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On this date 155 years ago....
Posted on 5/6/19 at 10:59 am
Posted on 5/6/19 at 10:59 am
The Union Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia are both reeling from the bloody first day of the Battle of the Wilderness. Thousands lay dead and wounded on the field yet the first day's fight was inconclusive. The high commands of both armies now pour over their maps to decide what the next move will be.
Grant believes that the Confederate lines are in disarray after the confusing fighting on day one. He calculates that A.P. Hill's line is the weak point of Lee's army and thinks a massive assault by Hancock's II Corps will break Hill's lines and force the Confederate army to retreat from the field. Kick off for the attack is scheduled for 5 AM.
On the other side, Robert E. Lee makes his first mistake of the campaign. Grant had correctly surmised that Lee's army is disorganized. But instead of re-organizing his lines on the evening of May 5, Lee chooses instead to let Hill's men rest behind their breastworks. Longstreet and his corps of infantry were now only 10 miles away and Lee believed he would be able to arrive on the field before dawn. Once that happened, Lee would have Longstreet reinforce Hill and then shift Hill's lines to the left to cover some of the ground between his divided forces.
Longstreet, however, calculated that there was time to allow his men (who had been marching all day) to rest. The march did not resume until after midnight and in the darkness, the columns lost their way on multiple occasions. Thus, as the first rays of sunlight began to appear over the horizon, Longstreet's men were still not in position.
The second day's fighting opened at 4:45 AM when Ewell's men renewed their attack on Union-held positions along the Orange Turnpike. This attack quickly became bogged down, however, by ferocious counterattacks from the Union V and VI Corps. At 5 AM, on the opposite end of the line, Hancock's assault on the Brock Road went forward on schedule. 20,000 screaming Union soldiers surged forward from the woods and smashed into Hill's exhausted troops.
The Battle of the Wilderness - May 6, 1864 (Hancock's attack)
Almost immediately the Confederate soldiers began to melt away and Lee's line was under the very real danger of complete collapse. It was in this moment, as the Confederate cause looked quite dim, that Lee rode forward astride his faithful horse Traveler to spurn his retreating soldiers back into the fight. Many took up Lee's call and formed back into line. It was around this same time that the first units of Longstreet's corps began to arrive on the field. Leading the way was Brigadier General John Gregg's 800-man Texas Brigade.
Seeing Longstreet's soldiers arriving on the field, Lee became very excited, waving his hat over his head and shouting, "Texans always move them!" His blood now completely up, Lee began to move forward with this lead brigade. The Texans immediately became horrified and shouted, "General Lee! To the rear!" One man even moved forward and grabbed the reins to Lee's horse, refusing to allow the commanding general to take another step forward. Lee eventually relented and obeyed the calls from his soldiers to fall back to his headquarters tent. While this little drama played out near the Widow Tapp farmstead, Longstreet's attack rolled forward.
The Battle of the Wilderness - May 6, 1864 (Longstreet saves the day)
Hancock's men had become disorganized after their assault went forward earlier in the morning and were unable to resist Longstreet's organized counter-attack. The Union soldiers fell back several hundred yards from the Widow Tapp farmstead. The Texans who had confronted Lee and yelled for him to go to the rear paid a high price in the assault as only 250 of the original 800 emerged from the fight unscathed.
At around 10 AM, Longstreet's chief engineer found the general and told him that he had discovered an unfinished railroad bed south of the Orange Plank Road that offered easy access to the left flank of the Union army. Longstreet assigned his aide, Moxley Sorrel, with the task of directing four fresh brigades to the unfinished railroad cut to attack Hancock's Union troops on the flank.
The attack went forward at 11 AM. Sorrel's men sprung from their relative protection at the railroad cut while, at the same time, Longstreet renewed his assault on the forward positions of Hancock's line, the Union men having no idea of the impending threat on their left.
The Battle of the Wilderness - May 6, 1864 (Longstreet's flank attack)
Longstreet's flank attack rolled up Hancock's line, as the Union general wrote some years later, "like a wet blanket." Several hours before, it seemed as if the Confederate line was near minutes from collapse, now it was the Union position that looked like it was about to launch a full retreat from the field. The attack from front and flank drove Hancock's men back to the Brock Road.
Longstreet rode forward on the Orange Plank Road with several of his officers and staff members. Some of Mahone's soldiers, returning triumphantly from the front line, mistook this group of brass for Union cavalry and opened fire. Longstreet was felled from his horse by a severe wound to the neck. Another Confederate officer, Micah Jenkins, was killed outright.
Longstreet was still conscious and successfully managed to turn over command to Charles Field, extolling him to press their advantage gained on the Orange Plank Road. But without Longstreet's leadership, the Confederate attack fell into confusion and then stalled completely before a new position erected by Hancock's II Corps along the Brock Road.
The loss of Longstreet was a crippling blow to Lee and the general would not be able to return to the field until October. Ironically enough, Longstreet had been felled by friendly fire not four miles from where Stonewall Jackson had been mortally wounded by his own men just over one year before.
Grant believes that the Confederate lines are in disarray after the confusing fighting on day one. He calculates that A.P. Hill's line is the weak point of Lee's army and thinks a massive assault by Hancock's II Corps will break Hill's lines and force the Confederate army to retreat from the field. Kick off for the attack is scheduled for 5 AM.
On the other side, Robert E. Lee makes his first mistake of the campaign. Grant had correctly surmised that Lee's army is disorganized. But instead of re-organizing his lines on the evening of May 5, Lee chooses instead to let Hill's men rest behind their breastworks. Longstreet and his corps of infantry were now only 10 miles away and Lee believed he would be able to arrive on the field before dawn. Once that happened, Lee would have Longstreet reinforce Hill and then shift Hill's lines to the left to cover some of the ground between his divided forces.
Longstreet, however, calculated that there was time to allow his men (who had been marching all day) to rest. The march did not resume until after midnight and in the darkness, the columns lost their way on multiple occasions. Thus, as the first rays of sunlight began to appear over the horizon, Longstreet's men were still not in position.
The second day's fighting opened at 4:45 AM when Ewell's men renewed their attack on Union-held positions along the Orange Turnpike. This attack quickly became bogged down, however, by ferocious counterattacks from the Union V and VI Corps. At 5 AM, on the opposite end of the line, Hancock's assault on the Brock Road went forward on schedule. 20,000 screaming Union soldiers surged forward from the woods and smashed into Hill's exhausted troops.
The Battle of the Wilderness - May 6, 1864 (Hancock's attack)
Almost immediately the Confederate soldiers began to melt away and Lee's line was under the very real danger of complete collapse. It was in this moment, as the Confederate cause looked quite dim, that Lee rode forward astride his faithful horse Traveler to spurn his retreating soldiers back into the fight. Many took up Lee's call and formed back into line. It was around this same time that the first units of Longstreet's corps began to arrive on the field. Leading the way was Brigadier General John Gregg's 800-man Texas Brigade.
Seeing Longstreet's soldiers arriving on the field, Lee became very excited, waving his hat over his head and shouting, "Texans always move them!" His blood now completely up, Lee began to move forward with this lead brigade. The Texans immediately became horrified and shouted, "General Lee! To the rear!" One man even moved forward and grabbed the reins to Lee's horse, refusing to allow the commanding general to take another step forward. Lee eventually relented and obeyed the calls from his soldiers to fall back to his headquarters tent. While this little drama played out near the Widow Tapp farmstead, Longstreet's attack rolled forward.
The Battle of the Wilderness - May 6, 1864 (Longstreet saves the day)
Hancock's men had become disorganized after their assault went forward earlier in the morning and were unable to resist Longstreet's organized counter-attack. The Union soldiers fell back several hundred yards from the Widow Tapp farmstead. The Texans who had confronted Lee and yelled for him to go to the rear paid a high price in the assault as only 250 of the original 800 emerged from the fight unscathed.
At around 10 AM, Longstreet's chief engineer found the general and told him that he had discovered an unfinished railroad bed south of the Orange Plank Road that offered easy access to the left flank of the Union army. Longstreet assigned his aide, Moxley Sorrel, with the task of directing four fresh brigades to the unfinished railroad cut to attack Hancock's Union troops on the flank.
The attack went forward at 11 AM. Sorrel's men sprung from their relative protection at the railroad cut while, at the same time, Longstreet renewed his assault on the forward positions of Hancock's line, the Union men having no idea of the impending threat on their left.
The Battle of the Wilderness - May 6, 1864 (Longstreet's flank attack)
Longstreet's flank attack rolled up Hancock's line, as the Union general wrote some years later, "like a wet blanket." Several hours before, it seemed as if the Confederate line was near minutes from collapse, now it was the Union position that looked like it was about to launch a full retreat from the field. The attack from front and flank drove Hancock's men back to the Brock Road.
Longstreet rode forward on the Orange Plank Road with several of his officers and staff members. Some of Mahone's soldiers, returning triumphantly from the front line, mistook this group of brass for Union cavalry and opened fire. Longstreet was felled from his horse by a severe wound to the neck. Another Confederate officer, Micah Jenkins, was killed outright.
Longstreet was still conscious and successfully managed to turn over command to Charles Field, extolling him to press their advantage gained on the Orange Plank Road. But without Longstreet's leadership, the Confederate attack fell into confusion and then stalled completely before a new position erected by Hancock's II Corps along the Brock Road.
The loss of Longstreet was a crippling blow to Lee and the general would not be able to return to the field until October. Ironically enough, Longstreet had been felled by friendly fire not four miles from where Stonewall Jackson had been mortally wounded by his own men just over one year before.
3
Posted on 5/6/19 at 11:00 am to RollTide1987
On the opposite end of the line, a drama had been playing out for most of the day that historians would debate for years to come. One of Lee's ablest commanders, John B. Gordon, had scouted the right flank of the Union position and found it vulnerable to attack. He had gone to his division commander, Jubal Early, seeking permission to launch an attack but was denied. For much of the day, there was only light skirmishing in this sector as the main event roared further south.
Gordon, writing after the war, says that it was the personal intervention of Robert E. Lee himself that finally saw his attack on the Union right flank go forward. Historians dispute Gordon's account but, nevertheless, Ewell did approve Gordon's plan of attack shortly before dark.
The Battle of the Wilderness - May 6, 1864 (Late afternoon actions)
Gordon's assault went forward and smashed headlong into inexperienced soldiers from New York who, until May 1864, were manning heavy artillery positions in the defenses around Washington DC. These Union soldiers fell back in disarray but darkness and heavy foliage finally forced Gordon to halt his advance. Union reinforcements arrived shortly thereafter and extended the army's flank to the Germanna Plank Road. Gordon would argue until his dying day that had his assault been allowed to go forward when he initially wanted it to, he could have crushed the Union right and forced Grant and Meade back to the Rapidan River.
At Union army headquarters, located around the Wilderness Tavern, staff members could clearly make out the sounds of battle to their north. When word came that the Union right was on the verge of complete collapse, panic set in amongst some of the staff officers. Grant, however, remained cool and collected. One obviously very panicked officer accosted Grant and said: "General Grant, this is a crisis that cannot be looked upon too seriously. I know Lee's methods well by past experience; he will throw his whole army between us and the Rapidan, and cut us off completely from our communications."
Grant took the cigar he was smoking out of his mouth and responded in typical Grant fashion: "Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do."
Grant's collectiveness was, in the end, justified. Gordon's attack was halted and the fighting died away as night fell over the battlefield. The survivors of the day's battle worked long into the night erecting earthworks for protection against what they were sure was another day of brutal combat. While there would be some skirmishing on May 7, the Battle of the Wilderness was essentially over.
It had been one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War. Combined casualties for the two-day fight approached 30,000. The Union army had suffered the majority of those losses, as the official tally for the Army of the Potomac reached 17,666. Of that number, 2,246 men were listed as killed in action. A further 12,037 were wounded and another 3,383 were listed as missing or captured.
Due to shoddy record keeping, estimates of Confederate losses vary widely. Some historians put Lee's casualties at no more than 7,000 while others go as high as 11,400. 155 years later, the consensus for Confederate casualties at the Wilderness lies right above 11,000. Of that number, nearly 1,500 were believed to have been killed, nearly 7,900 were wounded, and a further 1,700 were either captured or listed as missing.
So who won the Battle of the Wilderness? When analyzing a battle/campaign, historians always look at three different outcomes: the tactical, the operational, and the strategic. Tactically, most historians agree the battle was a draw. Neither side gained any significant advantage over the other. Though there are some historians who argue for a minor tactical victory for Lee and his Confederates. They successfully managed to turn both Union flanks and inflicted more casualties than they received.
Operationally, however, the victory goes to the Union army. Lee's operational objective was to keep the Army of the Potomac above the Rapidan River. That army had crossed south of the Rapidan on May 4 and remained south of the river on the evening of May 6/morning of May 7. This victory for Grant and Meade would become more apparent by what they do on the evening of May 7.
And that leads us into the strategic. The Battle of the Wilderness was definitely a strategic Union victory. While they may have failed to decisively defeat Lee's forces in the battle, by disengaging from the field on May 7 and trying once again to get around the right flank of Lee's army, Grant and Meade were sending a message to both the North and the South that this was it. This was going to be THE campaign of the war. There would be no more retreats, no more setbacks. This was becoming a war of attrition and in that kind of war, the South was doomed to ultimate defeat.
But that is a story for tomorrow...
Gordon, writing after the war, says that it was the personal intervention of Robert E. Lee himself that finally saw his attack on the Union right flank go forward. Historians dispute Gordon's account but, nevertheless, Ewell did approve Gordon's plan of attack shortly before dark.
The Battle of the Wilderness - May 6, 1864 (Late afternoon actions)
Gordon's assault went forward and smashed headlong into inexperienced soldiers from New York who, until May 1864, were manning heavy artillery positions in the defenses around Washington DC. These Union soldiers fell back in disarray but darkness and heavy foliage finally forced Gordon to halt his advance. Union reinforcements arrived shortly thereafter and extended the army's flank to the Germanna Plank Road. Gordon would argue until his dying day that had his assault been allowed to go forward when he initially wanted it to, he could have crushed the Union right and forced Grant and Meade back to the Rapidan River.
At Union army headquarters, located around the Wilderness Tavern, staff members could clearly make out the sounds of battle to their north. When word came that the Union right was on the verge of complete collapse, panic set in amongst some of the staff officers. Grant, however, remained cool and collected. One obviously very panicked officer accosted Grant and said: "General Grant, this is a crisis that cannot be looked upon too seriously. I know Lee's methods well by past experience; he will throw his whole army between us and the Rapidan, and cut us off completely from our communications."
Grant took the cigar he was smoking out of his mouth and responded in typical Grant fashion: "Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do."
Grant's collectiveness was, in the end, justified. Gordon's attack was halted and the fighting died away as night fell over the battlefield. The survivors of the day's battle worked long into the night erecting earthworks for protection against what they were sure was another day of brutal combat. While there would be some skirmishing on May 7, the Battle of the Wilderness was essentially over.
It had been one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War. Combined casualties for the two-day fight approached 30,000. The Union army had suffered the majority of those losses, as the official tally for the Army of the Potomac reached 17,666. Of that number, 2,246 men were listed as killed in action. A further 12,037 were wounded and another 3,383 were listed as missing or captured.
Due to shoddy record keeping, estimates of Confederate losses vary widely. Some historians put Lee's casualties at no more than 7,000 while others go as high as 11,400. 155 years later, the consensus for Confederate casualties at the Wilderness lies right above 11,000. Of that number, nearly 1,500 were believed to have been killed, nearly 7,900 were wounded, and a further 1,700 were either captured or listed as missing.
So who won the Battle of the Wilderness? When analyzing a battle/campaign, historians always look at three different outcomes: the tactical, the operational, and the strategic. Tactically, most historians agree the battle was a draw. Neither side gained any significant advantage over the other. Though there are some historians who argue for a minor tactical victory for Lee and his Confederates. They successfully managed to turn both Union flanks and inflicted more casualties than they received.
Operationally, however, the victory goes to the Union army. Lee's operational objective was to keep the Army of the Potomac above the Rapidan River. That army had crossed south of the Rapidan on May 4 and remained south of the river on the evening of May 6/morning of May 7. This victory for Grant and Meade would become more apparent by what they do on the evening of May 7.
And that leads us into the strategic. The Battle of the Wilderness was definitely a strategic Union victory. While they may have failed to decisively defeat Lee's forces in the battle, by disengaging from the field on May 7 and trying once again to get around the right flank of Lee's army, Grant and Meade were sending a message to both the North and the South that this was it. This was going to be THE campaign of the war. There would be no more retreats, no more setbacks. This was becoming a war of attrition and in that kind of war, the South was doomed to ultimate defeat.
But that is a story for tomorrow...
Posted on 5/6/19 at 11:01 am to RollTide1987
Imagine how hot they must have got in those uniforms.
I don't know how they did it.
I don't know how they did it.
Posted on 5/6/19 at 11:30 am to OysterPoBoy
Having re-enacted for some years, I can tell you it gets VERY hot.
Posted on 5/6/19 at 11:32 am to RollTide1987
Good post OP the other crazy thing is the wildfires that were started by all the guns in the thick woods that burned hundreds of men alive. What an absolute hell on earth this must have been.
This post was edited on 5/6/19 at 11:34 am
Posted on 5/6/19 at 11:32 am to OysterPoBoy
quote:
I don't know how they did it.
Neither do I.
Posted on 5/6/19 at 11:34 am to RollTide1987
Aint reading all that shite. Just tell us who won the battle?
Posted on 5/6/19 at 11:44 am to RollTide1987
quote:
Gordon would argue until his dying day that had his assault been allowed to go forward when he initially wanted it to, he could have crushed the Union right and forced Grant and Meade back to the Rapidan River.
The family curse continued when, exactly 125 years later, John Brown Gordon IV would have won state if Coach had put him in.
This post was edited on 5/6/19 at 11:45 am
Posted on 5/6/19 at 11:51 am to RollTide1987
quote:
Gordon would argue until his dying day that had his assault been allowed to go forward when he initially wanted it to, he could have crushed the Union right and forced Grant and Meade back to the Rapidan River.
No lie...my g-g-grandfather was on that right flank.
I'm happy that assault didn't go forward.
This post was edited on 5/6/19 at 11:51 am
Posted on 5/6/19 at 11:56 am to OysterPoBoy
quote:
Imagine how hot they must have got in those uniforms.
I don't know how they did it.
Wool is better in hot weather than you might think. The evaporating sweat has a cooling effect. Not saying it's better than a t shirt, but you're not necessarily going to have a heat stroke.
Posted on 5/6/19 at 1:25 pm to Dead Man Walking
quote:
Just tell us who won the battle?
It was a tactical draw.
Posted on 5/6/19 at 7:53 pm to RollTide1987
Also on this date 155 years ago...
While Grant, Meade, and the Army of the Potomac were squaring off against Robert E. Lee in the Battle of the Wilderness, another Union army was beginning a campaign of its own in central Virginia. The Army of the James, 33,000-strong, and under the command of Benjamin Butler, had disembarked from transports at Bermuda Hundred, VA on May 5th. From here Butler hoped to threaten the Richmond-Petersburg rail line.
On May 6, Confederate Brigadier General Johnson Hagood stopped initial probes by Butler's forces at Port Walthall Junction - a small township on the north bank of the Appomattox River. Butler moved more reinforcements into the area and planned to attack Hagood's forces on the next day.
While Grant, Meade, and the Army of the Potomac were squaring off against Robert E. Lee in the Battle of the Wilderness, another Union army was beginning a campaign of its own in central Virginia. The Army of the James, 33,000-strong, and under the command of Benjamin Butler, had disembarked from transports at Bermuda Hundred, VA on May 5th. From here Butler hoped to threaten the Richmond-Petersburg rail line.
On May 6, Confederate Brigadier General Johnson Hagood stopped initial probes by Butler's forces at Port Walthall Junction - a small township on the north bank of the Appomattox River. Butler moved more reinforcements into the area and planned to attack Hagood's forces on the next day.
Posted on 5/6/19 at 8:56 pm to RollTide1987
This whole campaign would've been wrapped up with half the deaths in half the time if Butler weren't one of the biggest buffoons in an army full of them.
He is a caricature of all the worst things people associate with Union generals in the civil war
-Incompetent
-Fat
-Irrationally arrogant
-Corrupt
-Political animal
-Wasted the lives of his men repeatedly
He is a caricature of all the worst things people associate with Union generals in the civil war
-Incompetent
-Fat
-Irrationally arrogant
-Corrupt
-Political animal
-Wasted the lives of his men repeatedly
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