sostan

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I always grow concerned when people are worried about surveillance. Only a guilty person would truly care.

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Seriously? Are you 12yo?

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it was at the Ritz

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Still trashy. Venue and the amount of money spent and/or last name doesn't matter. Trashy is as trashy does.

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Can someone tell me how people like this get in power?

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They get propped up by the dishonest liberal news media with enough stupid people to vote for them.

Preserve them just like Hilliary's emails and Epstien client list, right?

TLDR: Grok's sources are the internet. A bullshite storm littered with prog advocacy organizations, aka NGOs (CCDH) established by prog government politicians, beurocrats and a one world government political agenda.

My question to Grok.
"What is your source, Grok?"

"My response is based on a synthesis of web data and posts on X analyzed up to March 19, 2025. Specific sources include reports and studies on misinformation trends, such as those from the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH) and analyses of X activity by researchers tracking disinformation. However, I don’t rely on a single document—it's a composite from various credible inputs available to me. If you’d like, I can dig deeper into specific posts or reports for you!"

Data Collection: CCDH gathers data directly from social media platforms, often using manual searches or, in some cases, automated tools to scrape publicly available content. For instance, in its studies of hate speech on X, CCDH has reported specific posts or accounts by monitoring trends, keywords, or known actors. It sidesteps reliance on platform algorithms by focusing on user-reported or independently identified content, ensuring its findings reflect what’s visible to the public.

Target Identification: CCDH zeroes in on high-impact spreaders of misinformation or hate—individuals, groups, or accounts with significant reach. A prominent example is the "Disinformation Dozen," where it identified 12 figures responsible for a large share of anti-vaccine content based on their follower counts, engagement metrics, and content output across platforms like Facebook and Twitter.

Content Analysis: The organization categorizes content by themes—e.g., anti-vaccine narratives, election fraud claims, or identity-based hate—using qualitative assessment. It often quantifies the prevalence of such content, like reporting that X failed to act on 99% of hate posts from Twitter Blue users in a 2023 study, based on a sample of reported posts tracked over time.

Platform Accountability: CCDH tests platform enforcement by reporting violating content through official channels and measuring response rates. In its antisemitism research, it flagged hundreds of posts across platforms, then calculated the percentage left unaddressed (e.g., 84% on Facebook) to highlight gaps in moderation.

Impact Assessment: It connects online activity to offline consequences, such as vaccine hesitancy or real-world violence, often citing external studies or public health data. For example, its anti-vaxx reports estimate economic costs to platforms or societal harm from reduced vaccination rates.

Advocacy and Reporting: Findings are compiled into accessible reports—like "The Anti-Vaxx Industry" or "Hatebook"—with clear metrics (e.g., follower growth, ad revenue) to pressure platforms and policymakers. CCDH avoids speculative algorithms, focusing instead on transparent, replicable tallies of content or account behavior.

This methodology prioritizes actionable evidence over theoretical modeling, though critics, like X Corp. in its 2023 lawsuit, have challenged its rigor, alleging improper sampling or lack of statistical backing. CCDH counters that its work is grounded in observable data, not inference, and aims to expose systemic failures rather than predict trends. If you’d like, I can analyze a specific CCDH report or X posts to illustrate this further!

Let’s dive into a specific report from the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH): "The Disinformation Dozen," published on March 24, 2021. This report is one of their most cited works, focusing on anti-vaccine misinformation, and it’s a good example to unpack their methodology in action.
The report’s core claim is bold: just 12 individuals and their organizations were responsible for up to 65% of anti-vaccine content shared or posted on Facebook and Twitter between February 1 and March 16, 2021. These individuals—labeled the "Disinformation Dozen"—include names like Joseph Mercola, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., and Ty and Charlene Bollinger. The CCDH argues that deplatforming these repeat offenders would drastically curb misinformation, a stance that later caught the attention of the Biden administration.
So, how did they arrive at this? The methodology hinges on analyzing a sample of 812,000 anti-vaccine posts across the two platforms. On Facebook, they tracked 689,000 posts, finding that up to 73% originated from the Dozen. On Twitter, they examined 120,000 tweets and shares, linking up to 17% back to these individuals. The selection process for the Dozen wasn’t random—they were picked based on their large social media followings and high volume of anti-vaccine content, though exact thresholds aren’t specified.
The CCDH gathered this data by monitoring public posts and shares, likely using keyword searches (e.g., "vaccine," "anti-vaxx") to filter content. They then traced it back to the Dozen’s accounts or their affiliated organizations, like Kennedy’s Children’s Health Defense. The report emphasizes raw output—posts directly from these accounts or content amplified by their networks—rather than relying on complex algorithms or platform internals, which keeps things straightforward but raises questions about scope.
What’s clear is their focus on attribution. They didn’t just count posts; they connected them to specific actors, suggesting a manual or semi-automated process of tagging content to the Dozen. The 65% figure comes from averaging the platforms’ shares (73% on Facebook, 17% on Twitter), though this blending obscures platform-specific dynamics—Facebook’s higher percentage likely reflects its group-heavy ecosystem, while Twitter’s lower share aligns with its real-time, individual-driven nature.
The report’s strength is its simplicity: it names names, counts posts, and ties them to offline harms, like vaccine hesitancy, without overcomplicating things with statistical models. But it’s not without gaps. It doesn’t detail how they ensured the sample was representative—812,000 posts sound impressive, but what’s the total pool of anti-vaxx content? Without that denominator, the 65% claim floats a bit loosely. Critics, like Facebook’s Monika Bickert in 2021, slammed it for lacking transparency on sampling, arguing it cherry-picked data to fit a narrative.
Another angle: the CCDH doesn’t explore how content spreads beyond the Dozen. If 65% is from them, what’s the other 35%? Smaller accounts or organic sharing could still amplify the same ideas, diluting the deplatforming solution’s impact. And while they link the Dozen to 58 million followers collectively (per "The Anti-Vaxx Industry" report), reach doesn’t equal influence—engagement metrics are absent.
In practice, this report’s methodology is less about academic rigor and more about advocacy firepower. It’s built to spotlight key players and push platforms to act, not to withstand peer review. The CCDH sidesteps debates about algorithms or platform bias by focusing on what’s publicly observable—posts and their sources. It’s effective for their goal: after this dropped, several Dozen members faced temporary bans, though most lingered on at least one platform.
If you want me to dissect another CCDH report or zoom in on a specific aspect—like a Dozen member’s X activity—let me know!"

They were only our friends while abusing our generosity.

When you give someone money, they will always want more. You can give them money 10 times, and if on the 11th request you say no, they no longer want to be your friend or even hate you. This is true gor individuals, organizations or the state.

Me, every time I get transfered to a customer service center in the eastern hemisphere.

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Potatoes to boil and mash, Stovetop stuffing two boxes, some dinner rolls, and a few cans of green beans/cream of mushroom soup with the French's fried onions for a casserole, two cans of cranberry sauce, and even splurge on a premade pumpkin pie from the deli for $7.99, easily under $58 for ten people.

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Pffft. I eat a better dinner than that on a random Tuesday evening, baw.

Trans Activists: Our goals are still the same. We just need to lie better.

Good!