re: WWII hypothetical: could Britain have defeated Germany by itself after June 1940

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He knew that the longer he held back, the more the Soviets would have time to recover. He did not want to give them that chance so he struck.

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probably someone told him some astrology b.s.

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This was the beginning of Hitler's decision making becoming truly irrational IMO. And it only got worse from there

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I know books have been written and the debate rages on, but Hitler is very likely to have had a number of undiagnosed/untreated (or treated with some whackadoodle, new age crap) mental impairments, not the least of which was schizophrenia. Now, couple that with folks actually trying to kill him, his personality disorder(s), the deference/adulation so many important folks gave him, it makes it almost inevitable, rather than perplexing.

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And not listening to a commander like Guderian was rather foolhardy.

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For example - to call it foolhardy ignores all the other things Hitler got away with. He got away with so much because he was crazy, appeared crazy, and the other side backed down to avoid conflict until it was almost too late. He could use those successes as justification for continuing to be crazy.

This is why he remains one of the 3 or 4 most intriguing people in all of human history.

IMHO, the Center of Gravity for German strategic military success from 1935 to 1945 was located in Germany's economic strength, armaments production, armed forces motorization and access to strategic materials such as steel and petroleum. Questions with regard to operations, generalship, and the operational decisions of said generals were all of secondary importance.

Germany lost mainly due to its poor performance on the Center of Gravity issue. If Germany had "maxed out" and really nailed the Center of Gravity stuff, operational errors and failures could have been absorbed without decisively affecting the outcome.

Speer's book provides a good opportunity to learn about how Germany approached armaments production, and, this book is probably more important to read than any WW2 book concerning operations.

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Germany lost mainly due to its poor performance on the Center of Gravity issue. If Germany had "maxed out" and really nailed the Center of Gravity stuff, operational errors and failures could have been absorbed without decisively affecting the outcome. Speer's book provides a good opportunity to learn about how Germany approached armaments production, and, this book is probably more important to read than any WW2 book concerning operations.

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You have a little mix of right and wrong, here. On the ultimate question, there is an entire movement that agrees with you that war is a logistical exercise in the extreme.

Logistically/economically/industrially, Germany was faced with thoroughbred horses and chose to run the race on a quarter horse. Therefore, it can be argued that race tactics have no effect on the outcome.

However, a handful of strategic, operational, tactical and even diplomatic moves might have nudged it back the other way. The Poland and France operations were beyond successful. Not trapping the British army was the only point they don't score a solid "A." Perhaps holding off U.S. entry as an Allied nation for another year, if he had been more engaged with both us and Japan.

Not delaying Barbarossa by 6 weeks (or, once the SP was lost, push it to 1942). Probably half dozen strategic and operational mistakes in 1941 and 1942 on the Eastern Front. Not adopting the CSA replacement model, but instead fight units out like the Union did. Not committing offensive resources to Britain when he did not intend to invade. Diverting attention to the Balkans and North Africa when the focus should have been on the USSR.

Broader than the CoG issue is this issue of focus. A war should be an 'auto-focusing' process. In a way, the Wehrmacht brought down Hitler by being too good, too early. He placed too much faith in them, then increasingly in Waffen-SS formations, when the war was already lost. So, not only did he lose, he lost much worse than he had to.

Hell - if he had accepted the war was lost before the Allies got into Germany, he might have been able to get a halfway decent agreement. He chose ruin for all of Germany and suicide, rather than face the consequences of his ambition. In a way, he felt Germany deserved to be destroyed because it failed him. He never considered that, in truth. it was the other way around.

Interesting thread, I've been following if all day.

Can you clarify this for those who aren't familiar?

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Not adopting the CSA replacement model, but instead fight units out like the Union did. N

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You have a little mix of right and wrong, here.

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No, I strongly disagree with you that I have a mix of right and wrong. I think you have a mix of right and wrong, not I.

First, Barbarossa could not have started very much more early. The mud lasted a bit longer than normal. Not only that, but, not all of the forces were assembled until close to 22 June. Also, Barbarossa's failure was mainly due to the German military forces being insufficient for the task. Starting the campaign with insufficient forces to win it in 1941 was the reason for failure, not running out of time.

With regard to the German campaign in Russia in 1942, again, Germany's military forces in the East were too weak to attack and beat the Soviet Union in that year, also.

As for 1943 to 1945, it's clear that German forces in the East were too weak to beat or stop Russia.

In you earlier post, you said that Rommel was Prussian. Not so. Rommel was not of Prussian ancestry.

On the question of logistics, I agree with those that say that "war is a logistical exercise". It is. Germany did a horrible job at logistics because they depended on horses for most logistical movement throughout the war. They depended on the German railroad, too, but, even THAT critical strategic resource was not at all mobilized for war operations until AFTER Speer took over armaments and put the Reichsbahn on a war footing.

Germany's forces were too weak to win precisely because of her failure to focus on the Center of Gravity issues in time.

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Rommel was not of Prussian ancestry.

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Of course, Erwin Rommel was born in southern Germany. His mother was a von Lutz. He is of mixed ancestry, certainly, largely Bavarian. I should not have spoken so definitively in lumping him in with the Prussian elites. (Definitely aristocratic in origin, though.)

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Starting the campaign with insufficient forces to win it in 1941 was the reason for failure, not running out of time.

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And yet, they stalled at the gates of Moscow - right before the snows fell - and without all those other distractions (mainly operational, not logistical), it could have been reduced.

I agree with your larger point, and many scholars agree with you - the logistical challenge would have been enormous even if Germany had gone all in. Maybe they were doomed from the start, doubly so because they did not commit the industrial might as early as they might have (LBJ's "guns and butter" strategy?). However, I think it is foolish to say that (you're right about tactics - good tactics can rarely, if ever, cover for failed strategy or logistical inadequacies) strategy and operational errors are of no moment when we can see a handful that could easily have tipped the balance in favor of German victory in 1941 or early 1942.

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Ignorance is bliss

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Guess that's why you're so happy.

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I've seen him referred to as a Swabian, FWIW.

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Yeah, but "Schwabe" is to Bavarian, as Houstonian is to Texan. So, there's that.