re: SCOTUS Roberts now has authority to appoint new Judges to SCOTUS under AG Garland rule.

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Defend him at every turn

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Where have I defended Jack Smith, ITT?

The only thing I have discussed even tangentially related to him is his appointment, which he had no role in.

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while bashing Judge Cannon.

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I didn't do this either.

I said she's already made one embarrassing decision that the appeals court overturned with extreme prejudice. That's not an opinion, that's a fact.

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You refused to answer a legitimate question honestly

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Wrong.

I rejected the entire premise of it because the premise was ridiculous. Once a premise underpinning an argument is gone there's nothing more to say.

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And you triple down with the ad hom

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That's not an ad hom. Even if it was, you can both dismantle someone and insult them and one has no impact on the validity of the other.

Maybe you'll ineffectually shout strawman! slippery slope! next.

It was actually brought up by Rep. Massie when questioning AG Garland directly and he had no answer for it.

Continue to predictably shill though.

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Where have I defended Jack Smith, ITT?

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There it is. Like clockwork.

Tear down all things conservative or anti-left for 50 fricking pages then throw a fit when someone claims you are shilling. Muh LINK!?!??!??!

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There it is. Like clockwork.

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Again, it is factual to say I have not defended Jack Smith, ITT or said anything partisan, for that matter.

I'm just discussing the actual law.

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Tear down all things conservative or anti-left for 50 fricking pages then throw a fit when someone claims you are shilling

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The primary cite I am using is a Republican-appointed special counsel

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An Executive Agency is not, in fact, equal to the USSC

It's subordinate to both Congress and the President, which are equal to the USSC

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And exactly whey a subordinate executive agency cannot appoint an "Officer of the United States".

Thanks for the reinforcement.

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I lost a lot of respect for Massie for that gotcha attempt.

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Oh no, whatever will he do.

Massie's IQ is at least 100 points higher than yours.

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By citing the case law?

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anyone can do that, loser. In nearly any direction you want to go, as a matter of fact. What have you proven other than you love the sound of your own voice?

OP is a legitimate criticism of the Smith appointment that's being debated by pundits, legal experts, and legislators alot smarter and more experienced than your fat, binge posting arse. Cranking out 30 more pages of verbal masturbation isnt going to change that. You cant whine your way into being right, no matter what your doting mother tells you.

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As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Appointments Clause distinguishes between “principal officers,” who must be nominated by the President with advice and consent of the Senate, and “inferior officers,” who may be appointed by the President alone, or by heads of departments, or by the judiciary, as Congress allows. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670–71 (1988) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976)). Thus, if Special Counsel Mueller is a principal officer, his appointment was in violation of the Appointments Clause because he was not appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate. Binding precedent instructs that Special Counsel Mueller is an inferior officer under the Appointments Clause.

An inferior officer is one “whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). In Edmond, the Supreme Court applied three factors to determine whether an officer was inferior: degree of oversight, final decision-making authority, and removability. Id. at 66366. According to Miller, those considerations point to Special Counsel Mueller being a principal, rather than inferior, officer because the Office of Special Counsel regulations impose various limitations on the Attorney General’s ability to exercise effective oversight of the Special Counsel. But as foreshadowed in this court’s opinion in In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987), a supervisor’s ability to rescind provisions assuring an officer’s independence can render that officer inferior. There, this court recognized that an independent counsel was an inferior officer because his office was created pursuant to a regulation and “the Attorney General may rescind this regulation at any time, thereby abolishing the Office of Independent Counsel.” Id. at 56; see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 721 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

The Attorney General, an officer appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, has authority to rescind at any time the Office of Special Counsel regulations or otherwise render them inapplicable to the Special Counsel. Unlike the independent counsel in Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660–64, whose independence and tenure protection were secured by Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act, Special Counsel Mueller is subject to greater executive oversight because the limitations on the Attorney General’s oversight and removal powers are in regulations that the Attorney General can revise or repeal, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2), (b)(A), (b)(B), (d)(3); absent such limitations, the Attorney General would retain plenary supervisory authority of the Special Counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 509. Furthermore, even if at the time of the appointment of Special Counsel Mueller only the Attorney General could rescind the regulations, the Acting Attorney General could essentially accomplish the same thing with specific regard to Special Counsel Mueller by amending his Appointment Order of May 17, 2017, to eliminate the Order’s good cause limitations on the Special Counsel’s removal (on which Miller focuses particular attention).

In either event, Special Counsel Mueller effectively serves at the pleasure of an Executive Branch officer who was appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 515(a), 516; Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010); Appointment Order (May 17, 2017). The control thereby maintained means the Special Counsel is an inferior officer. See Sealed Case, 829 F.2d at 56–57. Miller’s contention that Special Counsel Mueller is a principal officer under the Appointments Clause thus fails.

The question whether Congress has “by law” vested appointment of Special Counsel Mueller in the Attorney General has already been decided by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 (1974), the Court stated: “[Congress] has also vested in [the Attorney General] the power to appoint subordinate officers to assist him in the discharge of his duties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533.” In acting pursuant to those statutes, the Court held, the Attorney General validly delegated authority to a special prosecutor to investigate offenses arising out of the 1972 presidential election and allegations involving President Richard M. Nixon. Id. Miller contends, unpersuasively, that the quoted sentence in Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694, is dictum because the issue whether the Attorney General had statutory authority to appoint a special prosecutor was not directly presented and the Supreme Court did not analyze the text of the specific statutes. It is true that a statement not necessary to a court’s holding is dictum. See City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 842 (1985); Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721, 722–23 (D.C. Cir. 1962). But Miller misreads Nixon, for the Supreme Court was presented with the question whether a justiciable controversy existed. When the Special Prosecutor issued a subpoena to the President to produce certain recordings and documents, the President moved to quash the subpoena, asserting a claim of executive privilege, id. at 688, and maintained the claim was nonjusticiable because it was “intra-executive” in character, id. at 689. The Supreme Court held there was a justiciable controversy because the regulations issued by the Attorney General gave the Special Prosecutor authority to contest the President’s invocation of executive privilege during the investigation. Id. at 695–97. In this analysis, the Attorney General’s statutory authority to issue the regulations was a necessary antecedent to determining whether the regulations were valid, and, therefore, was necessary to the decision that a justiciable controversy existed. The Supreme Court’s quoted statement regarding the Attorney General’s power to appoint subordinate officers is, therefore, not dictum. Moreover, under this court’s precedent, “carefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative.” United States v. Fields, 699 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

Furthermore, in Sealed Case, 829 F.2d at 52–53, this court recognized that the statutory scheme creating the Department vests authority in the Attorney General to appoint inferior officers to investigate and to prosecute matters with a level of independence. There, the Attorney General appointed an independent counsel and promulgated regulations to create an office to investigate whether Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North and other officials violated federal criminal law in connection with the shipment or sale of military arms to Iran and the transfer or diversion of funds connected to any sales (referred to as the Iran/Contra matter). The Attorney General also authorized the independent counsel to prosecute any violations of federal criminal laws uncovered during investigation of the Iran/Contra matter. Id. at 52. North refused to comply with a grand jury subpoena, arguing that the independent counsel’s appointment was invalid. Id. at 54–55. This court disagreed:

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In case anyone wants to read the actual law and precedent involved in this discussion.