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re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Posted on 3/20/25 at 3:29 pm to John Barron
Posted on 3/20/25 at 3:29 pm to John Barron
Posted on 3/20/25 at 4:11 pm to John Barron
Ukraine has lost over 80% of the equipment sent to them since 2024. Amazing incompetence by their weak military.
This post was edited on 3/20/25 at 4:12 pm
Posted on 3/20/25 at 4:20 pm to texag7
And despite Ukraine’s incompetence, Russia hasnt been able to subdue them. What does that say about Russias competence?
Posted on 3/20/25 at 4:33 pm to Chromdome35
quote:
And despite Ukraine’s incompetence, Russia hasnt been able to subdue them. What does that say about Russias competence?
Finest military in the world and they've only become better since this all started.
Posted on 3/20/25 at 4:37 pm to cypher
Posted on 3/20/25 at 4:39 pm to cypher
Posted on 3/20/25 at 4:44 pm to John Barron
Posted on 3/20/25 at 5:00 pm to Chromdome35
quote:
And despite Ukraine’s incompetence, Russia hasnt been able to subdue them. What does that say about Russias competence?
Look at what we know;
Russia a top four economy
They out produce NATO 3-1
Help from allies
A stunning secret missile
A recent stunning victory in Kursk where Ukrainian elite troops were surrounded and crushed
Before that a crushing victory in Bakmuth
A huge advantage in manpower.
A 10-1 advantage in artillery.
So why are we in month into year four of this war? Why are the Christians having such a hard time? By all accounts the bungling Ukrainians should be getting crushed by the brilliant leadership of Putin.
This post was edited on 3/20/25 at 5:08 pm
Posted on 3/20/25 at 5:04 pm to doubleb
You missed one, Russia is out-producing NATO 3 to 1
We all know why Russia hasn't won yet...They aren't really trying.
We all know why Russia hasn't won yet...They aren't really trying.
Posted on 3/20/25 at 5:10 pm to Chromdome35
quote:
You missed one, Russia is out-producing NATO 3 to 1 We all know why Russia hasn't won yet...They aren't really trying.
Thxs, I corrected my mistake.
I think Putin is playing 36D chess and is deliberately trying to lure NATO into a trap and take em all out with his secret missiles.
Posted on 3/20/25 at 5:13 pm to Chromdome35
Its as I feared, zelensky keeps dragging his feet and Russia will soon have Odessa as well. Lets just hope they stop there and zelensky comes to his senses.
Posted on 3/20/25 at 6:14 pm to trinidadtiger
Russian ships are too afraid to come near for an amphibious landing plus their landing vessels are groping the bottom of the waters around Crimea.
Posted on 3/20/25 at 6:25 pm to Chromdome35
quote:
We all know why Russia hasn't won yet.
Incorrect. I don't know why you guys continue to try and ignore the fact that Russia is fighting against the NATO war machine that has contributed 300 billion plus in 3 years. I am actually shocked NATO has not wrapped this up after year 2. The strongest and biggest military alliance in Human History is having trouble against a country that can't build anything and has the economy the size of New Jersey according to you guys. Grok 3 agrees
"Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort against a Ukraine heavily supported by NATO can be attributed to a combination of military, economic, and strategic factors.
While NATO has provided Ukraine with significant aid—coordinating 99% of its military assistance, including advanced weaponry, training, and over €100 billion in support and aid—Russia has leveraged its own strengths to endure the conflict.
Militarily, Russia maintains a substantial advantage in manpower and resources. With a population over three times that of Ukraine, Russia has not fully mobilized its forces, relying instead on a mix of professional soldiers, conscripts, and volunteers, bolstered by foreign fighters from allies like North Korea. This contrasts with Ukraine, which has fully mobilized and suffered significant losses, straining its human resources. Russia’s military-industrial base, though stressed, has ramped up production, supported by imports of dual-use materials from countries like China, allowing it to sustain equipment losses. Its strategy emphasizes attrition, using artillery and fortified positions to grind down Ukrainian forces, accepting high casualties—estimated in the tens of thousands—as part of its approach, which differs from NATO’s focus on precision and minimizing losses.
Economically, Russia has defied Western expectations of collapse under sanctions. It continues to generate around $400 billion annually from energy exports, redirecting oil and gas sales to Asia, particularly China and India. This revenue funds its war machine, while domestic production of drones, missiles, and refurbished Soviet-era equipment keeps its military operational. Ukraine, meanwhile, relies almost entirely on Western aid, with the U.S. alone providing over $150 billion since 2022, yet delays in delivery and political debates in NATO countries have occasionally disrupted its supply lines.
Strategically, Russia benefits from a unified command structure and clear objectives—securing eastern Ukraine and preventing NATO’s eastward expansion—while NATO’s support, though robust, involves coordination among 32 member states with varying priorities. Russia’s alliances with China, Iran, and Belarus provide additional matériel and diplomatic cover, offsetting NATO’s technological edge. Furthermore, Russia’s willingness to escalate rhetorically (e.g., nuclear threats) and its control of 20% of Ukrainian territory, including recent gains in Kursk and Donetsk, bolster its position.
In short, Russia has endured by leveraging its numerical and industrial depth, economic resilience, and geopolitical partnerships, countering NATO’s advanced support to Ukraine with a war of attrition that plays to its strengths. Factoring in the Sanctions placed on Russia for the last three years it truly is impressive how strongly Russia has performed."
Posted on 3/20/25 at 6:51 pm to John Barron
According to Grok 3 (bolding at the end added by me). You should include the prompt that generated your response.
Question:
How big a factor has corruption and incompetence been in Russias inability to defeat Ukraine after 3 years
Answer:
Corruption and incompetence have been substantial factors in Russia’s inability to defeat Ukraine after three years of war, undermining its military effectiveness at every level—from strategic planning to battlefield execution. These issues have eroded Russia’s theoretical advantages in manpower, equipment, and resources, turning what was meant to be a swift campaign into a protracted struggle.
Corruption has long plagued Russia’s military-industrial complex and defense establishment. Before the war, billions of dollars allocated for modernization were siphoned off through embezzlement, kickbacks, and fraudulent contracts. For instance, high-profile cases revealed by Russian whistleblowers and defectors show that funds meant for advanced weaponry—like the T-14 Armata tank—were mismanaged, leaving production stalled or incomplete. Instead of a cutting-edge force, Russia entered the war relying heavily on aging Soviet-era equipment, much of it poorly maintained due to pilfered maintenance budgets. Tires on military trucks rotting from neglect and substandard body armor are just a couple of examples that surfaced early in the conflict, directly impacting troop morale and combat readiness.
On the battlefield, this corruption translated into tangible weaknesses. Logistics—a critical component of any large-scale invasion—collapsed under the weight of mismanagement. Fuel and food shortages plagued Russian units within days of the 2022 invasion, with reports of soldiers abandoning vehicles or looting Ukrainian stores for supplies. The assumption that Kyiv would fall quickly led to minimal preparation for sustained operations, a misstep compounded by officers skimming resources for personal gain rather than ensuring operational readiness. Even as the war dragged on, corruption persisted: in 2024, Russian media uncovered schemes where conscripts paid bribes to avoid frontline deployment, further depleting manpower.
Incompetence has been equally damaging, rooted in a rigid, top-down command structure that stifles initiative and adaptability. The initial invasion plan, reportedly micromanaged by Putin and a small circle of loyalists, ignored intelligence warnings of Ukrainian resistance and overestimated Russia’s own capabilities. Early failures—like the botched airborne assault on Hostomel Airport or the 40-mile convoy stalled north of Kyiv—exposed a lack of coordination between units and an inability to adjust tactics on the fly. Mid-level officers, often promoted based on loyalty rather than merit, lacked the training or autonomy to respond effectively to Ukraine’s agile defenses.
This incompetence persisted as the war evolved. Russia’s shift to a war of attrition in the east revealed a reliance on brute force—mass artillery barrages and human-wave assaults—rather than sophisticated strategy. Losses in experienced personnel, including over 2,000 officers by mid-2024, worsened the problem, leaving poorly trained recruits and Wagner Group mercenaries (later reorganized under state control) to fill gaps. Training programs, meant to prepare mobilized troops, were rushed or outright falsified, with some soldiers reporting mere days of instruction before deployment. The result: staggering casualty rates—sometimes exceeding 1,000 per day in 2024 offensives like Avdiivka—reflecting a leadership more focused on pleasing the Kremlin than winning efficiently.
Quantifying the exact impact is tricky, but analysts suggest corruption and incompetence have cost Russia dearly in time, lives, and matériel. A 2023 RAND study estimated that up to 30% of Russia’s pre-war military budget was lost to graft, directly reducing its combat potential. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s ability to exploit these weaknesses—targeting poorly defended supply lines with drones or outmaneuvering inflexible Russian units—has amplified their effect. For example, the 2024 Kursk incursion succeeded partly because Russian border defenses, weakened by diverted funds and shoddy planning, crumbled under pressure.
In short, corruption drained Russia’s resources before the war even began, while incompetence ensured those resources were squandered once fighting started. Together, they’ve turned a supposedly mighty military into a sluggish, brittle force, incapable of overcoming a determined Ukraine despite three years of effort. Without systemic reform—unlikely under the current regime—these self-inflicted wounds will continue to hinder Russia’s prospects.
Question:
How big a factor has corruption and incompetence been in Russias inability to defeat Ukraine after 3 years
Answer:
Corruption and incompetence have been substantial factors in Russia’s inability to defeat Ukraine after three years of war, undermining its military effectiveness at every level—from strategic planning to battlefield execution. These issues have eroded Russia’s theoretical advantages in manpower, equipment, and resources, turning what was meant to be a swift campaign into a protracted struggle.
Corruption has long plagued Russia’s military-industrial complex and defense establishment. Before the war, billions of dollars allocated for modernization were siphoned off through embezzlement, kickbacks, and fraudulent contracts. For instance, high-profile cases revealed by Russian whistleblowers and defectors show that funds meant for advanced weaponry—like the T-14 Armata tank—were mismanaged, leaving production stalled or incomplete. Instead of a cutting-edge force, Russia entered the war relying heavily on aging Soviet-era equipment, much of it poorly maintained due to pilfered maintenance budgets. Tires on military trucks rotting from neglect and substandard body armor are just a couple of examples that surfaced early in the conflict, directly impacting troop morale and combat readiness.
On the battlefield, this corruption translated into tangible weaknesses. Logistics—a critical component of any large-scale invasion—collapsed under the weight of mismanagement. Fuel and food shortages plagued Russian units within days of the 2022 invasion, with reports of soldiers abandoning vehicles or looting Ukrainian stores for supplies. The assumption that Kyiv would fall quickly led to minimal preparation for sustained operations, a misstep compounded by officers skimming resources for personal gain rather than ensuring operational readiness. Even as the war dragged on, corruption persisted: in 2024, Russian media uncovered schemes where conscripts paid bribes to avoid frontline deployment, further depleting manpower.
Incompetence has been equally damaging, rooted in a rigid, top-down command structure that stifles initiative and adaptability. The initial invasion plan, reportedly micromanaged by Putin and a small circle of loyalists, ignored intelligence warnings of Ukrainian resistance and overestimated Russia’s own capabilities. Early failures—like the botched airborne assault on Hostomel Airport or the 40-mile convoy stalled north of Kyiv—exposed a lack of coordination between units and an inability to adjust tactics on the fly. Mid-level officers, often promoted based on loyalty rather than merit, lacked the training or autonomy to respond effectively to Ukraine’s agile defenses.
This incompetence persisted as the war evolved. Russia’s shift to a war of attrition in the east revealed a reliance on brute force—mass artillery barrages and human-wave assaults—rather than sophisticated strategy. Losses in experienced personnel, including over 2,000 officers by mid-2024, worsened the problem, leaving poorly trained recruits and Wagner Group mercenaries (later reorganized under state control) to fill gaps. Training programs, meant to prepare mobilized troops, were rushed or outright falsified, with some soldiers reporting mere days of instruction before deployment. The result: staggering casualty rates—sometimes exceeding 1,000 per day in 2024 offensives like Avdiivka—reflecting a leadership more focused on pleasing the Kremlin than winning efficiently.
Quantifying the exact impact is tricky, but analysts suggest corruption and incompetence have cost Russia dearly in time, lives, and matériel. A 2023 RAND study estimated that up to 30% of Russia’s pre-war military budget was lost to graft, directly reducing its combat potential. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s ability to exploit these weaknesses—targeting poorly defended supply lines with drones or outmaneuvering inflexible Russian units—has amplified their effect. For example, the 2024 Kursk incursion succeeded partly because Russian border defenses, weakened by diverted funds and shoddy planning, crumbled under pressure.
In short, corruption drained Russia’s resources before the war even began, while incompetence ensured those resources were squandered once fighting started. Together, they’ve turned a supposedly mighty military into a sluggish, brittle force, incapable of overcoming a determined Ukraine despite three years of effort. Without systemic reform—unlikely under the current regime—these self-inflicted wounds will continue to hinder Russia’s prospects.
This post was edited on 3/20/25 at 7:00 pm
Posted on 3/20/25 at 7:08 pm to Chromdome35
You mean to say JB only posted part of the story???
Posted on 3/20/25 at 7:08 pm to Chromdome35
Did you really just supply a assessment quoting the RAND Corporation that is a spook infested Deepstate think tank?
quote:
A 2023 RAND study estimated that up to 30% of Russia’s pre-war military budget was lost to graft
Loading Twitter/X Embed...
If tweet fails to load, click here. Posted on 3/20/25 at 7:32 pm to John Barron
No I posted an output from the same AI you quoted. So your Grok output is good and we should all believe it, but my Grok output is flawed. Hypocrite.
Posted on 3/20/25 at 7:38 pm to Chromdome35
quote:
The result: staggering casualty rates—sometimes exceeding 1,000 per day in 2024
That analysis is filled with all sorts of non sense. Where are they getting casualty figures from? The Body Exchange Rate in 2024 has consistently been lopsided in Russia's Favor. Hard Body counts is the only factual information. "Estimates" are complete BS.
Loading Twitter/X Embed...
If tweet fails to load, click here. Posted on 3/20/25 at 7:39 pm to Chromdome35
Well dual reports of ceasefire violations already
LINK
LINK
quote:
Russian Shahed drones have just targeted energy infrastructure near the port city of Odesa Ukraine causing city wide blackouts.
This is a clear violation of the infrastructural partial ceasefire agreed by Putin on Tuesday.
LINK
quote:
Russians report that the Ukrainian Defense Forces have struck the Sudzha gas metering station and a gas pipeline on the border of Russia’s Kursk region and Ukraine’s Sumy region, which carried Russian gas to Europe.
LINK
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