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| Favorite team: | LSU |
| Location: | Hoist the black flag, slit throats |
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| Interests: | |
| Occupation: | |
| Number of Posts: | 794 |
| Registered on: | 6/15/2015 |
| Online Status: | Not Online |
Recent Posts
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re: This has to suck for the people planning to retire
Posted by Omada on 11/21/26 at 8:40 pm to beaverfever
quote:
Somebody doesn’t know what a bond is.
A British secret agent who drives Aston Martins, drinks martinis, and bangs hot women. Duh :rolleyes:
With this approach, SPX is -6.05% below Wednesday's open. The max decline thus far is -6.43%, which is the 15th worst since 1994.
I expect Monday, if not next week overall, to be solidly green. If Monday doesn't end green, I suspect it will be due to some people getting out in expectation of a further decline.
Not investment advice and all of that disclaimer stuff
I expect Monday, if not next week overall, to be solidly green. If Monday doesn't end green, I suspect it will be due to some people getting out in expectation of a further decline.
Not investment advice and all of that disclaimer stuff
I expect a bounce tomorrow or next week, but that doesn't necessarily mean a reversal.
EDIT: a bounce I would notice as a trader but not necessarily noteworthy for investors
EDIT: a bounce I would notice as a trader but not necessarily noteworthy for investors
quote:
Was the run up on silver and now the down turn in silver all related to AI? Or is this manipulation now trying to get the price down for institutions.
Silver is highly correlated with gold (0.8+ iirc), and gold has taken approximately the same beating. Neither tends to like high interest rates and strong USD. That's also why foreign exchange rates have become more favorable for USD over the same time period.
quote:
well I don’t think anyone is actually taking that trade and that trade alone but it is illustrative
I would like to believe that, but some sections of retail are looking for a free lunch or low hanging fruit, so I feel obligated to point out the flaws. And if anyone does take such a trade and it doesn't work out, they don't have the right to complain to me because the risks are laid out.
quote:
“trading the index” ticker to me seems a little too much like gambling
There's plenty of alpha in it, but people (overwhelmingly retail) tend to approach trading wrong in terms of mental frameworks and intentions/goals.
quote:
it’s so top weighted now.
It is, though this isn't the first time. If you want to reduce concentration, XMAG, RSP, XOEF, and TOPC are all options, I think (no guarantee).
quote:
right on. that is extremely interesting.
It's still a poor trade, in my opinion. The following assumes no transaction costs or risk management, and the system earned nothing during the lengthy downtime (as a result, Sharpe and Sortino ratios are calculated using 0% for a risk free rate). I calculated multiple Gross Profits/Losses and Profit Factors out of curiosity, but the Profit Factor with a thick border (and the Gross Profit and Loss above it) is the correct and conventional calculation.
Average P/L was calculated using trade results. It is slightly lower than SPX's mean 20-day result of 0.7585% (the closest result to 18.4 days I have), though that has a much lower winrate of 64.14%. Still, you're paying for a high winrate with huge drawdowns that make compounding difficult (besides the obvious rareness of the signal).
I could add a stop loss, transaction costs, and risk free returns for idle days along with calculating Jensen's alpha, but I'm unsure how much it would improve, if at all.

Alright, I have the figures you asked about. Open is the opening price for the day after SPX closed below the 200D SMA, close is the closing price on the day that SPX finally closed back above the 200D SMA, Change % is the change from open to close, Trough is the lowest price during the time below the 200D SMA, and Max Decline is the change from open to trough.
What's worth mentioning is that just 9 of 111 Change % results are negative; the 3 not included above were for single day dips below the 200D SMA and resulted in -0.9671%, -0.1227%, and -0.0672%. That list could be longer if you applied transaction costs since this assumes being able to enter and exit exactly at the daily open and close prices, but any transaction costs of less than 0.25% expand the list to just 15.
Mean return for buying at the open after a close below the 200D SMA and holding until the end of the day that closes back above the SMA (the Change % column) is 0.7227%. The median is 1.3124%. If you took only this trade from 1994 through the end of 2025, $1,000 would have turned into $1,906.40, assuming no taxes, transaction costs, or risk management. However, you would have had a drawdown from $1,503.15 to $842.50 during the dot com crash and a drawdown from $1,344.71 to $605.93 during the financial crisis. Total days in the market is 2,043, or 8.107 years.
Mean and median max declines are -3.724% and -1.2325%, respectively. The standard deviation for the returns and declines is 4.7867% and 7.6488%. Mean absolute deviation for returns and declines is 1.8026% and 4.1334%.
Standard deviations 2.66x and 1.85x, respectively, above the mean absolute deviations indicate that the distribution has heavy tails and/or strong outliers, which should be obvious given the image above and the differences in mean and median. To reinforce that, the standard deviations for positive returns and their declines is 1.0953% and 3.8166%, far lower than the overall standard deviations.
What's worth mentioning is that just 9 of 111 Change % results are negative; the 3 not included above were for single day dips below the 200D SMA and resulted in -0.9671%, -0.1227%, and -0.0672%. That list could be longer if you applied transaction costs since this assumes being able to enter and exit exactly at the daily open and close prices, but any transaction costs of less than 0.25% expand the list to just 15.
Mean return for buying at the open after a close below the 200D SMA and holding until the end of the day that closes back above the SMA (the Change % column) is 0.7227%. The median is 1.3124%. If you took only this trade from 1994 through the end of 2025, $1,000 would have turned into $1,906.40, assuming no taxes, transaction costs, or risk management. However, you would have had a drawdown from $1,503.15 to $842.50 during the dot com crash and a drawdown from $1,344.71 to $605.93 during the financial crisis. Total days in the market is 2,043, or 8.107 years.
Mean and median max declines are -3.724% and -1.2325%, respectively. The standard deviation for the returns and declines is 4.7867% and 7.6488%. Mean absolute deviation for returns and declines is 1.8026% and 4.1334%.
Standard deviations 2.66x and 1.85x, respectively, above the mean absolute deviations indicate that the distribution has heavy tails and/or strong outliers, which should be obvious given the image above and the differences in mean and median. To reinforce that, the standard deviations for positive returns and their declines is 1.0953% and 3.8166%, far lower than the overall standard deviations.
quote:
I don’t trade the SPY
Neither do I; I use futures. SPY doesn't track SPX, which is what I use for the workbooks, the way I want it to due to gaps and such iirc. However, I use the starting year of 1993 for SPX workbooks because it was the year SPY was introduced.
quote:
What information do you have on when and to where it fell when it did not return to the average? Because on the few times it did not, it fell hard
I'd have to run the numbers to figure out the drawdowns, which I can do, but not tonight. I should be able to do so sometime tomorrow.
What I can provide right now is how many trading, not calendar, days SPX took to close back above the 200 day SMA when those instances were longer than 20 days. Over the sample period, SPX closed back above 111 times, and it did so within the next 20 days 92 times. Of the remaining 19, the number of days it took to close back above and the dates it occurred were:
22 3/22/2022
22 9/13/2010
23 7/26/2010
27 1/13/2023
31 12/23/2011
31 9/2/2004
32 5/12/2025
32 8/1/1994
38 3/4/2002
45 10/23/2015
46 2/12/2019
48 3/11/2016
54 6/14/1994
57 5/27/2020
61 10/27/2011
162 11/30/2022
245 3/21/2003
314 1/4/2002
358 6/1/2009
For reference, there are about 252 trading days in a year and about 21 trading days in a month on average. So of these 19, 9 had closed back above the SMA within 2 months, and 6 more did so within 3 months.
quote:
cgrand
I thought you weren't the type to look at common technical analysis mumbo jumbo.
quote:
A failure for the S&P 500 to find support near the 200-day would be an ominous sign. That's how meltdowns start. How we close today is important. The market is clearly under selling pressure. We need to capitulate.
Meh. After SPX closes below the 200 day simple moving average, it had closed back above that same average:
33.33% of the time the next day
50.5% of the time within the next 2 days
59.5% of the time within the next 5 days
73% of the time within the next 10 days
77.5% of the time within the next 15 days
and 83% of the time within the next 20 days
since March 1994 through the end of last year.*
If you could buy SPX at the open the day after it closed below the 200 day simple moving average, the mean returns would be:
0.2067% return from the first day with a 54% win rate
0.4940% return if you held for the 5 days following that cross with a 64% win rate
0.5226% return if you held for the 10 days following that cross with a 61% win rate
0.7526% return if you held for the 15 days following that cross with a 61% win rate
and 1.2925% return if you held for the 20 days following that cross with a 62% win rate
SPX's mean 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20 day returns for 1993-2025 are: 0.0307%, 0.1859%, 0.376%, 0.5678%, and 0.7585%, respectively.
All of this is coming from my own work and isn't available in a clean format, so I can't easily share it, and there may be mistakes.
*I only update my workbooks with new data at year-end, so I am not yet using any 2026 data. The data actually starts January 4, 1993, but 200 trading days were needed to first calculate the SMA, and no cross occurred until March 1994.
quote:
This right here is why you never put too much of your portfolio in a single stock, no matter how promising it looks.
Technically, proper diversification doesn't forbid having one or more large positions. Ray Dalio's mantra for investing is to find 15 good, uncorrelated return streams as an example. I wouldn't recommend 95-98% of retail to try to create such a portfolio on their own, however, because properly doing so requires understanding and calculating a number of metrics to make sure it is done correctly. But it is possible.
Look at the OP's posting date; the thread is nearly 2 years old. The "poster" above you necro'd the thread. I call it a "poster" because their history shows them necroing other threads (not necessarily as old as this one) to advertise. They have other posts that seem more legitimate, but it certainly appears the account exists to advertise through astroturfing.
quote:
your ignorant
:lol:
re: Nvidia Jensen Huang Second affair with an employee
Posted by Omada on 11/11/26 at 5:57 pm to castorinho
quote:
The chess move here is to come out as gay/bisexual
Okay, Kevin Spacey
re: U.S. intelligence finds Jensen Huang had a 'romantic relationship' with a Chinese Spy
Posted by Omada on 11/9/26 at 2:06 am to notsince98
quote:
NVIDIA lobbyists have been flooding DC with money to get special treatment in the name of national security.
Hardly a surprise. Defense/government contracts are how Ellison built Oracle, and Oracle is a major player buying Nvidia's products to build data centers such as, but not limited to, Stargate. Why not use the playbook that works?
re: Aduro Technologies
Posted by Omada on 11/8/26 at 7:46 pm to Upperdecker
What do you mean? You don't trust a year-old X account with a few hundred followers claiming its picks have 3x-10x (one substack claims 133x!) potential to provide you with good financial advice? Next you'll tell me the AI financial guru on the horoscope site won't make me rich, either! :rolleyes:
quote:
This board is mostly about guys without a bunch of equity trying to get rich quick. It has not been about smart money or investing.
It was different about 10 years ago, like Paul Allen said. Heck, it was different before I stopped looking at it several years ago; now, it seems to me like many people are just winging it and getting paid because of no drawn-out declines to make them reconsider their approach.
quote:
It has not been about smart money
It's hard to have such discussions with such a sparsely populated board covering such a wide array of topics. You'd either need a walled garden-type of message board to keep the width and gain the depth, or you have to sacrifice the width for a more focused board or niche subreddit.
I do agree with you, though. Out of curiosity, I ran a search of this board for the term alpha. The first 5 pages of results covered about 1.5 years, and the vast majority of results were either references to Seeking Alpha or posters using a term they don't seem to actually understand.
quote:Then it's actually a hybrid test of some sort. I don't know if it has an actual name, but it's basically a robustness test and not directly a risk test. It can indirectly examine risk based on sequencing and/or the possibility of unfavorable generated regimes/events. I don't think it can create any really novel simulated markets with unknown and rare risks (what a true black swan is rather than how it is used in common nomenclature). To do that, they'd need to use something like a jump diffusion model to create their simulated markets. That said, the white swan is already dangerous enough to show the downside risk.
Jason extracted a price-behavior profile from historical data and fed it into a "restricted randomizer that generates daily changes within this profile to simulate many markets."
Overfitting is still an issue, in my opinion. I've no interest in modeling the full systems, but I have analyzed the basic premise of the systems: buying after a quarter failed to meet a certain threshold. To do that, I gathered monthly SPX data from investing.com from February 1970 through December 2025, created quarterly data from it, and examined the results for the quarter after the previous quarter failed to meet the 3% threshold.
2010-2025: The quarter after a signal to increase position size returned an average of 4.2486%; out of 26 signals in 64 quarters, the next quarter exceeded the 3% threshold 18 times, resulting in typically quick trimming (37 trimming quarters in total). The average return when considering all quarters in this period was 3.1558%.
1990-2009: The quarter after a signal to increase position size returned an average of 1.6216%; out of 45 signals in 80 quarters, the next quarter exceeded the 3% threshold 22 times (36 trimming quarters in total). The average return when considering all quarters in this period was 1.7803%.
1970-1989: The quarter after a signal to increase position size returned an average of 0.7323%; out of 39 signals in 79 quarters, the next quarter exceeded the 3% threshold 18 times (40 trimming quarters in total). The average return when considering all quarters in this period was 2.1498%.
If you changed the target to 2%, the results are 4.5097%, 0.844%, and 0.967%, respectively. At 1.5%, they are 4.567%, 1.028%, and 0.967%, respectively. 4% isn't statistically significant from 3%. 5% is 3.7489%, 1.7767%, and 1.1564%.
If you just bought after a negative quarter, your average returns would have been 4.3981% in 2010-2025, 1.016% in 1990-2009, and 1.3287% in 1970-1989.
If you instead bought after a positive quarter, your average returns would have been 2.7754% in 2010-2025, 2.1918% in 1990-2009, and 3.1007% in 1970-1989.
I know this is nowhere close to the 3Sig system, and these don't reflect its actual historical returns for those periods. But I think, despite those limitations, you can understand that this indicates that the system relies on a signal that heavily depends on the current market regime and does not fare nearly as well outside of it. That's an overfitting risk that could mean lower returns to go with the drawdown risks already mentioned should the market regime change.
Honestly, I don't want your capital or the capital of anyone else on this board, I don't want to manage it, and I don't want to extract subscription fees or anything like that from anyone. I don't have a dog in this fight and no incentive to help or hurt you. I'm not incentivized to maximize subscription fees when analyzing or discussing this or any other system. I just like to provide helpful information to retail when I have the time. It's the choice of retail to take my words of advice or ignore them; I'll keep chugging along regardless.
quote:No. Does something I've typed imply that?
Do you think I’m saying it’s risk-free?
quote:Tail risks, specifically for the 9Sig system and effectively the risk premium of that particular system. From a glance, 3Sig doesn't have the same issue(s).
What argument are we having?
quote:I know; he somewhat addressed that in the original quote you gave. But he was also dismissive about the risk, disparaged metrics and methods to identify and understand such risks, and bragged about returns in that quote.
Your point about tail risk is fair, and Jason actually addressed that
quote:Just to be clear about terminology, this is called a Monte Carlo permutation test, not to be confused with a regular Monte Carlo simulation. MCPT does indeed check to see if one is overfitting or not, while a regular Monte Carlo sim is to model uncertainty but cannot (directly, anyway) check for overfitting. The only danger of MCPT is if it was used to decide which variant of 9Sig to use, which is p-hacking. I'm not saying your post implied they did so, but since I can't see this information, I would recommend you make sure they didn't for your sake.
Roger generated 100 different simulated 30-year Nasdaq-like markets using historical limits for daily gains, losses, volatility, etc., then tested 972 different combinations of 9Sig rules across them -- 97,200 plan runs in total. The goal was specifically to avoid curve-fitting and see whether the system could survive very different sequences of returns.
quote:When you consider the historical backtest, that's natural and expected. Technically they should have created several thousands, or at least several hundreds, of simulated markets rather than just 100 for their testing, but the 100 still presents the problem. And if they truly only ran a Monte Carlo permutation test, all of the simulations are just rearranging historical data rather than creating new hypothetical markets like a regular Monte Carlo would do. Because the actual market data contained those declines, the MCPT simulations will contain similar ones.
Some of those simulations got extremely ugly.
quote:Not really if they didn't do a regular Monte Carlo, and even if they did, 100 unique market simulations is too small for 30 years of market history. That said, you want a large number of simulations to make sure the system survives a wide variety of possible futures, but only one failed test can discredit a system. Since historical data already points to 9Sig's capability of catastrophic losses (even if it can eventually come back), a regular Monte Carlo is unnecessary. You don't need to concern yourself with testing for potential black swans because you have a known and dangerous white swan.
9Sig was specifically tested against severe, randomized, path-dependent drawdowns rather than just assuming the historical market repeats itself.
At this point, I'll just flatly state the problem. 9Sig's problem is market declines lasting multiple years and/or several quarters that drain both its bond sleeve and fresh capital contributions trying to catch falling knives and thus exasperating losses. Outside of that, you're either experiencing shorter versions of that or, more typically, collecting risk premium. It's just not good risk premium when you consider those drawdowns and their effects on the investor.
You will find very few investors capable of sticking to a system when down 80% or even 90%; depression, stress, anxiety, and psychosomatic pains all appear long before reaching those points. And since investors can't control when those declines happen, they can occur at already bad times for some of the investors. Many can say right now that it's the risk they choose for the returns they're chasing, but their tune will change when that risk is staring them in the face.
That's why I said on the first page that I don't trust Jason Kelly. He disparaged metrics and methods that are used to choose systems with good risk premiums and determine exposure levels people can realistically handle because those metrics and methods show the weakness of his 9Sig system. Then he had the gall to say that those metrics don't define superiority, perhaps implying 9Sig's returns since 2010 do. It would have been great if he had just acknowledged the serious risk his subscribers were taking and that he wanted to mitigate that with an improved version, but that's not what he did.
And after saying all of that, I still find the base idea of 3Sig, not 6Sig and 9Sig, interesting. It's given me some ideas to test, even if they don't look similar to that system.
quote:Are you being deliberately obtuse? Every example I gave was them encountering their specific tail risk. It was never me accusing Mr. Kelly's systems of having the exact same flaws as them.
9Sig is structurally different than LTCM or Niederhoffer's plans.
With normal 9Sig, you aren't borrowing money in your brokerage account. You own TQQQ and a bond fund. There isn't a broker standing there saying, "Send me another $500K by tomorrow morning or we're liquidating you."
Jason also built rules intended to preserve buying power. For example, the 9Sig buying-power throttle prevents a single quarterly buy from consuming more than 90% of the bond reserve, and the spike-reset rule can reduce an excessively high stock allocation after a huge rise.
So 9Sig doesn't have Niederhoffer's obvious Achilles heel of market plunging, margin call, forced liquidation, and game over.
We do have actual live stress tests, though. It was running during the February 2018 volatility explosion that killed XIV. It kept running.
quote:
It also went through COVID. During March 2020 9Sig was roughly 36.5% below its target and signaled a strong buy rather than being forced to liquidate.
2022 was the more interesting test where TQQQ lost roughly 79% for the year. By July, after the first half of the bear market, 9Sig had deployed almost all of its buying power and was 96% TQQQ / 4% bonds.
quote:So now you're admitting that Covid wasn't a specific tail risk for 9Sig. You know what I'm talking about, but you're dancing around it as best you can.
Tail risk for 9Sig isn't a one-day crash. Imagine the 2000-2002 Nasdaq collapse.
quote:-99.7% according to this backtest, which is worse than XIV.
At that point 9Sig hasn't "blown up" like XIV, but economically it could get awfully close.
quote:It's called overfitting, and yes, it matters enormously. It's why Mr. Kelly's backtests of 9Sig never go beyond 2010. He could do longer backtests for 3Sig that show it holds up fairly well through the Great Recession and tech bubble, but then he'd have to answer why he doesn't do the same for 6Sig and 9Sig.
Was I lucky? Was the system just that good? Does it matter?
quote:In some broader ways, yes. But I think you know what I mean: a rare event that will blow up the system and accounts that follow it due to the system's weaknesses. I speak of tail risks specific to the system, like February 2018 for the short vol crowd who thought they could just use that as a buy and hold investment, Victor Niederhoffer's 2 blow ups, or LTCM's blow up.
Covid was a pretty big tail risk.
Mr. Kelly likely recognizes that risk even if he seems to dismiss the naysayers in your quote. If it blows up, his subscription money does, too.
Bragging about your high beta approach having high returns in a bull market and that tail risks haven't materialized yet is certainly a choice on his end. I wouldn't trust him, especially after this part:
quote:
Many highly ranked rules-based plans focus on maximum drawdown, Sharpe ratio, smoothness, and such. Those are useful measurements, particularly for risk-averse investors, but don’t define superiority. A strategy with substantially lower return usually looks better by those measures because it carries less equity or leverage exposure.
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