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re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Posted on 6/8/25 at 8:02 pm to cypher
Posted on 6/8/25 at 8:02 pm to cypher
That's strange...At least Once a Month X ask me to take those Arkose Labs Challenge Bot Test and I don't frequently post there. I am sure heavy users are asked to take that Bot Test more frequently. Your "as high as 80%" is pure fan fiction and sounds like the coping mechanism Grok describes below
Bots on X: Exaggeration or Reality?
Evidence of Bots on X:
Bots and automated accounts have been a persistent issue on social media platforms, including X. Studies and reports, such as those from 2018-2020, estimated that around 5-15% of accounts on Twitter (X’s predecessor) were bots, used for amplifying content, spreading disinformation, or inflating follower counts. However, precise numbers for 2025 are harder to pin down due to X’s evolving and improving moderation policies since its ownership change. Claims of bot prevalence often rely on anecdotal observations or incomplete data, making it difficult to confirm exact figures.
Exaggeration Claims:
Accusations of bot activity can be weaponized. Groups like NAFO, known for their pro-Ukraine, anti-Russian disinformation efforts, often attribute overwhelming online pushback or negative sentiment to bots, particularly when faced with unfavorable narratives. This can serve as a way to dismiss criticism or bad news without engaging with it substantively.
For instance, dismissing dissent as "bot-driven" can be a rhetorical tactic to avoid grappling with genuine user sentiment or inconvenient facts. The pattern of attributing online opposition to bots is a known coping mechanism in polarized online spaces.
NAFO and Coping Mechanisms:
NAFO, a loosely organized group of online activists, uses humor, memes, and trolling to counter Russian propaganda. When faced with setbacks (e.g., unfavorable news about Ukraine or Western support), some NAFO members may lean on the "bot narrative" to explain away overwhelming pro-Russian or anti-Western sentiment on X. This aligns with psychological tendencies to externalize failure or bad news, framing it as artificial interference rather than organic opposition.
Bots on X: Exaggeration or Reality?
Evidence of Bots on X:
Bots and automated accounts have been a persistent issue on social media platforms, including X. Studies and reports, such as those from 2018-2020, estimated that around 5-15% of accounts on Twitter (X’s predecessor) were bots, used for amplifying content, spreading disinformation, or inflating follower counts. However, precise numbers for 2025 are harder to pin down due to X’s evolving and improving moderation policies since its ownership change. Claims of bot prevalence often rely on anecdotal observations or incomplete data, making it difficult to confirm exact figures.
Exaggeration Claims:
Accusations of bot activity can be weaponized. Groups like NAFO, known for their pro-Ukraine, anti-Russian disinformation efforts, often attribute overwhelming online pushback or negative sentiment to bots, particularly when faced with unfavorable narratives. This can serve as a way to dismiss criticism or bad news without engaging with it substantively.
For instance, dismissing dissent as "bot-driven" can be a rhetorical tactic to avoid grappling with genuine user sentiment or inconvenient facts. The pattern of attributing online opposition to bots is a known coping mechanism in polarized online spaces.
NAFO and Coping Mechanisms:
NAFO, a loosely organized group of online activists, uses humor, memes, and trolling to counter Russian propaganda. When faced with setbacks (e.g., unfavorable news about Ukraine or Western support), some NAFO members may lean on the "bot narrative" to explain away overwhelming pro-Russian or anti-Western sentiment on X. This aligns with psychological tendencies to externalize failure or bad news, framing it as artificial interference rather than organic opposition.
2
Posted on 6/8/25 at 8:05 pm to VolSquatch
He should of at least kept his BS AI post believable by posting "as high as 30%" instead he used "80%" which instantly discredits his whole post 
Posted on 6/8/25 at 8:17 pm to John Barron
Posted on 6/8/25 at 8:19 pm to John Barron
"In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian troops advanced beyond the Donetsk region and entered the Dnepropetrovsk region. The Russian Armed Forces crossed the regional border west of Orekhov, which is south of Kotlyarovka.
This offensive could become a turning point, we are talking about a new argument at the negotiating table, as Moscow directly hints at, but also about a dangerous military game of attrition. Medvedev has clearly voiced the logic: if you do not accept the current realities, you will get new ones. The offensive on the Dnipropetrovsk region is precisely an attempt to impose these "new realities".
In military terms, the capture or even threat to the Dnieper and Zaporozhye could cause the collapse of the entire logistics of the Ukrainian army on the southern and part of the eastern front . These are the largest industrial hubs, transport arteries and densely populated centers. Losing control over this region would also open the way to strategic envelopment of Ukraine with a possible offensive on Transnistria and blocking access to the sea.
Against this background, even the fierce battles near Slavyansk and Kramatorsk lose operational significance. Even if these territories are lost, they will not give the Russian Armed Forces a decisive advantage, since the Ukrainian Armed Forces fortifications there were built on the basis of the experience of 2022 and rest against the Barvenkovo ??area.
The vulnerability of the southern front flanks became obvious after the capture of Ocheretino. The loss of the defensive line from Kurakhovo to Ukrainsk effectively opened a bypass route to the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya regions for Russian units . That is where the main reserves of the Ukrainian Armed Forces went, even at the cost of failure on the Kursk bridgehead - which only emphasizes the importance of this area.
Today, it is not just a tactical task that is being solved – a game is being played for a change in the entire configuration of the front. And the closer the Russian troops get to the Dnieper, the more acute the question becomes: will Kiev and the West have enough resources to contain what increasingly resembles not a breakthrough, but a strategic reconfiguration of the entire war."
This offensive could become a turning point, we are talking about a new argument at the negotiating table, as Moscow directly hints at, but also about a dangerous military game of attrition. Medvedev has clearly voiced the logic: if you do not accept the current realities, you will get new ones. The offensive on the Dnipropetrovsk region is precisely an attempt to impose these "new realities".
In military terms, the capture or even threat to the Dnieper and Zaporozhye could cause the collapse of the entire logistics of the Ukrainian army on the southern and part of the eastern front . These are the largest industrial hubs, transport arteries and densely populated centers. Losing control over this region would also open the way to strategic envelopment of Ukraine with a possible offensive on Transnistria and blocking access to the sea.
Against this background, even the fierce battles near Slavyansk and Kramatorsk lose operational significance. Even if these territories are lost, they will not give the Russian Armed Forces a decisive advantage, since the Ukrainian Armed Forces fortifications there were built on the basis of the experience of 2022 and rest against the Barvenkovo ??area.
The vulnerability of the southern front flanks became obvious after the capture of Ocheretino. The loss of the defensive line from Kurakhovo to Ukrainsk effectively opened a bypass route to the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya regions for Russian units . That is where the main reserves of the Ukrainian Armed Forces went, even at the cost of failure on the Kursk bridgehead - which only emphasizes the importance of this area.
Today, it is not just a tactical task that is being solved – a game is being played for a change in the entire configuration of the front. And the closer the Russian troops get to the Dnieper, the more acute the question becomes: will Kiev and the West have enough resources to contain what increasingly resembles not a breakthrough, but a strategic reconfiguration of the entire war."
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Posted on 6/8/25 at 8:20 pm to John Barron
quote:
Grok describes below
Excerpt from the link below...
"The problem with language models like Grok is their inherent struggle with truth. Unlike Google and OpenAI, which have implemented strong guardrails around political queries, Grok was designed without such constraints. Google and OpenAI’s models often deflect sensitive political questions, directing users to reliable sources. In contrast, Grok is trained on tweets—a medium not known for its accuracy—and its content is generated in real-time. "
Misinformation at Scale: Elon Musk's Grok and the Battle for Truth
Do you see the problem?
Posted on 6/8/25 at 8:22 pm to AU86
quote:
Lee B or Cope showing their war face?
Probably Lee B. Cope seems like a crazy old man
Posted on 6/8/25 at 8:29 pm to cypher
quote:
Do you see the problem?
Yes, the problem is you posted up to 80% are bots which was clearly incorrect information. I just told you X gives me a bot test to make sure I am a real user at least once a month and I barely post on the platform. So my real life experience provides an accurate picture. Not some bias article/study from a liberal college that hates Elon Musk and his company. Just like I would never believe anything from the ISW knowing their biases as a Neocon Think Tank whose business is to support War for the MIC
This post was edited on 6/8/25 at 8:31 pm
Posted on 6/8/25 at 8:31 pm to John Barron
quote:
So my real life experience provides an accurate picture.
Cool anecdote.
Grok is trained on tweets.
Anonymous tweets
Probably your tweets
This post was edited on 6/8/25 at 8:37 pm
Posted on 6/8/25 at 8:35 pm to John Barron
quote:
Probably Lee B.
If the Russians only knew what was awaiting them in Lithuania
Posted on 6/8/25 at 9:00 pm to John Barron
quote:
That's strange...At least Once a Month X ask me to take those Arkose Labs Challenge Bot Test and I don't frequently post there. I am sure heavy users are asked to take that Bot Test more frequently.
They do that for accounts based in Russia.
Posted on 6/8/25 at 9:02 pm to Lee B
Posted on 6/8/25 at 9:12 pm to AU86
quote:
If the Russians only knew what was awaiting them in Lithuania's
Coastal Carolina
Posted on 6/8/25 at 9:52 pm to Lee B
Posted on 6/8/25 at 9:55 pm to Lee B
Posted on 6/8/25 at 9:59 pm to Lee B
I run many of these big Russian attacks through Excel to estimate their cost. Russia's annualized defense budget would come to about $550 million a day, and the earlier big attacks likely cost $350 million or so. Maybe this one will exceed $550 million.
Basically, Russia is spending most of their defense budget to kill four to twelve random civilians per attack. Financially, that's like using Su-35s for kamikaze attacks to take out Ukrainian farmers on their tractors. If they maintain this pace, they'll be blowing $120 billion of their defense budget to kill about 4000 civilians, which only increases Ukrainian resolve and international will.
It's like Hitler and his wonder weapons, which just hastened the collapse of Germany because they were hideously expensive weapons that did nothing to halt Allied advances. They just fed Hitler's ego and his desire to strike out in rage, which is likely what the Russian missile attacks are doing for Putin and his cadre.
And given Ukraine's deep strikes on the production chain for the missiles, and it's strikes on the bombers, Russia's supply of them is going to run thin.
Basically, Russia is spending most of their defense budget to kill four to twelve random civilians per attack. Financially, that's like using Su-35s for kamikaze attacks to take out Ukrainian farmers on their tractors. If they maintain this pace, they'll be blowing $120 billion of their defense budget to kill about 4000 civilians, which only increases Ukrainian resolve and international will.
It's like Hitler and his wonder weapons, which just hastened the collapse of Germany because they were hideously expensive weapons that did nothing to halt Allied advances. They just fed Hitler's ego and his desire to strike out in rage, which is likely what the Russian missile attacks are doing for Putin and his cadre.
And given Ukraine's deep strikes on the production chain for the missiles, and it's strikes on the bombers, Russia's supply of them is going to run thin.
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If tweet fails to load, click here.
Posted on 6/8/25 at 10:01 pm to Lee B
Looks like they achieved Hamas level concern for targeted shooting
Posted on 6/8/25 at 11:02 pm to Lee B
Posted on 6/8/25 at 11:06 pm to Lee B
Posted on 6/8/25 at 11:16 pm to Lee B
Posted on 6/8/25 at 11:32 pm to Lee B
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