Jackson: states have power over the 1st amendment when it comes to medical professionals

Her intelligence level is an embarrassment…. what a moron.

I’ve said it at least 50 times on here : the day we have 5 Kentajis on the Court is the day things absolutely go hot on our soil. There would have been enough crossover votes to impeach her several decades ago, I believe.

Tops in her DEI class

quote:

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…the Court’s opinion is unprincipled, unworkable…

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If I’m one of the other eight justices in the majority, I’m either laughing or insulted or both. (By the way, judging from the tone of the entire dissent, her law clerks must be really something.)

The majority opinion attacks her pretty harshly.

1. On Viewpoint Discrimination and Scrutiny
• “Contra, post, at 8, 20–21 (JACKSON, J., dissenting) (contending that ‘heightened scrutiny . . . is not warranted’ even while admitting that Colorado’s law discriminates based on viewpoint).” (p. 14)?? Highlights the majority’s view that the dissent concedes viewpoint discrimination but inconsistently resists strict scrutiny.
• “Colorado and the dissent may believe that the First Amendment should carry ‘far less salience’ for the Nation’s millions of ‘medical professionals’ than for everyone else. … They may believe that state-imposed orthodoxies in speech pose few dangers and many benefits in this field (and who knows what others). But their policy is not the First Amendment’s.” (p. 14)

2. On “Shoehorning” the Law as Regulation of Conduct (Rather Than Speech)
• “The dissent pursues a similar theme, insisting that Colorado has only incidentally prohibited Ms. Chiles’s speech because the law’s ‘primary objective’ is to regulate medical treatments.” (p. 15)
• “Her speech does not become conduct just because a government says so or because it may be described as a ‘treatment’ or ‘therapeutic modality.’ The First Amendment is no word game, and ‘the exercise of constitutional rights’ cannot be circumscribed ‘by mere labels.’” (p. 11-12)
• “At bottom, Colorado and the dissent fundamentally misconceive this Court’s speech-incident-to-conduct precedents.” (p. 16)

3. On Historical Traditions and Creating a “First Amendment Free Zone”
• “This argument stumbles out of the gate, for it proceeds at far too high a level of generality. From three specific sets of laws, Colorado and the dissent ask us to recognize a cavernous ‘First Amendment Free Zone,’ … one in which States may censor almost any speech they consider ‘substandard care.’ It is, once more, an approach our precedents already foreclose.” (p. 19)
• “The Court’s precedents foreclose aggregating discrete traditions of content-based regulations to sustain some new and broader category of lesser-protected speech.” (p. 18-19)
• “The dissent pursues the same point citing the same authorities. … This argument stumbles out of the gate…” (p. 19)

4. On Licensing, Informed Consent, and Malpractice Analogies
• “Colorado’s suggestion that the statute represents a traditional law licensing of medicine fails because … licensing laws have traditionally addressed qualifications, not dictated a professional’s point of view.” (p. 19-20)
• “Colorado’s analogy to informed-consent laws fails because such laws regulate speech only incident to separate physical conduct … whereas Colorado’s law as applied to Ms. Chiles seeks to silence a viewpoint she wishes to express.” (p. 20-21)
• “Colorado’s invocation of traditional tort claims for malpractice fails because malpractice actions require exacting proof of injury … ‘provid[ing] breathing room for protected speech,’ whereas Colorado’s law threatens fines, probation, and loss of license simply for expressing a particular view.” (p. 21-22)

5. On Deference to Medical Consensus / Standards of Care
• “Consider, too, where the State and dissent’s logic leads. Not long ago, many medical experts … considered homosexuality a mental disorder. On the view Colorado and the dissent advance, a law adopted during that era prohibiting counselors from engaging in the ‘substandard care’ of affirming their clients’ homosexuality would have been subject to only rational-basis or intermediate-scrutiny review—and likely upheld. … Today, tomorrow, and forever, too, any professional speech that deviates from ‘current beliefs about the safety and efficacy of various medical treatments’ could be silenced with relative ease. … Fortunately, that is not the world the First Amendment envisions for us.” (p. 22)
• “Licensed professionals ‘have a host of good-faith disagreements’ about the ‘prudence’ and ‘ethics’ of various practices in their fields. … Medical consensus … is not static; it evolves and always has. A prevailing standard of care may reflect what most practitioners believe today, but it cannot mark the outer boundary of what they may say tomorrow. … [T]he people lose whenever the government transforms prevailing opinion into enforced conformity.” (p. 22, quoting NIFLA)

In a land full of left-wing loons in positions of power, she just might be the dumbest and most clueless. It's truly a stain on this nation that she is sitting on the Supreme Court.

Then again, what can you expect from a brain-dead bimbo who once said, "How do I know what a woman is? I'm not a biologist." (Although, in hindsight I'm now a little surprised that this complete idiot even knew what a biologist was).

What a great ruling to issue on "Trans Day of Visibility!"