re: Ulysses S Grant is the Undisputed GOAT US General

I think Lee wanted the war to end as soon as possible. It may explain the higher death count than Grant.

I believe that Lee thought that dragging the war was certain doom for the confederacy.

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Again, this isn't shown in the casualty rate nor in overall casualties between Lee and Grant

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Go take a look at the casualty rates during the Overland Campaign when Grant went head to head with Lee. Grant suffered many, many more casualties and came under extreme pressure from the Northern public.

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Grant suffered many, many more casualties and came under extreme pressure from the Northern public.

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Grant was also attacking an entrenched army. And in the case of the Wilderness he was attacking through terrain unsuited for offensive warfare.

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Go take a look at the casualty rates during the Overland Campaign when Grant went head to head with Lee.

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I did. The Army of the Potomac suffered roughly 55,000 casualties out of an original force of 124,000 men. That's a casualty rate of forty-four percent. The Army of Northern Virginia suffered an estimated 30,000-35,000 casualties out of an original force of 65,000. That's a casualty rate of between forty-six and fifty-four percent. While Lee inflicted more overall casualties than he took, his losses were heavier proportionally speaking.

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Lee did not have many blunders

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of course there is Picketts Charge. 

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That is one enormous blunder to relegate to a footnote. The entire campaign into the Union was one long drawn out blunder. As stated before, he was great on the battlefield for the most part, but as overall strategist of a war he was actually pretty terrible.

He was a war criminal

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Go take a look at the casualty rates during the Overland Campaign when Grant went head to head with Lee. Grant suffered many, many more casualties and came under extreme pressure from the Northern public.

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Lee suffered casualty rates of upwards of 50% for that campaign, if we are to believe the numbers. And the high casualty rate of the Union also was the result of the more defensive posture of Lee, who suffered from early losses during offensive operations earlier in the war, which were major strategic failures, as in they did not achieve their strategic aims.

Overall, Grant took 154k from all his combined campaigns, over three theaters. He inflicted 191k causalities. In contrast, Lee took 209k casualties, and inflicted 240k, while in a single theater. Given the 4-1 margin the North had in manpower in 1861, the massive losses Lee suffered earlier in the war, such as Antietam, where he lost 31% of his fighting force, should be magnified due to the South's massive disadvantage. Lee lost 39% of his army during the Gettysburg Campaign, an explicitly offensive campaign, and 27% of his army during the Maryland Campaign. The only battle where Grant suffered rates that high were from The Crater, part of the siege of Petersburg, where he suffered 44% casualty rate. His next closest is at Shiloh, where his forces suffered a casualty rate a 19% casualty rate, while inflicting a 23% casualty rate against Johnston.

To be frank, Lee misunderstood the type of war he should have been fighting, and made major miscalculations about what it would have taken for the North to sue for peace. In contrast, Grant immediately understood that technological advances allowed for a new type of war, and he used impressive organizational skill to employ a cogent strategy across tactical, strategic, and operational elements in order to get the enemy to capitulate. Understanding, seemingly immediately, that the train and telegraph made the older way of fighting obsolete, and the new way required a unique way of combining tactical, strategic, and operational elements should be considered revolutionary. To quote John Keegan,

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But in retrospect, great though Grant’s generalship is seen to be, it is his comprehension of the nature of the war, and of what could and could not be done by a general within its defining conditions, that seems the more remarkable.

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That Grant isn't given credit for understanding how warfare had changed, and how his organizational skill isn't regarded as a tremendous achievement is probably due to the same line of historical work from those who accused him of being careless with his men. But a sober analysis should point out that he lost less men during his Vicksburg and Chattanooga Campaigns total than Lee did at Gettysburg. Why isn't Lee regarded as careless when manpower should have been considered more precious to him?

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Why isn't Lee regarded as careless when manpower should have been considered more precious to him?

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I'm assuming this is rhetorical?

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of course there is Picketts Charge.

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Pickett’s charge wasn’t the “aw F__k it… just go” moment it seems to be.

First the artillery barrage went past the lines of the Union entrenched and wound up being next to useless.

Second.. J.E.B Stuart was ordered around the right flank of the Union to attack the rear but was, luckily for the Union, Discovered by Custer and repelled.

Third, there was false intelligence handed down that the Union soldiers were withdrawing because of the artillery barrage and this caused Longstreet to give in and order the charge.

But what probably lost Gettysburg most of all was Lee’s inability to give an order and it be clear and concise. Instead of “take brigade x and x and take that hill”. He gave orders like “hey.. take that hill if at all practical”. He meant take the damn hill. But others heard the orders like “if you see an opening take it”. JEB Stuart was out of position for days 1 and 2 and Longstreet flat denied to make one attack because of it earlier in the battle.

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I'm assuming this is rhetorical?

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Lol. In fact, I don't find evidence for either of them being particularly careless, but the reputation remains for one, absent of evidence, and the same standard isn't applied to the other. I think both were informed by their own experiences and philosophies, and this informed how they wanted to end the war, which was the ultimate goal, and permeated the writings of both.

The important philosophical differences that emerged were firmly rooted in both Lee's and Grant's respective backgrounds. Lee had the better education, and sought a decisive victory over the North, much like Napoleon at Austerlitz and Jena-Auerstedt, as he was heavily exposed to French thinkers during his time at West Point. Lee's adventures northward into the Union were also attempts at trying to deliver something decisive which could sour public opinion, but they were major risks in terms of manpower that Lee felt justified in taking if he could land his own Austerlitz.

Grant's background as a quartermaster and officer under Zachary Taylor was foundational, and though he wasn't regarded as brilliant as Lee, he did have a positive reputation, as described by Confederate colonel (at the time) Richard Ewell, who said "There is one West Pointer, I think in Missouri, little known, and whom I hope the northern people will not find out. I mean Sam Grant. I knew him well at the Academy and in Mexico. I should fear him more than any of their officers I have yet heard of. He is not a man of genius, but he is clear-headed, quick and daring," which was during the very early days of the war, before Grant had earned a commission as the commander of the 21st Illinois. It also is as a succinct description of Grant's qualities as any other, as there are many quotes about his various talents, such as his communication ability, his ability to understand and incorporate new information, and his ability to adapt.

In general, though, I think people get more interested in tactical aspects of warfare, as in the movements of units, rather than the grand strategy aspects that technology has allowed, and the employment of combined strategical elements for the purpose of winning the war. For me there is no easy delineation of any specific aspect of warfare from the politics at play, as expressions of the same will to power which drives human competition in general. You see the politics at play in the correspondence between a general and the commander-in-chief, as Lee asking for manpower from Davis to support his invasion by necessity also entails a political component, as well as having operational effects on other theaters.

Building a fighting force during this period into something "modern," with combined operational and strategic elements and streamlined methods of communication is maybe seen as commonplace now, or rather, isn't described and lauded in popular history books as something both insanely difficult to do, and revolutionary. Grant's great achievement is being the first to see what "modern" was, and building it so seamlessly that into the fabric of his forces that he could execute the scale of operations is amazingly impressive. That isn't a banal achievement. The front of each theater Grant fought in, if combined, stretched from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, a distance that would make his achievements more impressive if he were anywhere else in the world or during any other time period. His work in Vicksburg required immediate understanding of the environment, the operational ability of naval and engineering elements to allow his forces passage from one bank of the river to the other, and the ceaseless work to ensure that Pemberton had no option but to surrender. His doctrine of 'continuous contact' with Lee during the Overland Campaign wasn't done out of disregard for human life, but rather from looking at Lee's earlier successes and realizing that he had to dictate the terms of the engagement to Lee, rather than react pensively as the Union did in earlier engagements of the war, as the best way to win the war.

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Grant was undeniably a great general, probably our greatest. Nathan Bedford Forrest was the most naturally gifted general in US history.

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gave you a downvote for saying probably our greatest.

if Lee were to have had the men and the resources the war would most likely have ended years earlier.