re: FDR, Pearl Harbor, The “Great Man” Myth And The True Historical Record…

In his later years, FDR was more like a Joe Biden and Woodrow Wilson, in that guy running the ship was nowhere to be found mentally and the minions were running show hiding and doctoring up how great their leader was despite having one foot in the grave.

That why when Truman took over he was pissed at the fact no one told him how bad FDR’s condition was. The minions that helped FDR during this time were summarily fired over time since they withheld information about FDR’s health and wanted to continue doing things the FDR way.

Warm springs would have been fitting.

I'm trying to understand your perspective and opinion on this.

Is it your contention that the US military high command in December, 1941, were negligent or not?

Or is your contention that they were negligent, but, it was understandable or excusable negligence, because no reasonable military commander at that time would conclude that an aerial/naval attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor was feasible?

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The one fact that counters the "FDR knew PH was going to happen and let it because he wanted into WWII" is that there was no guarantee Hitler would declare war on the USA.

Tripartite Pact was defensive. Since Japan attacked, Germany had no obligation to defend it.

FDR would not have been able to stand before the American People and say "yes, Japan attacked us, but Europe is rhe bigger threat and we need to go there." He'd have been run out of office.

Hitler did FDR a huge favor by declaring war on the US.

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We were already in a shooting war with the Germans in the North Atlantic as early as October, 1941. Hitler just seized upon PH as an opportunity to clarify the position.

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but the one person did, and it came out in a book in 1947/8.

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So he was just scribbling away while they spoke and no one noticed?

That never happened.

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Naraxour really not good at this history thing? He took the notes after the meeting and it was found out during the second investigation of the attack, which can also be found in the record of the second investigation.

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You know what a source is right?

Do you care to provide a source to this thing you claim happened?

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Just say I have looked into Peral Harbor much deeper than most historians. like did you know the USS Arizonia was to be refitted an in dry dock on the west coast already by Dec 7, 1941.

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Let's see your sources...

Specifically about this second investigation and secret notes

Go look it up Narax and spend time learning to do research. The Hit on the USS Arizonia by the USS Oklahoma is very easy to find.

The research into the investigations on Peral Harbor is much harder to find and took me near 40 years to run down.

And if you are really good at research, tell me which planes from which Japanese aircraft carrier where to attack which target and why the x height over battleship row on the inside attack groups.

Narax learn to do research!

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nothing happened in November.

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If you exclude the fact that intercepted Japanese communications clearly indicated that war was certain if successful negotiations with the U.S. had not been reached when November came to a close. Again, Naval intelligence was indeed busy throughout November intercepting and encrypting messages that indicated the threat from Japan was building day by day.

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Yes, and no one thought of Pearl.

It's obvious to us now, but that's hindsight.

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Whether the Roosevelt Administration knew that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor at exactly 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian time on December 7th 1941 is of secondary importance to the fact that the Roosevelt Administration were privy to intercepted intelligence that clearly indicated Japan was planning a military strike against Anglo-American forces. This was no idle threat: Japan — a militaristic culture which extolled the ideal that ritual suicide was preferable to dishonor — had demonstrated in the Second Sino-Japanese War that it possessed a deadly ruthless and efficient military.

And the excuse of hindsight simply downplays the Roosevelt Administration’s failures in adequately acting on critical intelligence that Japan intended to attack. The minority report of the Joint Committee effectively addressed the issue of hindsight:

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In extenuation of failures on the part of high authorities in Washington, two statements were often made by witnesses who appeared before the Committee. First, it is easy to see the mistakes and failures made by high authorities but this is merely "hindsight." Second, those high authorities were busy men carrying heavy burdens in their respective offices — burdens so heavy that many failures on their part must be excused.

Undoubtedly, hindsight is often easier and better than foresight. But the exercise of prudence and foresight with reference to knowledge in his possession is a bound duty imposed on every high authority in the Government of the United States by the powers and obligations of his office. By virtue of his office he is presumed to have special competence and knowledge; to act upon his special knowledge, and to be informed and alert in the discharge of his duties in the situation before him. For every failure to exercise prudence and foresight with reference to knowledge in his possession he must bear a corresponding burden of responsibility for the consequences that flow from that failure.

The introduction of hindsight in extenuation of responsibility is, therefore, irrelevant to the determination of responsibility for the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor. The question before this Committee is: What did high authorities in Washington know about Japanese designs and intentions; what decisions did they make on the basis of their knowledge; and what actions did they take to safeguard the security of the American outposts?

High Washington authorities took over so much of the detailed direction of affairs respecting operations of the Pacific Fleet and of the Hawaiian naval base as to limit narrowly the discretion and freedom allowed to the Hawaiian commanders. Having thus weakened the individual obligations of the Hawaiian commanders and having failed correspondingly to provide them with clear and adequate orders, high Washington authorities reduced the responsibility of the Hawaiian commanders in the defense of Pearl Harbor.

The responsibility of the Hawaiian commanders was further reduced by explicit orders from Washington not to do anything to alarm the civil population and that the high authorities in Washington desired Japan to commit the first overt act. In the critical hour from the afternoon of December 6 to 10: 30 a.m. on December 7, Washington authorities failed to take the instant action called for by their special knowledge of Japanese messages on those days which would have placed the Hawaiian commanders on the specific alert for probable danger to Hawaii…

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The documented evidence presented in the official Congressional inquiry into the Pearl Harbor attack demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt that by December 1 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of War Henry Stimson were well aware that Japan was going to attack Anglo-American forces — sooner rather than later. Further, key officials in the Roosevelt administration were actively seeking to provoke Japan into such an attack.

Nevertheless, the Roosevelt Administration did not share the full extent of this threat with their military commanders. Roosevelt further assured the American people that good faith diplomatic negotiations with Japan were still in progress when in fact they knew that the Japan was on the brink of an attack.

Roosevelt could have alerted Congress to the deteriorating state of the negotiations with Japan without revealing the origin of that intelligence since the true worth of intelligence is determined solely by its utility. When policy makers refrain from action out of fear of compromising an ostensibly valuable source, the information obtained from that source is rendered effectively useless.

Finally and perhaps most shamefully, the Roosevelt Administration ascribed responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster to be placed solely on General Short and Admiral Kimmel while effectively shielding senior Administration officials from comparable scrutiny. It was a despicable act of scapegoating.

Putting aside the legitimate question about whether the “Winds” intercept suggests an orchestrated and far larger conspiracy by the Roosevelt Administration to cover up their culpability, it was a gross dereliction of duty by the Roosevelt Administration to not inform the military commanders of vulnerable outposts in the Pacific about the increasing evidence that Japan was preparing a major strike against both British and American forces. At the very minimum, key officials in the Roosevelt Administration were guilty of a gross dereliction of duty.

Now, it was suggested elsewhere that to dare question the motives of the Roosevelt Administration when it comes to Pearl Harbor is in some way an affront to Pearl Harbor survivors. Nothing could be further from the truth: we have a sacred duty to inform future generations of Americans that in times of war, moral considerations often may be eclipsed by calculated political manipulation aimed at achieving foreign policy objectives.

I am repeating myself at this point. So you may have the last word if you so choose.