re: Hot take on Germany’s invasion of the USSR

Even if the shift were marginal, I believe that in this hypothetical scenario, the Royal Navy would have placed greater emphasis on producing escort vessels and accelerating advancements in ASW technology and tactics compared to what occurred in our actual timeline. While you are correct that the Royal Navy had global commitments, it would have been nearly impossible to overlook a large-scale submarine buildup taking place in its own strategic waters, orchestrated by the primary continental adversary.

Given the lessons learned from WWI’s unrestricted submarine warfare, British naval planners would have recognized the existential threat posed by a concentrated U-boat force far earlier. Even a relatively minor adjustment—such as reducing the King George V-class battleship order from five to four—would have freed up significant resources, allowing for the construction of more escort vessels than were available at the outbreak of war.

In short, I agree.

You make a great point about institutional inertia. Battleship-focused admirals absolutely shaped naval planning, and ASW wasn’t seen as a priority early on. The naval treaties also played a huge role in pushing carriers forward when battleship numbers were limited.

That said, I think Britain’s build strategy still responded to what it saw as the biggest threat. The KGV-class battleships were a direct response to Germany’s surface fleet, especially after the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. If Germany had gone all-in on U-boats instead, I do think we’d have seen a shift toward escorts and ASW development earlier, rather than assuming fleet engagements with German battleships were the bigger concern.

The RN would’ve built capital ships no matter what, but probably not five KGVs if there was no German surface threat. Curious to hear how much flexibility you think the RN really had to pivot in the late 30s

All right. We’re just going in circles repeating the same thing. I’ve got work so I’ll agree to disagree with you.

What? Expulsion of the bones?

I don’t think going for the oil fields would matter because didn’t the Russians trash it by going scorched earth?

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That’s how I do it in HOI4 and it works every time.

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All kinds of stuff here.

1. Yes, extermination of Jews, Slavs, and gypsies closed off a source of manpower for industry and military and did not engender any goodwill from the populace, so this was highly detrimental. Japan made the same mistake.

2. A lot of back and forth on the UBoats. The intention was to have a Navy that could fight Great Britain. Problem was the war came too early. Raeder still committed his surface forces early on. Riverplate saw Scharnhorst go down. The Norwegian campaign lost 10 destroyers, 2 light cruisers and a heavy cruiser. These early losses in the surface fleet coupled with the early defeat of France and upcoming operation Barbarossa meant materials earmarked for the Navy went towards Army and Air Force as well as switch of focus to UBoats, which aren't as resource intensive as a large surface fleet. There were only 57 U Boats at the beginning of hostilities, so it isn't surprising the RN was initially more concerned with what was viewed as a rising surface fleet. Neither arm of the Kreigsmarine was ready for war when it happened. Agreed that a heavy focus on U Boats at the outset would have been the better play, but I'd argue the RN would have pivoted quickly to ASW just like the did IRL. The U Boats had a happy time when Britain was still ramping up their ASW; when this became more effective, they went after shipping near US waters. The US refused to listen to advice from the RN, so there was another happy time until the US got better at ASW. The UBoats basically went from weak link to weak link until there were none left to find, thought Enigma was unbreakable, and didn't keep up with technology. An early focus on UBoats would also have to reconcile those issues.

3. As for Barbarossa, Hitler ended up with one of the worst allies ever in Italy. Italy stupidly backed Franco in Spain. They spent a lot of money there and sent a lot of equipment in return for empty promises. Then there was their Ethiopian expedition which was worthless. Perhaps if they had not embarked on these, Italy may have had more resources to effectively fight in the Mediterranean. This is still suspect considering the poor performance of their generals, but they would have been better off all the same. As someone noted, the Italian boondoggle in Greece is what threw off the Barbarossa timeline. This gave Germany a very narrow window to get to Moscow, one that they had zero time for all the side distractions on the way there. It was Russia that misplayed the whole thing badly. Stalin had no problem agreeing to the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact. He was willing to give Germany the resources it needed to defeat France while he marshalled his forces (his massive officer purge didn't help things). He figured Germany would exhaust themselves against what was thought to be one of the best armies in the world at the time, then he could make his move. He didn't count on France falling so quickly. Despite warnings from his subordinates, Stalin kept up the Soviet end of the pact and left his best formations as they were on the frontiers. That it was such a near thing even with their missteps, it begs the question could Germany have reached Moscow had they started early instead of subduing Greece.

Ultimately, this was a war the Axis could not win. Their success was predicated on early conquests that would not see the Allies standing by long enough to let them build up and solidify these. Japan was never going to accept US demands prior to Pearl, so that conflict was happening. Germany may have bought themselves a little more time had they not declared war on the US, but I think US involvement was a forgone conclusion unless the US refused to supply Britain and Russia which was likely never going to be the case. Even with their conquests, they started way behind in terms of native resources and industrial base.

You need to read a history book. Minimum was 6 million. Or listen to interviews of the survivors. Or visit a concentration camp.

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People taking their current positions and translating them to historical events are dumb

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Well considering that until Dec. 7, 1941, something like 70% of Americans were against getting involved, I’d say that my line of thinking is not without merit.