re: Latest Updates: Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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Do you care to give your prediction on how this war will end?

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Sure. My predictions have not changed from the beginnings of the war. The actual details of what peace in this current conflict look like are less important than understanding the larger geopolitical issues. While the Russian strategy of trying to grind Ukraine down might work in a vacuum, the language of their near neighbors suggests that it would be in the direct security interests of places like Poland to intervene in some fashion if Ukraine were in real danger of faltering. What that might look like is difficult to predict though. The conflict could continue to be relatively low-level for another decade or so, or could transform into several different types of conflicts, from purely economic competition to insurgency to direct open war. But with regards to the broader geopolitical picture, firstly, Eastern Europe will be a geopolitical flashpoint for the next few decades, as Russia has already failed in its ostensible security goals in a very direct way. They have increased their direct border with NATO by a massive amount, have turned the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake and undermined their own ability to reintegrate themselves in Europe for at least a generation. Their entire Western flank is mediated by NATO, which has to represent a broad failure for the nationalist wing of Russian politics. If you described to any security analyst in 2021 what the situation in 2024 looks like, with formerly neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden now fully integrated with NATO, they likely wouldn't believe you. Secondly, the West has to finally admit that the sanctions program they have developed first for Iran and now Russia does not work. What it tends to to is to make those countries more resilient and insulated. The sanctions program was a failure well before it was employed on Russia, with Iran as the example, as the Iranian regime, which was predicted to fall any day now for the past 40 years is as resilient as ever.

Lastly, long-term, the Russian demographics issue is going to present a problem for them. Even before the war, Russia was losing around 1 million ethnic Russians per year through gaps between births and deaths (i.e., due to a prolonged period of sub-replacement TFR) since 1992 or so and the admitted brain drain that has most definitely occurred is going to present its own sorts of problems at some point. Russia isn't exactly alone in this, but the reality is that there hasn't been a specific policy measure which has brought TFR up once that TFR has fallen below replacement. And there have been lots of different efforts employed by Japan, Sweden, and Hungary, among others. Simply asking women to have more children doesn't work. Even banning abortion doesn't seem to work, as countries where abortion was banned, such as Chile and Ireland, had sub-replacement TFR before the abortion ban was eventually repealed. The easy solution is to bring in immigrants and hope to 'Russify' them but that's easier said than done.

In that respect, we will have outright military and security competition in Europe and other places, which governments have already signaled (such as Japan, Poland and Germany with various white papers and defense statements) while all the competing powers, including Russia and Ukraine, have to deal with various demographic crises. The US is better positioned because it can generally integrate immigrants better than Europe can but some of those same demographic problems are at risk here as well.

But in short, the end to this war will not be the end to the broader geopolitical competition. We won't suddenly be able to go back to 2011. The competition will last until the circumstances change or until one of the powers fall and even then, that competition might continue.

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I think

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Now try to do that more than once per month.

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But showing a very real strength and capability boon that is coming down the pipe should increase their standing during the negotiation process.

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From the NY Times, image stolen from X



LINK

That's a two month window, it's reasonable to assume that brigade has taken in excess of 100% casualties. And there probably a dozen points of the line where the fighting is equally intense. With these kinds of losses you'll get weaker over time, not stronger.

Damn dude, I really got under your skin.

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That's a two month window, it's reasonable to assume that brigade has taken in excess of 100% casualties. And there probably a dozen points of the line where the fighting is equally intense. With these kinds of losses you'll get weaker over time, not stronger.

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That makes my point better though. Ukraine likely can't sustain the personnel losses, but if they show that they can at least negate those with increases in firepower via other means then that puts them in a better position than they would be otherwise.

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if they show that they can at least negate those with increases in firepower via other means

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That's impossible though, the Russians for example (per Ukraine) have a 6:1 advantage in drones.

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Ukraine likely can't sustain the personnel losses

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They certainly can't, and while they may be able to fill out units, like the Germans did at the end of World War 2, these units will be of very poor quality. That's probably why the line is bending in the Donbas right now.

Latest news:

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During the last week of July, Russia mounted its largest assaults in eight months in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk region, seizing a string of settlements in an apparent bid to cut off key supply routes and force a mass Ukrainian retreat.

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While it excites many that ukraine is striking oil refineries 100s of miles from the front.....wouldnt it be more prudent to at least pretend to hold the front lines for more than a couple of hours?

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its Ukraine with this capability vs Ukraine without

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Are you thinking about the F16s?

It doesn’t add a new capability, but it does makeup for some of aircraft losses they’ve suffered and it means they still have a platform for AGM-88s and JDAMs when they otherwise wouldn’t. And the Mirages will allow them to keep launching Stormshadows.

Flying near the front lines is risky though, the Russian fighters have shot down Ukrainian aircraft at distances of 200 to 250 km. The Ukrainians will have to fly at extremely low altitudes which in turn will limit the effectiveness and range of their own weapon systems.

There are no miracles here

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That's a two month window, it's reasonable to assume that brigade has taken in excess of 100% casualties. And there probably a dozen points of the line where the fighting is equally intense. With these kinds of losses you'll get weaker over time, not stronger.

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And I bet Russia only lost ten guys, right?