISTAR on the modern battlefield and the layering of multiple sensors at the tactical level make concealment exceedingly difficult to sustain. Survivability is often afforded by being sufficiently dispersed to become an uneconomical target, by moving quickly enough to disrupt the enemy’s kill chain and thereby evade engagement, or by entering hardened structures. Shell scrapes and hasty defences can increase immediate survivability but also risk the force becoming fixed by fire while precision fires and specialist munitions do not leave these positions survivable. Forces instead should prioritise concentrating effects while only concentrating mass under favourable conditions – with an ability to offer mutual support beyond line of sight – and should give precedence to mobility as a critical component of their survivability.

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Royal United Services Institute

Very interesting analysis, I look forward to reading more of these types of papers in the future as lessons learned are developed.

I think one of the first things the US will do is step up the development of anti-drone technology and focus on developing lethal drone swarms.

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Yes, their numbers of drone losses seem high to me (90%??),

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If a kamikaze drone crashes, does it count as a loss?

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Well seeing as Ukraine is only reporting 89k (a number likely overstated) I'd go with no, but seeing as you are just making shite up why not?

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Not counting Wagnerites and forced Donbas "breakaway" republic conscripts.

At the tactical level, I think we'll see a migration to modular drone technology where one airframe can serve multiple roles, recon, EW, or attack simply by changing out installed modules.

Then all you need is a couple of connexs full of parts and a couple of people to put together mission packages.

Now this. 100's deployed to ME

LINK