New national security strategy.

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In contrast to the Wolfowitz doctrine the introduction to the new NSS asserts:

After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.

The NSS is based on different consideration:

The questions before us now are: 1) What should the United States want? 2) What are our available means to get it? and 3) How can we connect ends and means into a viable National Security Strategy?

It next lays out principals, priorities and global regions.

The most remarkable point in the new NSS is, in my view, the acceptance of China as a (near) equal competitor.

As Twitter commentator summarized the paper:

“Trump Corollary” to Monroe Doctrine is now the core pillar.

China downgraded from existential threat to economic competitor.

Taiwan deterrence = “ideal” but conditional on allies paying up.

Indo-Pacific secondary, Western Hemisphere + homeland first.

No more democracy crusades, no value imposition abroad.

Tariffs quietly admitted as failure, focus shifts to multilateral pressure.

Biggest shift since 1945: from global cop to fortified hemisphere power.

Allies will be asked to foot the bill while US rebuilds at home.

Fortress America is back.

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Here are the major rhetorical shifts in strategy compared to the previous strategies released during the respective presidencies of Trump (2017) and Biden (2022):

From Global Cop to Regional Hegemon: Unlike Biden’s 2022 NSS (which emphasized alliances and great-power competition) or Trump’s 2017 version (which named China/Russia as revisionists), this document ends US “forever burdens” abroad. It prioritizes the Americas over Eurasia, framing Europe and the Middle East as deprioritized theaters.

Ideological Retreat: Democracy promotion is explicitly abandoned—”we seek peaceful commercial relations without imposing democratic change” (tell that to the Venezuelans). Authoritarians are not judged, and the EU is called “anti-democratic.”

Confrontational Ally Relations: Europe faces scathing criticism for migration, free speech curbs, and “civilizational erasure” risks (e.g., demographic shifts making nations “unrecognizable in 20 years”). The US vows to support “patriotic” European parties resisting this, drawing Kremlin-like rhetoric accusations from EU leaders.

China Policy: Acknowledges failed engagement; seeks “mutually advantageous” ties but with deterrence (e.g., Taiwan as a “priority”). No full decoupling, but restrictions on tech/dependencies.

Multipolar Acceptance: Invites regional powers to manage their spheres (e.g., Japan in East Asia, Arab-Israeli bloc in Gulf), signaling U.S. restraint to avoid direct confrontations.

The NSS represents a seismic shift in America’s approach to NATO, emphasizing “burden-shifting” over unconditional alliance leadership. It frames NATO not as a values-based community but as a transactional partnership where US commitments—troops, funding, and nuclear guarantees—are tied to European allies meeting steep new demands. This “America First” recalibration prioritizes US resources for the Indo-Pacific and Western Hemisphere, de-escalating in Europe to avoid “forever burdens.” Key changes include halting NATO expansion, demanding 5% GDP defense spending by 2035, and restoring “strategic stability” with Russia via a Ukraine ceasefire. While the US reaffirms Article 5 and its nuclear umbrella, it signals potential partial withdrawals by 2027 if Europe fails to step up, risking alliance cohesion amid demographic and ideological critiques of Europe. When Russia completes the defeat of Ukraine the continued existence of NATO will be a genuine concern.

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